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Foreword
Louisiana is blessed with an abundant supply of water for naviga-
tion, irrigation, and industrial and domestic use, as well as for fish and
wildlife. The economic potential of this important resource has not
yet been fully realized, nor has the destruction resulting from uncon-
trolled water been completely halted,
Louisiana's rice industry has long depended upon an abundant
water supply for irrigation, but in recent years other segments of agri-
culture have also turned to supplemental irrigation and the increased
use of water for other production purposes. These trends toward greater
utilization of this resource are likely to continue, and perhaps at an
accelerated pace.
The legal structure governing the rights of persons to appropriate,
use, and dispose of water is very complex, and niany problems will arise
as water resources achieve greater economic importance. Constructive
legislation may be needed to conserve this vital resource and encourage
its most effective use. But sound regulation can best come from an in-
formed public. It is for the purpose of promoting a better understand-
ing of Louisiana water laws, particularly as they apply to agriculture,
that the Louisiana Agricultural Experiment Station requested the Farm
Economics Research Division, Agricultural Research Service, United
States Department of Agriculture, to undertake a study of the legal
aspects of water use in the state. It is believed that this carefully pre-
pared report will contribute materially toward this objective.
M. D. Woodin and F. L. Corty






Nature of Riparian Rights 15
Ownership of Beds 15
Ownership of Water 17
Right to Use Water 18
Irrigation 20
Contractual Agreements 23
Domestic and Other Uses 23
Pollution 24
Diversion 28
Dams and Obstructions 30
Navigable Watercourses 32
Definition 32
Ownership of Beds 35
Right to Use Water 38
Nonriparian Use 44
Nature of Riparian Land 47
Construing Grants and Conveyances , 48
Shifting Shores and Channels 52
Pollution Control by Public 55
Diffused Surface Waters 59
Ground Waters 63
Natural Lakes and Bayous 67
Artificial Watercourses 71
Prescription 74
1958 Declaration of State Policy Regarding Surface Waters 77
State and Local Agencies or Organizations 77
State Department of Public Works 78
State Stream Control Commission 79
State Board of Health 79
State Wildlife and Fisheries Commission 80






Soil Conservation Districts 88
Sabine River Authority 90
Bayou D'Arbonne Lake W^atershed District 93
latt Lake Water Conservation District 95
Recreation and Water Conservation Districts 97
Fish and Game Preserves 98
Levee and Drainage Districts 99
Federal Watershed Protection and Flood Prevention Act 10
Type o£ Assistance 10
Conditions of Assistance 10
Limitations on Size of Projects and Structures 10
Interstate Compacts 10
Sabine River Compact and Administration . 10
Other Interstate Agreements and Arrangements 11
Appendix 11
Acknowledgement
Figures and photographs were provided through the courtesy c
the Louisiana Department of Public Works and the Louisiana Offid




Of Water Use in Louisiana
Mark E. Borton and Harold H. Ellis*
Introduction
Water is one of Louisiana's most important natural resources and
serves many vital needs. According to a recent report, Louisiana has
an average rainfall of about 56 inches per year, nearly twice the na-
tional average.! But seasonal and yearly variations in this rainfall and
its variations throughout the state cause problems of both water use
and water damage. This is true also of water entering Louisiana from
other states, through the Mississippi and other rivers and streams.
Furthermore, several types of water use have been expanding. It
was reported that:
Municipal use of water increased from lv50 million gallons daily
in 1950 to 242 million gallons daily in 1954.
Industrial use jumped from 1,940 million gallons a day in 1950
to 3,750 million gallons a day in 1955.
Rural use of water has almost doubled since 1950—from 47 to 85
million gallons a day.
Irrigation water also showed an increase, with over one million
acreage feet of water used in 1955—about 2,000 million gallons a
day for a 160-day pumping season.
The rivers, bayous, canals, and lakes are being used more and
more for navigation, recreation, commercial fishing, sports, and
disposal of waste. These are nonwithdrawal uses that are diffi-
cult to measure, but of great economic importance.
Based on records of the past few years, it is reasonable to expect
* Mark E. Borton, L.L.B., formerly with the Farm Economics Research Division,
Agricultural Research Service, United States Department of Agriculture; Harold H.
iEllis, Agricultural Economist, Farm Economics Research Division, Agricultural Re-
search Service, and member of the Illinois Bar.
The authors wish to acknowledge the helpful criticisms and suggestions of a num-
ber of state, federal, and local officials and other persons concerned with water
use in Louisiana, especially (1) Mr, Fred Ellis, who reviewed the manuscript under
the guidance of Dean Milton Harrison and Professor Joseph Dainow, The Law
'School, Louisiana State University and Agricultural and Mechanical College, (2) Dr.
F. L. Corty, Department of Agricultural Economics, Louisiana State University, who
handled publication details and related editorial work, and (3) Mr. Calvin T.
jWatts, Assistant Director, and other staff members of the Louisiana Department
iof Public Works, who provided information regarding a number of projects with
I which that department is concerned.
1 Water, A Special Report to the Louisiana Legislature, by the Louisiana Depart-
ment of Public Works, Baton Rouge, 1956.
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the use of water to be doubled in the next 10 or 15 years. Thij
increase will be accompanied by conflicts of interests and comp(
tition among users.
The 1954 Census of Agriculture reported 6,897 irrigated farms ii
Louisiana with 707,818 irrigated acres of cropland harvested (includ
ing 665,607 acres of rice) Most of the irrigation was in southwesteri
Louisiana. This irrigated land amounted to 136,153 acres more than th(
571,665 acres reported for 1949.^ Streams and lakes supplied somewha
less of the 1949 irrigated acreage than did pumped wells, with miscel
laneous sources providing the rest.
A capital investment of $21,503,040 in irrigation works was reporte(
in the 1950 Census. These works included dams, reservoirs, wells, am
3,477 miles of canals and ditches.^ The irrigation enterprises wer<
classified as follows:
Type of Enterprise' Number Acreage Irrigated
Single-farm 3,584 342,590
Commercial 270 243,588
Unincorporated cooperative 47 15,735
Incorporated cooperative 4 1,574
Irrigation of rice has long been a common practice in Louisiana
More recently, irrigation of other crops and pastures has been' in
creasing, particularly in the northern half of the state. According to
recent survey, the number of farms equipped for irrigation (other thai
irrigation of rice) in 27 North Louisiana parishes increased from 12 ii
1949 to about 466 in 1955, while the acreage equipped for irrigation in
creased from 566 to 39,610. Flooding is the standard method of irr
gating rice, but methods of irrigating other crops and pastures includec
both flooding (31,454 acres) and sprinkling (20,681 acres). Most of thi
2 Not counting irrigated pasture or irrigated cropland not harvested and no
pastured.
3 See Table 21, 1954, Census of Agriculture, Vol. II, General Report; Parish Ta
bles la and 9a, Vol. I, Part 24, Counties and State Economic Areas, Louisian;
(1954 Census) ; Parish Tables la and 5a, Vol. I, Part 24, Counties and Stat
Economic Areas, Louisiana (1950 Census) .
In addition to the 571,665 acres of cropland harvested in 1949, 4,434 acres
irrigated pasture and 676 acres of irrigated cropland not harvested and not pasture
were reported. Similar data were not obtained in the 1954 Census.
4 1950 U.S. Census of Agriculture, Vol. Ill, Irrigation of Agricultural Lands, Par
8, Louisiana, State Table 2.
5 An enterprise was classed as "commercial" if less than 50 percent of the acreag
irrigated was in the farms of the water users that controlled and operated it. It wa
classed as cooperative (or mutual) if it was controlled and operated by two o
more water users primarily to supply water to their own farms. These classification
do not necessarily correspond with legal classifications of enterprises in Louisiam
See Irrigation Cojnpanies, infra.
1950 U.S. Census of Agriculture, Vol. Ill, Irrigation of Agricultural Lands, Defini
tions and Part 8, Louisiana, State Table 2. (Comparable data were not obtained i
the 1954 Census.)
6 Acreage reported by more than one type of enterprise was included for each.
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irrigated acreage was from streams, lakes, and ponds, but the propor-
tion using wells was increasing/
Irrigation is a seasonal use of water. Much of it takes place when
natural streamflows are lowest and when several competing uses, for
instance recreational and municipal uses, may be relatively intense. At
such times, withdrawals for one or more types of use also may aggra-
vate pollution problems.
With expanding uses of water for irrigation and other purposes, an
increasing number of problems and potential conflicts concerning water
use, disposal, and control may be expected—both among farmers and
among the difl^erent segments of the state's economy. Moreover, an in-
creasing need for development of natural water resources may be ex-
pected, such as the construction of dams to regulate and even out
streamflows and provide storage of water for use in seasons of short
natural supply. The Legislature in 1958, in an act declaring a state
policy regarding surface waters and establishing a water resources study
commission, noted that "continued waste, and misuse or lack of bene-
ficial use of surface waters may create critical problems . . ."^
With this expanding activity, it is important for farmers and others
to have a general understanding of their legal rights and responsibilities
in utilizing and developing the various water resources in the state, in-
cluding natural rivers, streams, lakes or bayous, artificial watercourses,
diffused surface waters, and ground waters. Rights to use water may
vary with the nature and. type of the source. They may also vary with
such factors as type and method of use and location of the land on
which the water is used in relation to source of water.
Laws relating to water resources in Louisiana are embodied in: (1)
the State's Constitution, Civil Code, Revised Statutes, and reported Su-
preme and Appellate Court decisions; (2) certain special or local laws
enacted by the State Legislature that have not been incorporated in the
-Revised Statutes;^ (3) Federal statutes, constitutional provisions, and
court decisions; (4) certain rules and regulations promulgated by state-
federal agencies; (5) local laws, such as parish or municipal ordinances;
(6) certain interstate compacts or agreements; and (7) local court de-
cisions not appealed from.
The discussion that follows deals with several features of the appli-
; cable water laws of Louisiana but is not exhaustive in these respects.
7 Wiegmann, Fred H., and Koch, Kenneth A., Trends in Irrigation in Louisiana,
Louisiana State University and A and M College, Agr. Expt. Sta., D.A.E. Circular No.
187, March, 1956. See also Wiegmann, Fred H., General Crop Irrigation in 1955, Lou-
isiana State University and A and M College, Agr. Expt. Sta. Mimeo. Circular No. 179,
April, 1955, p. 28.
8 Louisiana Acts 1958, No. 363. See 1958 Declaration of State Policy Regarding
Surface Waters.
9 It may be noted that L.S.A.-Const. of 1921, Art. 4, sec. 6, requires notice of in-
tention to secure passage of a "local or special law" to be published, without cost
to the state, "in the locality where the matter or things to be affected may be
situated . . ."
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Primary attention in this discussion will be given to state legislatior
incorporated in the Louisiana Civil Code and Revised Statutes, and thfj
reported Supreme and Appellate Court decisions. The laws discussec
herein relate to legal rights of individuals, organizations, and agenciei
concerning the ownership, use, control, or regulation of the varioui
water resources in the state. Except as indicated otherwise, the discus
sion deals with the general rules of law that have been adhered to h]
the state's Supreme Court, in the absence of contractual agreements
prescriptive rights, controlling statutes, or other complicating factors.
Louisiana law has its foundations in the French, Spanish, and Romar"^
civil law, in contrast to other states whose foundations are in th('
common law of England (although court decisions in Louisiana hav<
been influenced in various cases by common law principles followed ii
other states) . While the similarities between the two systems are per
haps as striking as the differences, one major difference must be noted
In general, in the common law, the law regulating relationships betweei
individuals is formed largely in the courts through decisions of thif
judges in particular cases. Any legislation changing this "judge-made'
law is viewed as a modification of this basic case law, while other legis
lation may merely codify it. But in the civil law, the basic law con
cerning relationships between individuals is found mainly in legslatioi*
rather than in case law. Case law has developed mainly to explain anJ
illuminate this legislation. The result reached may be the same unde
either system, but the methods differ. One striking similarity is tha
the so-called riparian doctrine has been applied in various ways t(
the use of water in natural watercourses in Louisiana and several othe
states, particularly in the eastern United States. This has resulted pri
marily from legislative provisions in Louisiana, whereas in other state
it has been primarily a development of the common law, although ap
parently based on some ideas borrowed from the French Civil Code.
The codification of the laws regulating relationships between indi
viduals is the Louisiana Civil Code of 1870, as amended, while certaii
provisions added since 1870 appear in Title 9 of the Louisiana Revises
Statutes. The Louisiana Revised Statutes (except for Title 9) contaii
legislation affecting public law; i.e., the law that governs relationship
between individuals and the State or public. (The Louisiana Civil Cod.
of 1870, Constitution of 1921 and earlier constitutions, and Revise(
Statutes of 1950, with amendments, are all embodied in Louisiana Stat
utes Annotated, which hereafter in this bulletin are referred to a
L.S.A.)io
The primary objective of this discussion is an exploration of som
of the legal aspects of water use in Louisiana, with primary emphasi
on agricultural uses. Water use problems are increasing. In the past
10 For a more complete discussion of the nature of Louisiana's Civil Law and il
relationship to the common law, see Dainow, Joseph, "Introductory Commentary t
the Louisiana Civil Code," L.S.A.—Civil Code, Vol. 1, page 1.
8
however, most disputes in Louisiana arising from water problems have
centered around the rights and duties associated with the disposal of
water through drainage; very few disputes have centered around the
rights and duties associated with the use of water. Consequently, there
has been little authority outside the Civil Code and some provi-
sions of the Revised Statutes for answers to many of the questions
that might be raised concerning water use. Usually the provisions
of the Civil Code are deliberately couched in very general terms to cover
the vast number of particular fact situations that might be presented.
The scarcity of reported court decisions regarding water use makes it
difficult to give precise answers to these questions. In several instances,
only possible or probable answers are set forth.
In any event, as the laws may change and their application may de-
pend on the particular circumstances of each case, the discussion that
follows should not be regarded as a substitute for competent legal
advice on specific problems.
Natural Watercourses
Definitions
Various rights concerning the waters, beds, and banks of water-
courses may depend on the definitions of and the distinctions between
certain types of watercourses. In Louisiana, there are as yet no clear
i definitions or distinctions of this kind for the purpose of determining
rights to use the waters of any watercourse, but certain definitions or
I distinctions have been made in cases in which other rights closely
associated with watercourses were involved, such as drainage rights and
ownership of beds, banks, and lands near or adjoining certain waters.
Bear in mind, however, that the definitions and distinctions that are
applicable in determining one set of rights (e.g., rights regarding beds
and banks) may or may not be applicable in determining another set
of rights (e.g., rights to use waters).
The Supreme Court of the state has never defined or distinguished
between different bodies of water in its few cases that have dealt with
the rights of persons to utilize water from them.^^ yj^e principal Code
11 Other discussions of various aspects of Louisiana water laws include: Walther,
E. P., Jr., "Acquisition of the Right to Use Water." 29 Tulane Law Rev. 554 (1955) ;
Jones, Jerry G., "Water Rights in Louisiana," 16 La. Law Rev. 500 (1956) ; and
Water Problems in the Southeastern States, Research Report No. 5, Louisiana Legis-
lative Council, Baton Rouge, April 7, 1955; revised and published as Research Study
No. 11, December, 1957.
12 The Second Circuit Court of Appeal decided a case in 1925 in which rights
ito the use of a bayou were involved. The court indicated that from the evidence it
[
was not clear whether the bayou was "a running stream." It said, "we get the im-
pression that it is not." The bayou was described as being about 2,000 feet long, 100
I
feet wide, and nonnavigable. But the court did not otherwise discuss how the
i
body of water should be classified, nor did it indicate what difference it would have
[made if the bayou had been a running stream. Jackson v. Walton, 2 La. App. 53
(1925) . The case is discussed more fully later, under Natural Lakes and Bayous.
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Mexico
Principal river basins of Louisiana.
article dealing with such rights refers only to "running water. "^^ It i
difficult to predict what bodies of water the court might consider to b
subject to its terms. From the cases discussed below, it appears thaj
the court may require a flow more continuous than that which wouLi
depend solely on rainwater, that the flow generally be only in one d
rection, and that there be at least poorly defined banks. But none c
these cases directly involved rights to use waters.
In 1904, the court said that a body of water which lay in th
middle of a swamp, forming a part of a so-called shallow lake conveyin
water sometimes one way, sometimes another, depending for its exis
ence on overflow from streams or rainwater, was a mere slough rathej
than a stream. This case involved the question of whether title to cev
13 L.S.A.—Civil Code, Art. 661: "He whose estate borders on running wat(
may use it as it runs, for the purpose of watering his estate, or for other purpose:
"He through whose estate water runs, whether it originates there or passtj
from lands above, may make use of it, while it runs over his lands; but he cannc!
stop or give it another direction, and is bound to return it to its original channe
where it leaves his estate."
The term "running water" is used also in Article 450, included in Appendix, infr
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tain lands was to be decided under the law applicable to rivers and
streams, or under the law applicable to swamp and overflowed lands.
In a 1957 case, the court was faced with the problem of determining
whether a body of water called "the Deer Park Bend channel" was a
"lake or pond" or a "river or stream" within the meaning of L.S.A.—
Civil Code, Article 509.^^ This article deals with the ownership of
"accretions" to soil formed along the shore of a "river or other stream. "^'^^
The court stated broadly that this article applies to "all streams whose
waters have the power to form accretions . . ." It noted that "Generally,
a lake could not have so done because in it there is not sufficient moving
water to form silt to the extent of forming additions to its banks. "^^
The court further concluded that:
In the present case at the present time there is not a constant or
continuous flow at low water around the bendway every day in
every year, but definitely the bendway is not a lake. When it
does flow it is not drainage and the bendway gets its water from
the main body of the Mississippi River. A stream is not required
to flow every minute of the time. In this case the bendway is
characterized by definite banks on each side, a definite bed, a
natural current always downstream with the main body of the
Mississippi River being the source of water supply. The current
is capable of carrying alluvion and of depositing it along the banks.
These characteristics fulfill every possible requirement of a stream
and prevent the Deer Park Bend channel from being classified as
a lake or pond up to this time.^*
With respect to the continuity of flow, the court noted that:
Apparently the language of the article acknowledges that there
is a distinction between a river and a stream. Smaller streams may
14 Hall V. Board of Com'rs. of Bossier Levee Dist., Ill La. 913, 35 So. 976 (1904) .
See also State v. Aucoin, 206 La. 786, 20 So. 2d. 136 (1944) regarding the question
of shallow lakes whose beds were granted to the state as "overflowed land" in swamp-
land grants by Congress.
See "Diffused Surface Water/' infra, for a discussion of such water.
15 Esso Standard Oil Co. v. Jones, 233 La. 915, 98 So. 2d. 236 (1957) .
16 L.S.A.—Civil Code, Art. 509: "The accretions, which are formed successively and
imperceptibly to any soil situated on the shore of a river or other stream, are called
alluvion.
"The alluvion belongs to the owner of the soil situated on the edge of the water,
whether it be a river or stream, and whether the same be navigable or not, who is
bound to leave public that portion of the bank which is required by law for the public
use," (Emphasis added.)
17 Quoting from Amerada Petroleum Corp. v. The State Mineral Board, 203 La.
473, 14 So. 2d. 61, 69 (1943) , which is discussed later. It would seem, however, that
accretions might form along the bank of a lake near the outlet of rivers or streams
that may discharge into the lake.
18 The ends of the horseshoe bendway had been cut across by the Corps of Engi-
neers and the main channel of the river straightened.
This case involved the question of rights to oil royalties on oil taken from wells
located on accretions of soil formed on the edge of the bendway.
The quoted statements are from the original trial court's opinion which the
Supreme Court adopted as its own.
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go completely dry in the summer and resume their flow with the
coming of winter rains. They must still retain their status as
streams . . .
In 1943, the court similarly was faced with the problem of determin-
ing whether a body of water designated as an "Arm of Grand Lake" was
in fact an arm of a lake, or whether it was a "river or other stream" fall
j
ing within the scope of the above-mentioned Article 509. The court'
quoted extensively, with approval, from the trial judge's decision, which
read in part as follows:
According to these definitions^^ we must, therefore, note that
lake does not imply a body of water in which a current flows, but
it indicates a body of water, more or less, stagnant, in which the
water is supplied from drainage. In rainy seasons drainage would
increase, and hence, the level of the water would probably rise
and a current would form. A river is distinguished from a lake ir
that it flows, more or less, in a permanent bed or channel betweeri
defined banks or walls with a current, whereas streams are bodiesj
of flowing water including rivers. A stream, therefore, include;
any body of flowing water.
We have seen that the arm of Grand Lake is a body of flowim
water and in my opinion constitutes, therefore, a stream withir
the meaning of Article 509 of our Civil Code.
It cannot be classified as a river, because it does not possess well
defined banks or walls as are required of rivers, and it cannot ht
called a lake because its waters are not still or dead and th(
waters are not supplied from drainage as is required of lakes.
The Supreme Court did not quarrel with these definitions set forti
by the trial court. It noted that since the parties in the case had agreec
that the water in question "flowed between banks," it might be a river.^
But it concluded that, "Regardless of the characterization of the wate
as a river or merely as a flowing stream, the conclusion reached by th,<
trial judge is correct." Article 509 applies to both. 22
The court noted also that the arm of Grand Lake was 3,960 and 4,40*
feet wide, respectively, at the two points measured, and said:
This width is relatively insignificant as compared to the width o
Grand Lake, and this width between banks negatives the idea tha
19 The trial judge had referred earlier to the definition of rivers, streams, an
lakes as defined in Black's Law Dictionary. (Authors' footnote.)
20 Amerada Petroleum Corp. v. State Mineral Board, 203 La. 473, 14 So. 2d. 6
68, 69 (1943) .
21 It also noted that the arm of Grand Lake "is unmistakably a part of Atchafalay
River by which its waters are solely supplied." Amerada Petroleum Corp. v. Stat
Mineral Board, 203 La. 473, 14 So. 2d 61, 70 (1943) .
22 Amerada Petroleum Corp. v. State Mineral Board, 203 La. 473, 14 So. 2d. 61, 7
(1943) . Accord: Amerada Petroleum Corp. v. Case, 210 La. 630, 27 So. 2d. 431 (1946)
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it is a lake instead of a widening branch or fork of the Atchafalaya
River.23
It would appear, therefore, that the size of a body of water may be
significant at least in distinguishing a lake from a mere widening of a
stream or river for the purpose of deciding the applicability of Article
509 regarding accretions.
The court had earlier indicated in two cases that where rivers
flowed through certain large bodies of water, these bodies of water
were lakes and not merely widenings of the rivers. The large size
of the bodies of water in these two cases apparently was a factor in
defining them as lakes rather than rivers or streams. They involved
the question of whether the state had acquired title to lands adjoining
a navigable lake that had become gradually covered by the lake waters.
However, in the later of these two cases, the court indicated that a navi-
gable lake would be treated the same as a navigable stream for this
purpose,^^ overruling the former case in this regard. Under this view,
the distinctions drawn between lakes and streams in these two cases ap-
parently would not have been necessary.^^
In the earlier of these two cases, the body of water involved was 18
miles long and from 4I/2 miles to 14 miles wide. The river entering the
body of water was 600 feet or more in width and considerably deeper
than the body of water. The river had a channel about 1,000 feet wide
through this "lake," and in high water there was a slight current even
near the shores of the lake. Under such a fact situation, the court con-
ceded that in France, from which the Louisiana Code is largely taken,
the lake would have been considered a mere widening of the river. But
the court held that . . the better view ... is to regard such a vast ex-
panse of water as Calcasieu Lake as being in fact a lake, although a
river empties into the sea through it."^?
In the later case, the fact situation was nearly the same, except that
the current in the lake was even stronger than in the earlier case. The
court again treated the body of water, which was 3 to 9 miles wide and
10 miles long, as a lake rather than a stream.
23 The court also noted that the river's waters flowed "through it ... to again
form a distinct river . . . before reaching the gulf." Amerada Petroleum Corp. v.
State Mineral Board, 203 La. 473, 14 So. 2d. 61, 70, 71 (1943) . In the 1957 Esso
case, supra, the width of the bendway was not given, nor was its size emphasized;
In both cases, the court determined that riparian landowners were entitled to the ac-
cretions rather than the state, which had held title to the bed of the river.
24 State V. Erwin, 173 La. 507, 138 So. 84, 86 (1931); Miami Corp. v. State, 186
La. 784, 173 So. 315, 319 (1936) .
25 Miami Corporation v. State, 186 La. 784, 173 So. 315, 322-323 (1936) .
26 In the Amerada case, supra (at 14 So. 2d. 61, 67, 68, 72), the court noted
that these two previous cases did not deal with accretions and indicated that the
decision in the later (Miami) case was based on articles of the Code and related
legal principles dealing with public ownership of beds, and hence were not decisive
of the above-described question faced in the Amerada case.
27 State V. Erwin, 173 La. 507, 138 So. 84, 86 (1931) .
28 Miami Corporation v. State, 186 La. 784, 173 So. 315, 319 (1936) .
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In view of the two foregoing cases defining certain large bodies o
water, although having some current, as lakes, it might be questionect'
whether the courts would be willing to accept "any body of flowimi'
water" (as stated in the above-mentioned 1943 case) as a definition o
"a stream" in a case that would depend on such a definition. It seem:
more likely that the court would be willing to distinguish between c
river and a stream on the basis of the existence or nonexistence of well
defined banks, but would distinguish between a stream and a lake oi
other grounds than merely whether or not the water flowed. Thus, j
"stream" will probably be defined more liberally than a "river," bu
not so liberally as to include "any body of flowing water."
The court has stated that a river or stream consists of its bed,- it
banks, and its water.^o This would not preclude a distinction betweerl
a river and a stream; for, although both might be required to have'
banks, a river must possess well-defined banks, while the banks of <
stream m.ay be poorly defined.
Banks are defined in the Civil Code as follows:
The banks of a river or stream are understood to be that whicl
contains it in its ordinary state of high water; for the nature of th(|
banks does not change, although for some cause they may be overi
flowed for a time.
Nevertheless, on the borders of the Mississippi and other navi
gable streams, where there are levees, established according t(
law, the levees shall form the banks.
The court has extended this definition somewhat, so that:
The land lying between the edge of the water at its ordinary lov
stage and the line which the edge of the water reaches at its ordi
nary high stage—that is, the highest stage that it usually reache
at any season of the year— is called the bank of the stream. . . .^^
As the levees of navigable rivers are made the banks of the river
by the Code article set forth above, it follows from the above definitioij
of banks that the levees are the ordinary high-water mark.^^ Becaus(|
of the definition of banks, the bed of a stream is that land which i;
covered by water at its ordinary low stage. But even though water i
29 See in this connection 32 Tulane Law Rev. 319, 323, note 20 (1958).
30 Morgan v. Livingston, 6 Mart. (O.S.) 19,229 (La. 1819); State v. Richardson
140 La. 329, 338, 72 So. 984 (1916) .
31 L.S.A.-Civil Code Art. 457.
32Wemple v. Eastham, 150 La. 247, 90 So. 637, 638 (1922) Accord: Seibert \
Conservation Commission, 181 La. 237, 159 So. 375, 377 (1935) ; Pizanie v. Gauthreauis
173 La. 737, 138 So. 650, 652 (1931) ; Ward v. Board of Levee Com'rs. of Orlean
Levee Dist., 152 La. 158, 92 So. 769, 772 (1922) .
33 Seibert v. Conservation Commission, 181 La. 237, 159 So. 375, 377 (1935). Thi
might not apply, however, in some cases where the levee may be located far beyon*
the ordinary high-water mark.
34 Wemple v. Eastham, 150 La. 247, 90 So. 637 (1922) ; Pizanie v. Gauthreaux, 17
La. 737, 138 So. 650 (1932) .
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outside the bed of the stream, if it remains inside the levee or the
ordinary high-water mark it would be within the watercourse.
Nature of Riparian Rights
Unless otherwise indicated, we are concerned in this section only
with rights concerning nonnavigahle watercourses, saving for later the
discussion of navigable watercourses.
The court has fairly recently defined riparian rights to be:
The rights of owners of lands on the banks of watercourses relat-
ing to the water, its use, ownership of soil under the stream, ac-
cretions, etc.35
From an examination of this definition, it can be seen that two
separate but interrelated points are involved in determining rights to
watercourses. The first of these concerns wJio has such rights, and the
second concerns what are the rights. The "who" is given by the defini-
tion quoted above to be "owners of lands on the banks of watercourses,"
and the "what" is given to be "the water, its use, ownership of soil under
the stream, etc."
As a matter of definition, then, riparian rights are limited to those
who own^*^ lands on the banks of watercourses. This is not to say that
persons not owning such lands might not have rights "relating to the
water, its use, ownership of soil under the stream, etc.," but only that
such rights are not defined (at least by the court and, therefore, this
bulletin) to be riparian rights. In the following three subsections, which
deal with ownership of beds, ownership of water, and rights to use
water, we shall be thinking, then, only in terms of riparian rights,
i.e., the rights of those owning lands on the hanks of the watercourses.
Ownership of Beds
It is now well settled by the Louisiana courts that the beds of non-
navigable streams which were nonnavigahle in 1812^^ generally are
35 Doiron v. O'Bryan, 218 La. 1069, 1081, 51 So. 2d. 628, 632 (1951) . The dispute
involved whether a conveyance of land that included "riparian rights" conveyed
title to the bed of the adjoining water.
36 In this bulletin, we shall, for convenience, use only the terms "own," "owner,"
and "ownership" when discussing the rights of persons in and to various waters. It
is possible that persons holding or possessing land who are not the actual owners
of the land may be entitled to claim, or be under a liability to observe, these rights.
Thus a tenant or lessee may "stand in the shoes" of the owner, and be entitled to
assert the same rights that the owner might have asserted. We therefore are using
the above terms as "shorthand" symbols to describe all those persons, estates, and
property interests that are capable of maintaining or defending an action based
on the particular rights under discussion.
37 Brief mention is made, however, of the possibility of ownership of beds by
nonriparian landowners. The possibility of water use by nonriparian landowners is
discussed later, under Nonriparian Use.
38 The date of Louisiana's admission as a state into the United States. See 2 Stat.
701, effective April 30, 1812.
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owned by the riparian owners to the thread of the stream. The threac
is defined as "the line midway between the banks at the ordinary stag(j
of water, without regard to channel or the lowest and deepest part o!'
the stream. (Under this rule, of course, one owning land on bod
sides of a stream would own the entire bed.) The court has said tha
this arises by inference from Articles 513, 514, and 515^^ of the Civi
Code.^2 Apparently it is possible to transfer ownership of the bed sep
arately from a transfer of the adjoining lands. yhj^ possibility of sepl
arate ownership of the bed and adjoining land may well raise a prob'
lem for determining rights in and to the use of waters between thi
owner of the bed and the owner of the adjoining land. This is dis
cussed later, under Rights to Use Water.
The beds of nonnavigable streams which were navigable in 1812
however, may be owned by the state^^ (although the state could hav
transferred ownership of the bed of a formerly navigable stream to pri'
vate individuals after it became nonnavigable) .^^
39 Begnaud v. Grubb and Hawkins, 209 La. 826, 25 So. 2d. 606 (1946) ; Amit
Gravel and Sand Co. v. Roseland Gravel Co., 148 La. 704, 707, 87 So. 718, 719 (1921)
Wemple v. Eastham, 150 La. 247, 253, 90 So. 637, 638 (1922) ; Nattin v. Glassell, 15
La. 423, 426, 100 So. 609 (1924) ; Bodcaw Lumber Co. of Louisiana v. Kendall, 16
La. 337, 338, 108 So. 664 (1926) .
40 State V. Burton, 106 La. 732, 31 So. 291, 292 (1902) .
41 L.S.A.—Civil Code, Art. 513: "Islands and sand bars which are formed i
streams not navigable, belong to the riparian proprietors, and are divided amon
them according to the rules prescribed in the following articles."
L.S.A.—Civil Code, Art. 514: "If the island be formed in the middle of th
stream, it belongs to the riparian proprietors, whose lands are situated on th
sides opposite the island. If they wish to divide it, it must be divided by a lin
supposed to be drawn along the middle of the river. The riparian proprietors thei
severally take the portion of the island which is opposite their land, in proportio
to the front they respectively have on the stream opposite the island."
L.S.A.—Civil Code, Art. 515: "If on the contrary, the island lies on one of th
sides of the line thus supposed to be drawn, it belongs to the riparian proprietors (
the side on which the island is, and must be divided among them in proportion to th,
front they respectively have on the stream opposite the island."
42 Begnaud v. Grubb and Hawkins, 209 La. 826, 25 So. 2d. 606, 609, 610 (1946) .
43 Nattin v. Glassell, 156 La. 423, 426, 100 So. 609 (1924) . In this case, ihe owr
ership of the bed of the nonnavigable stream was not actually in dispute, and th
court did not decide where the title lay. It did, however, find ithat the words in
deed indicated that ownership of certain land was to be determined by measurin
from the banks of the stream rather than the thread, saying, that in a sale of riparia
land, "... the ownership extends to the thread, unless it clearly appears otherwis
that a different purpose was intended." (Emphasis added.)
44 Wemple v. Eastham, 150 La. 247, 90 So. 637 (1922) ; Smith v. Dixie Oil Co
156 La. 691, 702, 101 So. 24 (1924). Also see L.S.A.-R.S. 9:1101 as amended, Ac
1954, No. 443 whereby the Legislature declared the state to be the owner of a
river and stream beds which were not privately owned on August 12, 1910. This :
discussed under Navigable Watercourses: Ownership of Beds, infra.
45 Bd. of Com'rs. of Caddo Levee Dist. of Louisiana v. Glassell, 120 La. 400, 45 S«
370 (1907) . See La. Op. Atty. Gen. 1938-40, p. 705, for an opinion that after
navigable stream becomes nonnavigable the state owns the bed as a private, m
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Ownership of Water
It appears that the waters flowing in rivers and streams, whether
navigable or nonnavigable, are incapable of being privately owned.
L.S.A.—Civil Code, Article 450 cites running water as an example of
a "common thing," the ownership of which belongs to nobody in par-
ticular,^*^ and Article 482 states that common things are not susceptible
of ownership.
In 1910 the Legislature declared the vv^aters of "bayous, lagoons,
lakes, and bays . . . not under the direct ownership of any person" to
be the property of the state,^^ and in 1954 amended this declaration to
include the waters of "rivers" and "streams,"^^ apparently not being
satisfied that the former terms were sufficiently broad to cover rivers
and streams. This declaration, as amended, reads as follows:*^
The waters of and in all bayous, rivers, streams, lagoons, lakes,
and bays, and the beds thereof, not under the direct ownership
of any person on August 12, 1910, are declared to be the property
of the state. . . .
This Section is not intended to interfere with the acquisition in
good faith of any waters or the beds thereof transferred by the
state or its agencies prior to August 12, 1910.
It will be noticed that the statute exempts from state ownership
any waters which were privately owned on August 12, 1910. This excep-
tion would not seem to be applicable to the waters of rivers and streams,
for, by the terms of L.S.A.—Civil Code, Article 450 (supra) —which has
remained basically the same since the admission of Louisiana into the
United States—running water is not susceptible of private ownership.
The implication of the exception that such water might have been
privately owned results from the inclusion of running waters with other
waters which are susceptible of private ownership.^'' The excepting
clause is meaningful when read in connection with the entire sentence.
45 (Continued)
public, property of the state, and hence may "prevent the public from using the
stream for any purpose."
It also may be noted that a recent Supreme Court decision indicates that if
the state had transferred title to navigable river beds prior to a 1921 constitutional
provision (see below) to individuals, the individuals retain good title to the beds.
California Co. v. Price, 225 La. 706, 74 So. 2d. 1 (1954) .
L.S.A.—Const. Art. 4, sec. 2 (1921) contains a provision prohibiting the aliena-
tion of the beds of navigable streams by the state. Prior constitutions had no such
provisions. See Navigable Watercourses: Ownership of Beds, infra.
46 L.S.A.—Civil Code, Art. 450: "Things which are common, are those the owner-
ship of which belongs to nobody in particular, and which all men may freely use,
conformably with the use for which nature has intended them; such as air, running
water, the sea and its shores." (Emphasis added.)
47 La. Acts 1910, No. 258.
48 La. Acts 1954, No. 443.
49 L.S.A.—R.S. 9:1101. The entire section is included in Appendix, infra.
50 See Natural Lakes and Bayous, infra.
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Right to Use Water
I
Although the state apparently owns the water flowing in rivers an(
streams within its borders, the riparian owners have certain rights iij
and to the use of these waters. Article 661 of the Civil Code sets fortr
the riparian doctrine in Louisiana. It reads as follows:
He whose estate borders on running water may use it as it runj
for the purpose of watering his estate, or for other purposes.
He through whose estate water runs, whether it originates ther
or passes from lands above, may make use of it, while it runs ove
his lands; but he cannot stop or give it another direction, an(
is bound to return it to its original channel, where it leaves hi
estate.
(A similar provision was included in the Civil Code of 1808, whic]
evidently was borrowed from a provision in the Code Napoleon, 1804.^^
In 1917 the court indicated that this Article vested certain rights ii
riparian owners, saying:
Rural estates have always been bought and sold here with rel
erence to the streams that furnish their water supply, and to thi
law which declares that he whose estate borders on running water!
51 This provision has undergone a few modifications since its incorporation in th
Civil Code of 1808, which was in force in the territory prior to the state's admissioi
to the Union in 1812. In the 1808 Code, p. 128, Art. 8, it read as follows:
"He whose estate borders on running water, may use it as it runs, for the purpos
of watering his estate."
"He through whose estate this water runs, may make use of it in the spac
which it runs over, but he is bound to return it to its ordinary channel whe
it leaves his estate."
This provision was identical with Art. 644 of the Code Napoleon, 1804, excep
that in the Code Napoleon the following words were added in the first paragraph'
"other than that which is declared to belong to the public domain by article 538'
under the title of the Classification of Property. . . ." See Navigable Watercourses
Right to Use Water, infra.
(It may be noted that the Louisiana Code of 1808, p. 128, Art. 5, provided that
"He who has a spring upon his estate, may use it as he pleases, saving the righ
which the proprietor below may have acquired by title or by prescription." Art.
provided that a prescriptive right might be acquired by a lower proprietor after 3
years uninterrupted enjoyment following completion of works to facilitate the fall c
and course of water through his estate. Art. 7 provided that: "The proprietor o
the spring cannot change its course when this spring supplies the water that is nec
essary to the inhabitants of a city or town. But if the inhabitants have not acquire*
the use of said spring by prescription or otherwise, the proprietor may claim
compensation for this use." However, these provisions, which were based on th
Code Napoleon, were omitted from the 1825 and later Louisiana codes. The redactor
of the 1825 Code noted that: "We have thought it best to suppress these thre
articles by which it was permitted to the owner who has a spring on his estate, ma
dispose of its waters under certain modifications at his pleasure [sic]. We hav
thought it was for the public interest to establish, as we have done in the follow
ing article, that the owner shall be bound to keep the water in its ordinary cours
at the place where it leaves his estate, whether the spring be on his land, or whethe
the water comes from above his own." The article adopted was a modification c
Art. 8 of the 1804 Code and a forerunner of Art. 661 of the Code of 1870. Louisian^
Legal Archives (1937), Vol. 1, p. 71, and Vol. 3, pp. 1983-1984.)
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or through whose estate water runs, may use it as it runs (Civil
Code, Art. 661), . . . and [this provision has] been read into the
titles to all the lands bordering upon all the streams, and through
which streams have run, in this territory, since and before the
State was created, and [has] vested in the owners of such lands
the rights to which [it refers].
Riparian owners also may have certain rights to use the waters of
Qonnavigable streams by virtue of the fact that they generally own the
beds. Article 505 of the Civil Code states that: "The ownership of the
soil carries with it the ownership of all that is directly above or under
it." At first glance, this would seem to indicate that the owner of the
fbed would own the water above it, but we have seen that running water
lis incapable of private ownership.^^ This Article cannot, then, give
52 Palmer Co. v. Wilkinson, 141 La. 874, 75 So. 806, 810 (1917). The case in-
volved an action by the owner of riparian land along a nonnavigable stream called
Coushatta Bayou to enjoin the defendant from exercising alleged mineral rights to
drill for oil or gas in the bed of the stream under a lease from the state. The riparian
landowner claimed that he owned the bed in question or, in any event, was entitled
jjto have the water "free and unpolluted." The court held that he had stated a cause
ot action. The court also indicated, however (at 75 So. 810) , that ". . . the state, in
the exercise of its police powers, and in the public interest, may, perhaps, maintain
ja certain control, or take certain action, the extent and circumstances of which we
iihall not here attempt to define . . ." citing two earlier cases involving drainage and
'improvements for navigation. See also cases cited under L.S.A.—Const. (1921) , Art.
|i, sec. 15, Notes of Decisions, No. 33, with respect to vested rights and the exer-
bise of the state's police power.
53 See Ownership of Water, supra.
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absolute ownership of the water to the riparian owners. But it is pos-
sible that certain rights to the water may be given by it.^^
We shall now proceed to consider the nature and extent of the
rights of the owners of riparian land along a flowing stream or other
natural watercourse, as between each other, to use the water in con-
nection with this riparian land. (The questions of what constitutes
riparian land and of using water on nonriparian land are considered
later.) There appear to be very few clear answers here. We shall, how-
ever, examine certain uses that may be made of water, and certain limita-
tions on its use, so as to provide some indication of the rights involved.
In the following discussion, we shall examine certain water uses from
the standpoint of general riparian rights, with a consideration of legis-
lative changes and programs left for later.
Irrigation—L.S.A.—Civil Code, Article 661 states that a riparian owner
may use running water "as it runs, for the purpose of watering his
estate. . . ." This certainly provides for some irrigation by the riparian
owner, but just how much is not clear.
It may be noted that Article 661 also states that one through whose
estate water runs . . cannot stop or give it another direction, and is
bound to return it to its original channel, where it leaves his estate,"^^
while a section of the Revised Statutes provides that: "No person di-
verting . . . the course of water from a natural drain shall fail to retuirn
the water to its natural course before it leaves his estate without any
undue retardation of the flow of water outside his enclosure thereb)
injuring an adjacent estate. "^^ (Emphasis added.) But it is not ver)
54 A somewhat similar situation exists in the case of oil and gas beneath the sur-
face of the earth. The court has held that these minerals, like running water, are
insusceptible of private ownership, while beneath the surface of the earth and "ir
place." Continental Securities Corporation v. Wetherbee, 187 La. 773, 175 So. 571
(1937) . Nevertheless, the owners of the overlying soil have the right to reduce them
to possession and make them their personal property. Allies Oil Co. v. Ayers, 152 La
19, 92 So. 720 (1922) ; Continental Securities Corp. v. Wetherbee, 187 La., 773, 175
So. 571 (1937) . Under such reasoning, the riparian owners, who are for the mosi
part the owners of the beds of nonnavigable streams, would have the right tc
reduce these waters to possession and make them personal property.
One major distinction which must be noted between the two situations, however
(besides the obvious fact that running water lies above the surface and oil anc
gas beneath the surface) is that in the case of running water the state has declared
itself to be the owner (see Ownership of Beds, supra) , while it has made no such
pronouncement concerning oil and gas. Nevertheless, since any rights granted unde^
L.S.A.—Civil Code, Article 505 would have been granted for more than 100 year
prior to the state's pronouncement of ownership, it seems possible that ownershij
of the bed may carry with it some rights in the water above it.
A possible difficulty which should be noted if this approach concerning ownershij
of beds and the right to use water is valid is the problem created if ownership o
the bed may be in a different person than ownership of the banks. (See Ownership o
Beds, supra.) L.S.A.—Civil Code, Art. 661 clearly gives certain rights to use the water
to owners of the banks. If L.S.A. Civil Code, Art. 505 gives these same rights tc
the owners of the beds, a direct conflict between the two articles might result.
55 See L.S.A.-Civil Code, Art. 661 in Appendix, infra.
56 L.S.A.-R.S. 38:2:18. I
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Siphoning water for irrigation.
clear as to what constitutes such diversion. The significance of these
provisions is discussed later, under Diversion.
In a 1926 case before the Louisiana 2d Circuit Court of Appeal, Ar-
ticle 661 was invoked by a lower owner in an attempt to compel the
upper owner to remove two terraces which diverted water away from
a natural drain into other drains located on the lower lands. It was
contended that this caused flooding of the lower lands. Apparently the
drain was not a continuous stream running from the upper estate
onto the lower estate, and Article 661 was probably not applicable. But
the court said that even if it conceded that it was applicable:
It [Article 661] must be construed with the preceding article^^
and with the rule of construction which has been universally fol-
lowed by the Supreme Court of this State in its application of
the law to cases where one of the owners of contiguous estate has
constructed works for improving and cultivating his land.
The universal rule in this State has been to construe the law so
as to reconcile it with the interests of agriculture; . , .^^
57 L.S.A.—Civil Code, Art. 660. See Appendix, infra. (Authors' footnote.)
58 Chandler v. Scogin, 5 La. App. 484 (1926)
.
It may be noted that p. 128, Art. 9, of the Civil Code of 1808 contained a sug-
gestion that in disputes concerning waters the judges should "conciliate the interest
of agriculture with the respect due to property." However, this was deleted in the
Code of 1825. The notes of the redactors indicate that this was done because the
provision contained "rather advice than commands." Project of the Civil Code of
1825, 1 Louisiana Legal Archives 71 (1937) .
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In an earlier case (in 1885) , where rights concerning waters in i
constructed canal and cross ditch were involved, the Supreme Courii.
indicated that while rights concerning the canal grew out of contractua!
agreements, these agreements did not contradict, and were supplementec
by, Article 661 and certain other Code articles. The agreements relatec,
to the use of a canal that led from a lake or swamp across one sugar
plantation to another adjoining plantation. This canal was crossec
at right angles by a cross ditch on the former plantation. The court
said that the owner of the former plantation could use the cross ditch
for the proper cultivation and development of his estate, provided hf
did not thereby "unnecessarily divert" the flow in the canal or cause
any "permanent injury" to the adjoining landowner which mighii
seriously impair his contractual right to draw water through it, citing
Article 661.^9
These two cases appear to indicate that Article 661 is to be con
strued in cases involving rights to use water for irrigation so as to recon
j
cile it with the interests of agriculture. This would be consistent with
the way in which the preceding article (660) , which deals with drain
age rights, has been construed. If this construction is placed on Artick^
661, it would seem that some form of a "reasonable use" rule would ht
developed within the framework of the riparian doctrine. The best in
terests of agriculture conceivably might be furthered by the application
of some other doctrine, such as the Western "prior appropriation doc
trine," but since Article 661 apparently is a statement of the ripariar
doctrine, it would seem more likely that it will continue to be applied,^'
Probably, then, the right to use water for irrigation from nonnavi
gable streams is granted to the riparian owners; and the water is tc
be distributed among them (at least for irrigation purposes) such thai
each owner might use the amount of water that is "reasonable" undei
the particular circumstances.
There may, of course, be conflicts in the use of water between oppo
site owners on a stream, as well as between upper and lower owners.
In view of the fact that each owner would be allowed to "water his
estate," it would seem that some form of a "reasonable" distribution oi
water between the two would be called for. Each estate would have a
right against and a duty to the other estate under Article 661, and it
59 His principal use of the water was for operating his sugarhouse. Shaffer v.
State National Bank, 37 La. Ann. 242, 248 (1885) . Other questions involved in this
case are discussed under Dams and Obsftructions and Artificial Watercourses, infra.
60 Martin v. Jett, 12 La. 501, 32 Am. Dec. 120 (1838) ; Guesnard v. Bird's Exr's., 33
La. Ann. 796 (1881) ; Ludeling v. Stubbs, 34 La. Ann. 935 (1881) ; Petit Anse Coteau
Drainage Dist. v. Iberia & V.R. Co., 124 La. 502, 50 So. 512 (1909) ; Broussard v.
Cormier, 154 La. 880, 98 So. 403 (1923) ; Bolinger v. Murray, 18 La. App. 158, 137
So. 761 (1931) ; Becknell v. Weindhal, 7 La. Ann. 291, 292 (1852) .
61 This would be in accord with the usual French interpretation of Article 644
of the Code Napoleon (1804) , according to Wiel, S. C, "Waters: American Law and
French Authority," 33 Harvard Law. Rev. 133, 134, 148 (1919) .
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would seem that such a distribution would very likely arise in a situa-
tion of this kind.
Contractual Agreements—Particularly since the Louisiana law on
the above and several other questions is not settled, consideration might
be given to the possibility of entering into voluntary contractual ar-
rangements.
L.S.A.—Civil Code, Article 752 provides that . . servitudes . . .
which result from the situation of places, may be altered by the agree-
ment of the parties, provided the public interest does not suffer thereby."
This would seem to permit alternation of the riparian servitude under
Article 661 of the Code as between upper and lower, or opposite, land-
owners.
Apparently, a contract could be entered into by two or more riparian
landowners located on the same stream to rotate or otherwise regulate
the use of its waters, as between the contracting parties and between
themselves and other riparian owners of the state or public. For ex-
ample, by rotating their use during periods of short supply, the con-
tracting parties would not reduce the streamflow as much as they might
do otherwise.
The effectiveness of such contracts in reducing the danger of being
enjoined by, or having to pay damages to, others who have not joined
therein may be enhanced if the Louisiana courts adhere to a rule of
reasonable use, as discussed above.
Domestic and Other Uses—The right to use water from nonnavi-
gable rivers and streams for domestic purposes has never been clearly
determined by the court, but no doubt riparian owners have such a
right.6* Recall that L.S.A.—Civil Code, Article 661, discussed above, men-
tions use for watering a riparian owner's estate or for other purposes. So
62 It should be noted, however, that with respect to the servitude of drainage as
between upper and lower lands under Article 660 of the Code (see Appendix, infra.) ,
I
an appellate court has held that while such servitudes may be altered by agreement
j
between the parties, by virtue of Article 752, of the Code, such a servitude affecting
I
real estate cannot be altered in such a way as to hold subsequent owners of either
\
property unless the agreement is in writing and is put on record or unless the
subsequent proprietors can be charged with knowledge of the written agreement in
j
some form or manner. Cornett v. Hebert, 31 So. 2d. 446, 450 (La. App., First Circuit,
1 1947)
.
Also see notes 148 and 150, infra,, regarding the execution of access agreements
jand contracts with nonriparian owners.
1
63 Their effectiveness would also be enhanced by adherence to "the balance of
convenience" rule, discussed under "Pollution," infra.
I
64 See Palmer Co. v. Wilkinson, 141 La. 874, 75 So. 806, 810 (1917) . The court
'(apparently has not defined domestic uses other than by its reference in a case dealing
i with a navigable river to ". . . domestic purposes, ad lavandum et potendum . . ."
;The qualifying words apparently mean "to wash and to drink." New Orleans Water-
works Co. V. Louisiana Sugar Refining Co. and City of New Orleans, 35 La. Ann.
1111 (1883) . The case is discussed later, under "Navigable Watercourses: Right to
• Use Water." See also the definition of domestic use in the Sabine River Compact,
discussed later. What influence, if any, this definition might have on the Louisiana
courts, except with respect to the Compact, is problematical.
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long as the level of a stream is not appreciably diminished by the use
for domestic purposes, the use would appear to be authorized by this
article. Where, however, the stream would be diminished to the extent
that lower owners might be deprived of the streamflow, it is difficult to
determine how the water would be allocated—the upper riparian owners
might be granted the entire flow of the stream, or there might be some
equitable division of the flow among all the riparian owners. Probably
the court would follow the French lead and apply some form of the
"reasonable use" doctrine, such that all owners would share in the
streamflow.*^^
The right to fish in nonnavigable streams apparently is vested solely
in the riparian owners. In 1906, the court held that an injunction
should not be issued compelling a riparian owner of lands on both
sides and presumably the beds of certain nonnavigable bayous and
lagoons to allow a fisherman who apparently was not a riparian owner
to use these waters within the riparian owner's lands.
Pollution—There have been a great many pollution cases in the last
50 years. It has not always been clear, however, under just what legal
theory the courts have decided some of the cases.
The authors have been unable to discover any reported court deci
sion in Louisiana where damages have been refused to an injured ri-
parian owner on the grounds that the upper riparian had a right tc
cause the injurious pollution. There has been language in some cases
indicating that a reasonable pollution might be made,^"^ that pollution,
if not negligent, might be allowed,^^ and there have been holdings that
the right to recover damages had been lost by failing to take timely ac-
tion, or because damages were not proved. But there have been nc
holdings denying recovery where, in fact, a timely claim has been
made and actual damages shown. It seems likely that a riparian owner
has a right to pollute a stream as against other riparian owners, only
so long as they are not injured.
65 See Weil, S. C, "Origin and Comparative Development of the Law of Water
courses in the Common Law and in the Civil Law," 6 Calif. Law Rev. 245, 263 (1918)
and Weil, op. cit., note 61, 33 Harvard Law Review, pp. 149-151.
66 Burns v. Crescent Gun and Rod Club, 116 La. 1038, 41 So. 249 (1906). The
Louisiana Attorney General also has rendered an opinion to the same generai
effect. Report and Opinions of the Attorney General, 1938-1940, p. 705. See alsc
Louisiana Navigation Co. v. Oyster Commission, 125 La. 740, 51 So. 706, 712 (1910):
Delta Duck Club v. Barrios, 135 La. 357 and 364, 65 So. 489 and 491 (1914) .
67 Long V. Louisiana Creosoting Co., 137 La. 861, 69 So. 281 (1915) ; Orten v
Virginia-Carolina Chemical Co., 142 La. 790, 77 So. 632 (1918) ; Barrow v. Gaillardine
122 La. 558, 47 So. 891 (1908) .
68 Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Hardee, 189 F. 2d. 205, 212 (1951) .
69 Young V. International Paper Co., 179 La. 803, 155 So. 231 (1934) .
70 Ricou V. International Paper Co., 117 F. Supp. 128 (1953); Rhodes v. Interna;
tional Paper Co., 174 La. 49, 139 So. 755 (1932) .
71 These observations are limited to actions between private riparian owners. The
rights and liabilities of riparian owners to pollute streams as against public anc
state rights are discussed later, under Pollution Control by Public.
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The same rule does not apply, however, regarding the right of a
riparian owner to injunctive relief from upstream pollution. Even though
damages are allowed the lower owner, he may not be able to prevent
the polluter from continuing the pollution. Here the "balance of con-
venience" rule is applied, such that the relative good done by the
pollution is weighed against the harm done, the cost of a cessation of
the pollution is weighed against the advantage of a cessation, the good
faith and exercise of care by the polluter is taken into account, the best
interests of the community are considered, and, in general, the relative
"conveniences" of the parties are balanced.^- And, also, if actual or im-
minent damages are not shown, the injunction will be denied.^^
Thus, a form of "reasonable use" is applied to test the availability
of injunctive relief, even though a "strict liability" test is apparently
applied for the determination of money damages.
We shall now consider in more detail the reported court decisions
regarding a riparian landowner's right to dam.ages as against a polluter.
In a 1915 case in which a lower riparian owner's land was injured
by the negligent pollution of a stream by an upper riparian owner, the
court talked in terms of "reasonable use." In the trial court, the lower
riparian owner had been granted $200 damages for the injury to his
land, and the upper owner appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed this
decision, saying that although the right of a lower riparian owner to
receive the waters from above in a pure state was subject to the right
of upper riparian owners to make a reasonable use of the stream, the
question of reasonableness of the pollution ". , . is for the judge or
jury to determine from all the circumstances of a case, including the
nature of the watercourse, its adaptability for particular purposes, the
extent of injury caused to the lower riparian owner, etc."^*
The court apparently was thinking in terms of the reasonable use
doctrine found in several eastern common law states. (It cited no Civil
Code article.) But the case has been neither cited nor followed in any
pollution case considered later. It stands as the only case in which
it appears that damages were determined by the relative rights of ri-
parian owners to utilize the water, rather than by considering the duty
of one owner not to cause injury to the property of another owner.
Just three years later, in 1918, the court, when faced with a case in
which a chemical com.pany had permitted sulphuric acid to escape into
a drain emptying into a bayou running through a lower riparian owner's
lands such that vegetation and livestock were killed, attacked the prob-
lem on the theory that such a use of property created a nuisance. This
approach resulted in a form of reasonable use test again being applied,
the court quoting from 29 Cyc. 1156:
72 Young V. International Paper Co., 179 La. 803, 155 So. 231 (1934); Ricou v.
International Paper Co., 117 F. Supp. 128 (1953); Clark v. Gifford-Hill Co., Inc., 100
F. Supp. 879 (1951) ; Maddox v. International Paper Co., 47 F. Supp. 829 (1943) .
73 Young V. International Paper Co., and Ricou v. International Paper Co., supra.
74 Long V. Louisiana Cresoting Co., 137 La. 861, 69 So. 281, 282 (1915).
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A fair test as to whether a business lawful in itself, or a particular
use of property, constitutes a nuisance is the reasonableness or un-
reasonableness of conducting the business or making the use of
the property complained of in the particular locality and in the
manner and under the circumstances of the case, and where the
use made of his property by the person complained of is not un-
reasonable, it will not, as a rule, be enjoined, nor can a person
complaining thereof recover damages. But when it is established
that a person is creating a nuisance, the mere fact that he is doing
what is reasonable from his point of view constitutes no defense.
The lower owner was allowed damages for the injury sustained.
Although the court also applied a "reasonableness" test in this case,
it should be noted that recovery was allowed because the upper riparian
owner had used his property in such an unreasonable way as to create
a nuisance. But so long as the same criteria used to determine reason-
ableness under a theory of nuisance are applied to the determination
of the reasonableness of pollution under the theory of riparian rights,
>|
there would seem to be little difference in effect between the two ap-
proaches. Whether it is determined that a certain pollution is unreason-
able and hence a nuisance violating the lower owner's right to enjoy-
ment of his property, or it is determined that the pollution is unreason
able and hence a violation of his rights to the flow of the stream will,
make little difference if the same factors are taken into account in de-
termining the reasonableness of the pollution.
The court had taken a third approach in an earlier case (1907)
where an upper riparian owner had polluted a stream with salt water.
The polluter attempted to avoid liability on the basis of L.S.A.—Civil
Code, Article 660, which reads as follows:
It is a servitude due by the estate situated below to receive the
waters which run naturally from the estate situated above, provided
the industry of man has not been used to create that servitude.
The proprietor below is not at liberty to raise any dam, or to
make any other work, to prevent this running of water.
The proprietor above can do nothing whereby the natural
servitude due by the estate below may be rendered more burden-
some.
I
The polluter argued that this required the lower owner to re-
ceive the stream as it flowed from the polluter's estate, but the court
held that this requirement, by the terms of the article, applied only to
waters that ran "naturally" and were not rendered more burdensome
by the upper riparian polluter. The taking of salt water from beneath
the earth and placing it in the stream had rendered the servitude more
burdensome through the industry of man, and the waters were not
75 0rton V. Virginia-Carolina Chemical Co., 142 La. 790, 77 So. 632, (1918) . '• !
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running naturally from the upper estate. Thus the polluter was liable
for damages for the injury caused.^®
This opinion was relied upon by a Federal District Court of Lou-
isiana in deciding a 1943 case in which waste water was periodically
released by the upper riparian owner (defendant) into a stream such
that fish were killed and the water of the stream blackened. The lower
owner (plaintiff) owned a fishing camp on the stream for commercial
and sport fishing which was ruined by defendant's polluting of the
stream. The defendant was not in any sense negligent, but, rather,
had exercised good faith and great care to prevent harmful pollution.
Plaintiff sought damages and to enjoin defendant from further polluting
the stream.
The defendant argued, as one point of his case, that the injury was
"damnum absque injuria"; i.e., that though the plantiff had been
injured, the injury was not compensable at law under L.S.A.—Civil Code,
Article 2315, under which the plaintiff was bringing his action. The
pertinent sentence of this statute reads: "Every act whatever of man
that causes damage to another, obliges him by whose fault it happened
to repair it; . . ."^^ The court held, however, that Article 660 of the
Code prevented the injury from being "damnum absque injuria," and
the case clearly fell within the broad principle of Article 2315. The
fact that the defendant had acted in good faith and with great care
did not constitute a defense to an award of damages to the plaintiff.^*
pl This third approach, using Article 660 as its basis, would indicate
that any pollution rendering the lower estate's servitude to receive
water more burdensome would give a cause of action to the lower
estate. In practice, this approach could be reconciled with a reasonable
use theory by construing Article 660 liberally to allow a reasonable
amount of pollution, but there is no indication that this will be done.
It seems that any pollution causing injury to a lower estate furnishes
a cause of action.
The question of negligence or fault on the part of the polluter is
difficult to unravel from the holdings and language of the decided
cases. Under Article 2315 of the Code, any act causing damage to a
person ". . . obliges him by whose fault it happened to repair it; . . ."
I
Two defenses which might be set up by an upstream polluter to escape
liability for injuries caused to downstream owners by his act of pollution
are (1) that his act was done with care and good faith and hence is
not caused by "fault" under the article, and (2) that he either has a
right to use the stream as he has, or that the lower owner has no
t
I
76 McFarlain v. Jennings-Heywood Oil Syndicate, 118 La. 537, 43 So. 155 (1907) . Also
I
see Barrow v. Gaillardine, 122 La. 558, 47 So. 891 (1908) where the court held
I
that the owner of an upper estate could not allow sugarhouse slops to drain into
i
a bayou under authority of L.S.A.—Civil Code, Article 660.
I




78 Maddox v. International Paper Co., 47 F. Supp. 829, 831 (1943)
.
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legal right to the pure flow of the stream, and hence the "act" is out-
side the scope of the article.
In the 1915 "reasonable use" case and the 1918 "nuisance" case,
the court apparently accepted the second defense as valid, even though
in both cases the particular facts prevented it from operating. The 1907
case and the 1951 Federal court case would deny the validity of the
second defense, on the grounds that Article 660 of the Code sets up
a legal duty compelling the upper riparian not to further burden the
servitude due by the lower estate by polluting the stream. The Federal
court case also denied the validity of the first defense, although no
grounds were assigned for the denial.
The first defense, hinging on the issue of "fault," apparently is of no
avail so long as there is a duty owed by the riparian owner to the lower
owners not to pollute a stream to the extent that injury is caused the
lower owners. It is here that the court's interpretation of Article 660
seems incompatible with its language concerning "reasonableness." It
seems that Article 660 creates a duty not to make the servitude more
burdensome, while in certain circumstances, a reasonableness test
would of necessity allow the upper ow^ner to make the servitude more
burdensome.
It seems that Article 660 has won out, for the more recent pollution
cases appear to have established that the downstream riparian owner
can recover when he can prove damages and show that the actions of
the polluter caused these damages. The only possible exception to
this rule that the writers have discovered is the case of Phillips Petro-
leum Co, V. Hardee, in which a United States Court of Appeals indi-
cated that negligence on the part of the polluter must be shown. But as
the point, which the court was called upon to decide, concerned an
interpretation of the Louisiana law applicable to the liability of joint
wrongdoers, perhaps a great deal of weight should not be attached to
this, particularly in view of the holdings by the Louisiana courts allow-
ing damages even when great care has been shown.
Diversion—"Diversion" as used here means the changing of the
course of a stream, either wholly or partially from its natural course into
a different channel. .L.S.A.—Civil Code, Article 661 provides that: "He
through whose estate water runs . . . may make use of it while it runs
over his lands; but he cannot stop or give it another direction, and is
79 Williams v. Pelican Natural Gas Co., 187 La. 462, 175 So. 28 (1937); Greer
V. Pelican Natural Gas Co., 163 So. 431 (La. App. 1935) ; Bilbray v. Pelican Natural
Gas Co., 163 So. 433 (La. App. 1935) ; Young v. International Paper Co,, 179 La.
803, 155 So. 231 (1934) ; Rhodes v. International Paper Co., 174 La. 49, 139 So.
755 (1932); Ricou v. International Paper Co., 117 F. Supp. 128 (1953); Connell v.
International Paper Co., 99 F. Supp. 699 (1951) ; Clark v. Gifford-Hill Co., 100 F.
Supp. 879 (1951) ; Busby v. International Paper Co., 86 F. Supp. 603 (1949) ; Mad-
dox V. International Paper Co., 47 F. Supp. 829 (1943) ; White v. Edgerly Petroleum
Co., 4 La. App. 20 (1925) .
80 189 F. 2d. 205, 212 (1951)
.
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bound to return it to its original channel, where it leaves his estate.^^
This statement is somewhat ambiguous, for the prohibition against
giving water another direction would seem to prohibit diversion while
the mandate to return the water to its "original channel" seems to
imply that it might be taken from its natural channel for a time. Per-
haps, however, the implication is only that water might be withdrawn
from the stream, rather than that the course of the stream might be
changed; thus authorizing withdrawal and not diversion. Or perhaps
what is meant is that the entire flow cannot be given another direction,
or diverted, but that a partial diversion would be allowed so long as
a certain flow is left in the original channel, and the diverted water
is returned to the channel.
In any case, the Legislature has indicated that diversion under
certain circumstances will be allowed by the following statute:
"No person diverting . . . the course of water from a natural drain
shall fail to return the water to its natural course before it leaves his
estate without any undue retardation of the flow of water outside
his enclosure thereby injuring an adjacent estate." Penalty is provided
for violation.^2
It is not clear what the courts might hold in a situation in which
a stream is diverted for purposes of water use rather than drainage. It
would seem that if the diverter returns the stream to its original chan-
nel where it leaves his estate, without undue retardation, the diversion
would be allowed, as probably the lower owner would not ordinarily be
injured. At the other extreme, if the diverter changes the course of the
entire stream so that it flows from his estate onto the lands of a person
different from the one who would have received the waters in their
natural course, it would seem that the owner deprived of the waters
might complain of this deprivation. Whether he would have to show
actual or impending damage to maintain a cause of action is difficult to
determine, but it would seem from the Civil Code that he would be
entitled to the flow as a servitude,^^ and should not be required to show
damages.
Between the two extremes of diversion lie the situation in which
the upper owner might divert a portion of the stream, allowing the
rest to flow in its natural channel; and that in which he diverts the
waters onto lands owned by the same person who would have received
the stream in its natural channel, but not at the point at which they
would enter naturally. Prediction of the legal results of such actions
would be difficult to make with any assurance of accuracy. But there is
81 This article provides also that "He whose estate borders on running water may
use it as it runs, for the purpose of watering his estate, or for other purposes." See
Appendix, infra.
82 L.S.A.-R.S. 38:218. This section provides for a fine of $25 to $100 and/or im-
prisonment for 10 to 30 days.
83 See Nature of Riparian Rights: Right to Use Water, supra.
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some indication from an 1885 court decision,^* discussed above under
Irrigation, that some kind of reasonable use rule may apply at least
in the former type of case.
The above discussion has dealt with diversion of waters by an owner
through whose lands the stream runs. In such a situation, there are
(no rights of an opposite owner to consider. When a riparian owner
diverts water from a bordering stream, such that an opposite owner
is affected, a different situation is presented. For even though all the
water diverted is returned farther downstream, the opposite owner
may be adversely affected. There is little on which to base an opinion
as to the relative rights of the riparian owners in such a case. Article 661
of the Code would seem to indicate that a complete diversion of a
stream by one owner would violate the servitude due the opposite
owner created by the Article. Perhaps a partial diversion of the stream
would be allowed, particularly if the "interests of agriculture" would
be served by such diversion. A great deal would depend upon how
strictly the court would interpret the servitude of Article 661. It seems
probable that some form of reasonableness test would be applied in
situations such as that indicated earlier under the discussion of Irri-
gation.^^ J
Dams and Obstructions—There have been a number of decided
cases in which the lower owner has obstructed a stream in such a way
that the upper owners are damaged by the waters that are backed up
or by the lack of proper drainage.
Article 660 of the Civil Code provides, among other things, that:
The proprietor below is not at liberty to raise any dam, or to
make any other work, to prevent this running of water.
The court has consistently regarded this provision as prohibiting
any obstruction of a natural stream that damages the upper owner by.
hindering the natural drainage of his lands,^^ unless the upper owner
has long acquiesced in the arrangement,^^ or the parties have agreed
to such obstruction and alteration of the drainage,^^ or the parties had
acquired their lands from a person who owned both their properties
84 Shaffer v. State National Bank, 37 La. Ann. 242, 248 (1885) .
8-^ See Planiol, Marcel, Treatise on the Civil Law, 12th Ed., Translation by the
Louisiana State Law Institute (1959), Vol. 1, No. 2419, for a French interpretation
of Art. 664, Code Napoleon 1804, from which Art. 661 of the Louisiana Civil Code
was evidently borrowed.
86 Hooper v. Wilkinson, 15 La. Ann. 497 (1860) ; Darby v. Miller, 6 La. Ann. 645
(1851) ; Herbert v. Hudson and Lamberth, 13 La. 54 (1839) ; Petit Anse Coteau
drainage Dist. v. Iberia & V. R. Co., 124 La. 502, 50 So. 512 (1909) ; Vidrine v. Guil-
lory, 3 La. App. 462 (App. 1925) .
87 Becknell v, Weindhal, 7 La. Ann. 291 (1852) .
88 Guillory v. Fontenot, 170 La. 345, 127 So. 746 (1930) ; Barrilleaux v. Delaune,
176 La. 377, 145 So. 776 (1933) ; Elam v. Cortinas, 219 La. 406, 53 So. 2d. 146 (1951) .
See also Robertson v. Lebermuth, 132 La. 318, 61 So. 388 (1913) .
,
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and had changed the natural drainage prior to the disposition of the
parcels.s^
In a very early case (in 1826) in which a lower riparian owner had
constructed a milldam in such a way that the impounded water pre-
vented a prior milldam upstream from being used, the court applied
the Spanish Civil Law (Par. 3, title 32, law 18) , which specifically pro-
vided that a man could not erect a mill near another so as to obstruct
the current of water to that previously erected. This case was cited
as authority by the court in a 1921 case in which a riparian owner was
allowed damages for injury caused by floodwaters backed up because
a railroad had partially obstructed the river downstream.
The court has recently taken a more direct approach in a case in
which the damage caused was not brought about by an interference
with drainage but by actual flooding caused by the obstruction. Under
L.S.A.—Civil Code, Article 2315, which provides that: "Every act . . .
that causes damage to another, obliges him by whose fault it hap-
pened to repair it . . .", a person building a "cofferdam" in a stream
was required to compensate a person injured by the flooding of his
land by waters backed up by the dam.®^
In any event, it seems that, unless there is some form of agreement to
the contrary between the parties,^^ ^ny obstruction of a natural non-
navigable watercourse which causes water damage to another is ac-
tionable.
There have been no reported court decisions involving the right
of an upper riparian owner to dam or obstruct a nonnavigable stream
so as to cause the natural flow of the stream to be hindered, diminished,
or stopped entirely and thereby reduce or cut off the flow which
t would benefit those below. Article 661 of the Code specifically provides
\
that a riparian owner "cannot stop" a stream. Whether this means
I
that he cannot diminish or partially obstruct the flow, or only that
I
he cannot stop it completely, is not entirely clear. It is possible that
the courts would interpret this provision in the interests of agriculture
to allow a reasonable obstruction, but what this might be in any par-
ticular case is difficult to say.^*
A case in 1885 involved the damming of an artificial canal so as
to obstruct its flow which was used by an adjoining plantation. The
court said a contractual agreement governed its use but that the
contract was in accord with Articles 660, 661, and certain other Code
89 Hebert v. Champagne, 144 La. 659, 81 So. 217 (1919) ; Rodriguez v. Prevost,
' 129 La. 940, 57 So. 276 (1912)
.
90 Boatner v. Henderson, 5 Mart. (N.S.) 186 (La. 1826) .
I
91 Miller v. Texas & P. Ry. Co., 148 La. 936, 88 So. 123 (1921) .
;
92 Magee v. Texas Construction Co., 227 La. 32, 78 So. 2d. 500 (1955) . Also see
note 77, supra.
93 Or perhaps certain other extenuating circumstances such as those mentioned
above in text at notes 87 to 89.
94 Recall earlier discussions of reasonable use rule in considering extent of permis-
sible irrigation under Article 661. See Irrigation, supra.
31
articles. It said that these articles, "are to the effect that the owner of the
estate which owes the servitude, can do nothing tending to diminish its
use, or to make it more inconvenient." It concluded that the dams in-
volved, "were illegal obstructions, and that the plaintiff cannot be
required to endure them, unless for a time in cases of unavoidable ne-
cessity . . While the court adhered to a rather strict rule of liability,
it based this on rules adopted in earlier cases that were not directly in
point. At any rate, as the case involved an artificial canal and apparently
could have been decided by the terms of the contract, it is problematical
whether it would be given much weight regarding the above question
concerning the proper construction of the words "cannot stop" in Ar-
ticle 661.»5
It may be noted also that legislation provides that: "No person di-
verting or impeding the course of water from a natural drain shall fail
to return the water to its natural course before it leaves his estate
without undue retardation of the flow of water outside his enclosure
thereby injuring an adjacent estate." Violators may be fined and/or im-
prisoned.96
Another statute provides that no person shall willfully obstruct
natural drainage creeks, bayous, or small rivers, "or any public or
private drainage." Violation of this statute provides for a fine of from
$25 to $100, and costs. In default of payment, imprisonment is provided




Watercourses may be classified as to their navigability. In Louisi-
ana a river or stream is navigable in law when it is navigable in fact.^^ In
determining whether it is navigable in fact, the court has applied the
general rule followed by the United States Supreme Court in a case
in 1874 (87 U.S. 430, 441) as follows:
The capability of use by the public for purposes of transportation
and commerce affords the true criterion of the navigability of a
river, rather than the extent and manner of that use. If it be
capable in its natural state of being used for purposes of commerce!
ij
li
95 Shaffer v. State National Bank, 37 La. Ann. 242 (1885) . The case is discussed
more fully under Artificial Watercourses, infra.
96 L.S.A.-R.S. 38:218. Also see note 82, supra.
97 L.S.A.-R.S. 38:215. In addition, R.S. 38:214 provides that no person shal|
dump or discharge any materials which might interfere with the drainage into an^|
waters or drains. Violation of the statute calls for a fine of from $25 to $300.
i
98 State V. Jefferson Island Salt Mining Co., 183 La. 304, 163 So. 145 (1935) ; Stat(| .
V. Sweet Lake Land & Oil Co., 164 La. 240, 113 So. 833 (1927) ; McClusky v. Merau>:
& Nunez, 186 So. 117, 120 (App. 1939). Particularly for purposes of determining bec^ i(
ownership, the court has considered whether the water involved was navigable ai 'ti
the time of the state's admission to the Union. See Ownership of Beds and Natural
Lakes and Bayous, infra. I '8
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Watercourses which are navigable in fact are classified as navigable in law.
no matter in what mode the commerce may be conducted, it is
navigable in fact, and becomes in law a public river or highway.^^
The Louisiana court has indicated that the capacity of a watercourse
for some commercial use, even though not actually so used, may be
99 State V. Jefferson Island Salt Mining Co., 183 La. 304, 163 So. 145, 150 (1935).
Accord: State v. Capdeville, 146 La. 94, 83 So. 421 (1919) ; Transcontinental Petro-
leum Corp. V. Texas Co., 209 La. 52, 24 So. 2d. 248, 253 (1945) ; Delta Duck Club v.
Barrios, 135 La. 357, 65 So. 489, "490 (1914) ; Delta Duck Club v. Barrios, 135 La.
364, 65 So. 491 (1914) .
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considered. While some reported decisions include the above-quoted
reference to the "natural state" of a stream, the court in one case de-
cided that a stream was nonnavigable partly on the grounds that it
. . could not be made navigable by dredging and clearing the
stream, . . ." at least without incurring great expense.
In one case, the court quoted approvingly from a Massachusetts
case as follows: "It is not every small creek in which a fishing skiff or
gunning canoe can be made to float at high water which is deemed
navigable, ... it must be generally and commonly useful to some pur-
pose of trade or agriculture." The court added: "It implies the possibil-
ity of transporting men and things. "^^^
In another case, the court concluded that a stream could be con-
sidered navigable notwithstanding that ". . . its free navigation may
be at times encompassed with difficulties by reason of natural barriers
such as rapids and sandbars or accumulations of timber . . ."^^^
The court has said that the question of navigation is one of fact,
depending upon the evidence in each case.i°^ Evidence considered in one
case where a stream was held to be nonnavigable included (1) the lack
of any actual use of the stream by any water craft for the purpose of
commerce, although small boats with detachable gasoline engines used
it occasionally, (2) the treatment by the United State Government of
100 State V. Jefferson Island Salt Mining Co., State v. Capdeville, and Transconti-
nental Petroleum Corp. v. Texas Co., supra.
101 Bodcaw Lumber Co. v. Kendall, 161 La. 337, 108 So. 664, 665-666 (1926) .
Some later Federal decisions also have considered the possibility of artificial im-
provements. See United States v. Appalachian Power Co., 311 U.S. 377, 407-409 (1940)
so holding in a case involving the licensing by the Federal Power Commission of a
hydroelectric dam. The court said that navigability, for the purpose of the regula-
tion of commerce, may arise after the admission to statehood. "In determining
the navigable character of New River it is proper to consider the feasibility of
interstate use after reasonable improvements which might be made." The court
also said, "There must be a balance between cost and need at a time when the
improvement would be useful." (Cited in dissenting opinion in State v. Aucoin, 206
La. 786, 20 So. 2d. 136, 160 (1944) .
It may be noted that Federal legislation cited in the above Federal case, whidh
gives the Federal Power Commission certain licensing powers, defines "navigable
waters" for this purpose as bodies of water which in their "natural or improved
condition" are "used or suitable for use" for transporting persons or property in
interstate or foreign commerce, notwithstanding that they may be interrupted by
"falls, shallows, or rapids compelling land carriage." See 16 U.S.C.A. sec. 796 (8) .
Also see Laurent, Francis W., "Judicial Criteria of Navigability in Federal Cases,"
1953 Wisconsin Land Review No. 1, p. 8, to the effect that somewhat different cri-
teria have been followed for different purposes.
102 Burns v. Crescent Gun and Rod Club, 116 La. 1038, 41 So. 249, 251 (1906).
103 Goodwill V. Police Jury of Bossier Parish, 38 La. Ann. 752, 755 (1886) . But
in Egan v. Hart, 45 La. Ann. 1358, 14 So. 244 (1893) , the court held the upper part
of a bayou to be nonnavigable which dried up and became ". . . choked with rafts
and filled with sand, reefs, etc . . ." at many places each summer. See 30 Tulane
Law Rev. 332 (1956) regarding tests of navigability.
104 State V. Capdeville, 146 La. 94, 83 So. 421, 425 (1919) ; Cert. den. Atchafalaya
Land Co. v. Capdeville, 40 S. Ct. 346, 252 U.S. 581, 64 L. Ed. 1011 (1920) .
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the stream as nonnavigable, as shown by its authorization of the con-
struction of stationary bridges across it, (3) the fact that it was narrow,
filled with sand, gravel bars, stumps and logs, and had a fall of from
21/2 to 5 feet to the mile, and, if cleaned out, its current would have
been a torrent, (4) the considerable rise and fall of the stream, in a
few hours, and (5) the depth of the waters at average stage. ^O'^
The question of use by small boats vs. other uses of streams classi-
fied as nonnavigable under the above-described test has not been
directly in issue in any case that has come to the authors' attention.
The Supreme Court has said in one case that streams might be "float-
able streams" serving as highways for the transportation of logs and
other property.106 This concept of "floatable streams" perhaps intro-
duces a third class of watercourse to the normal classification of navi-
gable and nonnavigable watercourses. The court said that persons other
than the riparian owner might have rights in such a class of streams,
but did not spell out what these rights might be. Apparently a riparian
owner might be required to allow other persons (at least other riparian
owners) to use the stream for the transportation of logs and other
property.
The language used by the court as to floatable streams, however,
was not necessary for a decision of the case under consideration and
must be considered as m.erely an incidental statement, not carrying
the full authority of the actual holding in the case. Moreover, not
only has the language never been adopted by the court in any later de-
cision (the case was decided in 1917), but the writers have been un-
able to discover any other mention of the concept of "floatable streams"
i in any reported appellate or Louisiana Supreme Court decision. Under
" these circumstances, it cannot be definitely said that the concept of
I
"floatable streams" is accepted in Louisiana. At present, it seems that
the only classes of watercourses that have legal significance are those
which are and those which are not navigable.
' Ownership of Beds
The basic rule concerning the ownership of the beds of navigable
rivers and streams is that the state owns all lands lying beneath the
navigable waters, between the normal low watermarks. (The Supreme
Court has indicated that title to the beds of navigable rivers, streams,
105 Amite Gravel and Sand Co. v. Roseland Gravel Co., 148 La. 704, 87 So. 718,
i7i9 (1921). See also State v. Capdeville, 146 La. 94, 83 So. 421 (1919);
Transcontinental Petroleum Corp. v. Texas Co., 209 La. 52, 24 So. 2d. 248, 253
. (1945) , where the width, depth, and location of the waters were considered.
106 Palmer Co. v. Wilkinson, 141 La. 874, 75 So. 806, 810 (1917) .
107 L.S.A.—R.S. 38:291 provides that any artificial waterway created by any levee
' district, where the waterway is navigable in fact and connects with any navigable
water, may be dedicated by the levee district as a waterway subject to free and un-
restricted navigation by the public. See Artificial Watercourses, infra, for a brief
discussion of navigation canals.
108 State v. Richardson, 140 La. 329, 72 So. 984, 991 (1916) ; State v. Capdeville,
146 La. 94, 83 So. 421, 425 (1919) ; Wemple v. Eastham, 150 La. 247, 90 So. 637 (1922) ;
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and lakes was acquired by the state on its admission to the Union by
virtue of its sovereignty^"'*) This land cannot now be transferred to
}3rivate ownership by the state, as the Louisiana Constitution of 1921
provides:
Nor shall the Legislature alienate, or authorize the alienation of
the fee of the bed of any navigable stream, lake or other body
of water, except for purposes of reclamation.^^"
Prior to 1921, however, there was no Constitutional limitation on
the power of the Legislature to alienate the beds of navigable waters,
and it was within the Legislature's power to issue patents to these
lands. A 1912 act provides that actions to annul any patent issued by
the state, and duly signed and recorded in the prescribed manner, must
be brought within 6 years reckoned from the day of the issuance of
the patent or the passage of the act.^^^ In 1954, the court held that,
108 (Continued)
Smith V. Dixie Oil Co., 156 La. 691, 702, 101 So. 124 (1924); Pizanie v. Gauthreaiix,
173 La. 737, 741, 138 So. 650 (1931).
Moreover, the public has riglits to use certain lands lying along a navigable
river for certain purposes connected witli navigation or the making or repairing of
levees, etc. See e.g., L.S.A.—C.C. Arts. 455 and 665; and other statutes and consti-
tutional provisions as discussed in Delaune v. Bd. of Comm'rs, Pontchartrain Levee
Dist., 230 La. 117, 87 So. 2d. 749 (1956); Hebert v. James and Co., 224 La. 498, 70
So. 2d. 102, (1954) ; Bd. of Comm'rs, Pontchartrain Levee Dist. v. Baron, 236 La. 846,
109 So. 2d 441 (1959) . Among other things, these cases discuss L.S.A.-Const. 1921, Art.
16, sec. 6 regarding compensation for property used or destroyed for levees or
levee drainage purposes.
109 Transcontinental Petroleum Corp. v. Texas Co., 209 La. 52, 24 So. 2d. 248,
253 (1945). See also Smith v. Dixie Oil Co., 156 La. 691, 101 So. 24 (1924); State
V. Bozeman, 156 La. 635, 101 So. 4 (1924); Ellerbe v. Grace, 162 La. 846, 111 So.
185 (1927) ; State v. Erwin, 173 La. 507, 138 So. 84 (1931) ; Miami Corp. v. State, 186
La. 784, 173 So. 315 (1937) , cert, denied 302 U.S. 700. See also 2 Stat. 666; 33 U.S.C.A.
sec. 10; 2 Stat. 642 and 703.
It should be noted, however, that the- U.S. Supreme Court has indicated that the
Federal government could validly have conveyed the beds under navigable waters in
tlie Louisiana and other territories in furtherance of appropriate public purposes,
to a limited extent, although it otherwise held such beds in trust for the benefit of
the : ates later created out of the territories. In holding that the beds under nonna\i-
gable waters in the Oklahoma part of the Louisiana Territory had been con-
\'eyed to an Indian tribe prior to Oklahoma's admission as a state, the court fotind
it unnecessary to decide whether the bed could validly have been conveyed to
the tribe even if the water were navigable. Brewer—Elliott Oil & Gas Co. v. United
States, 260 U.S. 77, 85-86 (1.922) , affirming 270 F. 100 (8th C.C.A., 1920) , which
affirmed 249 F. 609 (1918) .
Questions regarding the validity and effect of old Spanish grants to lands in
the Louisiana Territory are considered in Menard's Heirs v. Massey, 49 U.S. (8 How.)
293 (1850) , discussed in Begnaud v. Grubb and Hawkins, 209 La. 826, 25 So, 2d.
606, 610 (1946)
.
Questions regarding the Oyster Statutes (See L.S.A.—R.S. 56:421 et seq.) declaring
that certain waterbeds should remain the property of the state are considered in
Onebane, Joseph, "Who Owns the Water Bottoms?" 6 La. Bar Journal Xo. 1, p. -16
(May, 1958) .
110 L.S.A.-Const. of 1921, art. 4, § 2.
111 Acts 1912, No. 62, § 1. This section also applied to •any transfer of property
by any sub-division of the state . . ." It is now embodied in L.'S.A.—R.S. 9:5661.
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by virtue of this act, the state could not in the 1954 case attack the
validity of a patent so issued and recorded to the beds of navigable
waters. While the patent in question was issued in 1874, the court ap-
parently would have held likewise if the patent had been issued any-
time before the Constitutional limitation of 1921.^^2
Later in 1954, the Legislature, apparently not satisfied with this
decision, passed an act aimed at nullifying it. The act provides that
the intent of the 1912 Legislatiue was that the prescriptive statute
should not apply to the transfer of navigable waters or the beds of
same,"^ that any patent or transfer of navigable waters and the beds
thereof is null and void,^^^ and that no statute enacted by the Legis-
lature shall be construed as to validate by reasons of prescription any
patent or transfer of navigable waters or the beds thereof.^^-^ It would
seem possible that this act might be imconstitutional as retroactive
legislation divesting vested rights^^*^ although it has not as yet been
passed upon by the cotirt.^^'
The state also has been declared to be the owner of the beds of
navigable rivers under the Civil Code^^^ and of the beds of navi-
gable waters by at least two other statutes. But the court in the
above-mentioned case reasoned that, no matter what the policy of the
Legislature might have been regarding the ownership of beds of navi-
gable waters, it was within the Legislature's power to grant ownership
thereof to private individuals prior to the 1921 constitutional restric-
tion. While apparently there had been no legislative pronouncements
authorizing the issuance of patents to beds of navigable waters prior
112 California Co. v. Price, 225 La. 706, 74 So. 2d. 1 (1954) , decided by a divided
court. See also 234 La. 338, 99 So. 2d. 743 (1957) . Thus, the last year in which the
state might have attacked any such patents was 1927—six years after the 1921 cut-off
date for validly issuing such patents.
113 La. Acts 1954, No. 727, § 1, now embodied in L.S.A.-R.S. 9:1107.
114 La. Acts 1954, No. 727, § 2, now embodied in L.S.A.-R.S. 9:1108.
115 La. Acts 1954, No. 727, § 3, now embodied in L.S.A.-R.S. 9:1109.
116 See L.S.A.-Const. of 1921, Art. 4, § 15.
In accord with this view, see Hebert, P. M., and Lazarus, C. E., "Legislation
Affecting the Civil Code," 15 La. Law Rev. 1, 23-24 (1954); Onebane, Joseph, "Who
Owns the Water Bottoms?" 6 La. Bar Journal No. 1, p. 46, 64 (May, 1958),.
11" It may be noted that the court in the above-mentioned case indicated with
respect to certain prior legislation that "if the recital be construed as referring
also to previously disposed of property, it would be subject to a constitutional at-
tack as divesting vested rights." California Co. v. Price, 225 La. 706, 74 So. 2d. 1,
7 (1954) .
118 Article 453 of the Code provides that the beds of navigable rivers are
publicly owned "as long as the same are co\ered with water." (See note 124, infra.)
The bed of a navigable stream that was nonnavigable in 1812 may have been pri-
vately owned. (See Nature of Riparian Rights: Ownership of Beds, supra.) It seems
doubtful that when it later became navigable the state thereby acquired title to
its bed. See 65 C.J.S., Navigable Waters, sec. 97.
119 L.S.A.-R.S. 9:1101 and L.S.A.-R.S. 56:421. See Nature of Riparian Rights,
supra. See also discussion of possible application of La. Civil Code, Art. 482 to navi-
gable lakes and bays, in California Co. v. Price, 225 La. 706, 74 So. 2d 1, 10-11 ,(1954) .
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to 1912, the court indicated that because of the 1912 prescriptive statute,
the validity of such grants cannot be attacked at this late date.'^^
Aside from these possible exceptions, however, the state now owns
in fee, and cannot transfer ownership of, the beds of any navigable
watersJ -1
Right to Use Water
Although there is little authority on which to base an opinion, it
seems probable that L.S.A. Civil Code, Article 661, which gives ri-
parian owners certain rights to use running water,^^^ either is inappli-
cable to navigable rivers or streams or is subservient to provisions of
the Code and Revised Statutes that give the state and public rights in
such streams.
Article 661 does not explicitly distinguish between navigable and
nonnavigable watercourses. This is in direct contrast to the comparable
French Civil Code provision, which definitely exempted navigable
streams from its application. ^^s j^^ j-j^g Louisiana provision is almost
certainly based on the French law, it would seem that there is some
significance in this omission. It would have been a simple matter foi
the codifiers to have inserted this exception in the Louisiana provisior
had they intended it to apply.
On the other hand, in L.S.A.—Civil Code, Article 453, navigable rivers
are cited as an example of public things, the property of which b
vested in a whole nation, and the use of which is allowed to all its
members. xhis is in accord with the early French treatment of the
subject and seems to indicate that the French law was meant to be
followed. It is not easy to reconcile the vesting of navigable rivers ir
the public by Article 453 with an interpretation of Article 661 whict
might give to the riparian owners a vested right in their use.
120 California Co. v. Price, 225 La. 706, 74 So. 2d. 1 (1954) .
121 See Nature of Riparian Rights: Ownership of Beds, supra., regarding stream;
that have ceased to be navigable.
122 See Appendix, infra.
123 Code Napoleon, 1804, Art. 644: "He whose estate borders on running water
other than that which is declared to belong to the public domain by Article 538
under the title of the Classification of Property, may use it as it runs for the purpose
of watering his estate."
Par. 2 was similar to Par. 2 of L.S.A.—Civil Code Art. 661. See note 51, supra
(Translation from L.S.A.—Civil Code Art. 661, History and Text of Former Codes.)
Code Napoleon, 1804, Art. 538, referred to in Art. 644, declared navigable stream:
to be a part of the public domain; hence these streams were outside the scope ol
Art. 644. Riparian owners had no special rights to use navigable waters according t(
Planiol, Marcel, Treatise on the Civil Law, op. cit. (note 85) , Vol. 1 No., 2428. Se(
also Wiel, S.C., "Waters: American Law and French Authority," op. cit., note 61, 3'
Harvard Law Review, p. 152.
124 L.S.A.—Civil Code, Art. 453: "Public things are those, the property of whicl
is vested in a whole nation, and the use of which is allowed to all the member?
of the nation: Of this kind are navigable rivers, seaports, roadsteads and harbors
highways and the beds of rivers, as long as the same are covered with water . . ."
See also Article 450 in Appendix, infra.
38
The Legislature evidently intended the state to have paramount
rights in navigable waters, for in L.S.A.—R.S. 9:1101 it expressly pro-
vided . . that the ownership of the water itself . . .is vested in
the state and that the state has the right to enter into possession of these
waters when not interfering with the control of navigation exercised
thereon by the United States of America/'^^o
It may be noted also that while the beds of nonnavigable streams gen-
erally belong to the riparian owners, the beds of navigable rivers and
other navigable waters generally belong to the state. L.S.A.—Civil Code,
Article 505 provides: "The ownership of the soil carries with it the
ownership of all that is directly above it . . ." Although running water
itself cannot be owned privately,^^? j-^g article may nevertheless lend
some support to the proposition that the state and public have para-
mount rights to use such waters.
With respect to the use of navigable rivers, the court in an 1883
case refused to enjoin a company owning land along the Mississippi River
(whose land was separated from it only by a public levee and street)
from laying pipes to the river to withdraw water for its domestic and
manufacturing purposes. ^-'^ The injunction was requested by a water-
works company that was supplying the City of New Orleans with
water under an exclusive franchise to do so. The court indicated that
the waterworks company . . in common with all the inhabitants of
the city, possessed, independent of any legislative grant or concession,
the right to draw water from the river for its own purposes, and to sup-
ply the city and its inhabitants with it." Although the company had
acquired an exclusive charter to supply the city, it contained an ex-
ception allowing the city to grant permits to "contiguous" landowners
125 The Legislature perhaps could not have divested by this pronouncement rights
which may have been vested in individuals prior to the passage of the act in 1912.
See note 52, supra. But since L.S.A.—Civil Code, Article 453, which was enacted
previously, clearly states that navigable rivers are public, it seems unlikely that
any riparian rights to use these waters are vested in private persons.
12G See Ownership of Beds, and Nature of Riparian Rights: Ownership of Beds,
supra.
127 See Nature of Riparian Rights, supra.
128 An analagous situation exists in the use of oil and gas. The court has
said that even though oil and gas are insusceptible of ownership in their free
state beneath the surface of the ground, the right to reduce them to possession
exists in the owner of the soil above them. McCoy v. Arkansas Natural Gas Co., 175
La. 487, 143 So. 383, 85 ALR 1147, cert, denied, 287 U.S. 661, (1932) ; Continental Se-
curties Corporation v. Wetherbee, 187 La. 773, 175 So. 571 (1937) . If the analogy
is sound, it would seem that the owners of the soil beneath running water would
"have a right to reduce it to possession also. See note 54, supra. This would mean
that the state, being the owner of the soil beneath navigable streams, would have
the right to utilize the waters from these streams, and that the riparian owner would
not have a vested right in these streams. The same reasoning would, of course,
strengthen the argument that riparian owners have vested rights to utilize nonnavi-
gable running water,
129 New Orleans Waterworks Co. v. Louisiana Sugar Refining Co. and City of
Xew Orleans, 35 La. Ann. 1111 (1883); dismissed for want of jurisdiction in 125 U.S.
18 (1888) .
39
to lay water pipes to the river for their own use. But the court said
that even without such an exception, riparian landowners: . . had,
clearly, not only the privilege, in common with all others, to draw the
running water from the river for domestic purposes, ad lavandum et po-
tendum, but also, on principle, that, without the need of a previous
permission, of laying pipes from the river to their premises, to draw the
water necessary for their use." (Emphasis added. However, the
nature of the privilege or right of riparian landowners or others to use
the river was not clearly defined, nor was any significance of the navi-
gability of the river discussed.
In any event, the rights to drainage granted under L.S.A.—Civil Code,
Article 660, probably are applicable to both nonnavigable and navi-
gable streams, and any infringement of the rights of riparian or other
landovv^ners granted under it would seem to furnish a cause of action
to the injured party.^"^! On the other hand, it is clear that the public
has the right to use navigable waters for fishing^22 navigation.^^^
130 The city had granted the defendant company permission to lay pipes to
the river for its domestic and manufacturing purposes. The court indicated that
this constituted a valid exercise of its police power to regulate the laying of pipes
across the river bank and public street.
The court did not mention Article 661 of the L.S.A.—Civil Code dealing with ri-
parian rights. But it did cite Articles 450, 453, 455, and 457 of the Code, which
deal with common and public things and the definition of river banks, in connec-
tion with its assertion that the city "had the right of permitting the defendant com-
pany to lay pipes and conduits across the quay and through the streets, from the
river to within its factory limits, for the purpose of supplying itself with the water
needed for its objects."
In the appeal of this case to the U.S. Supreme Court, that court noted, at 125
U. S. 32, that this case was distinguishable from an earlier case where it had en-
joined the taking of water from the same river for use in a hotel, partly on the
grounds that in the former case the defendant was not an owner of land "contiguous
to the river." New Orleans Water Works Co. v. Rivers, 115 U.S. 674 (1884). How-
ever, in that case the court seems to have been more concerned with the above-
mentioned exception of "contiguous" owners in the charter of the waterworks
company than with any question of riparian rights of such owners. Other Federal
cases involving this same charter include New Orleans Water Works Co. v. Southern
Brewing Co., 36 Fed. 833 (1888), afE'd in 145 U.S. 649 (1891), and New Orleans
Water Works Co. v. New Orleans, 164 U.S. 471 (1896) .
In Doiron v. O'Bryan, 218 La. 1069, 51 So. 2d 628, 632 (1951), the court in-
cluded a definition of riparian rights, as: "The rights of owners of lands on the
banks of watercourses relating to the water, its use, ownership of soil under the
stream, accretions, etc." See Nature of Riparian Rights, supra. This case involved a
navigable lake, but it was dealing only with the question of ownership of formerly
submerged land adjoining the lake. It may be doubted whether the quoted statement
would have any material significance on the question of rights to use the waters of
navigable rivers, streams, or lakes.
131 See Nature of Riparian Rights, supra.
132 U.S.A.—Civil Code, Art. 453, supra, note 124, provides that "every man has
a right freely to fish in rivers, ports, roadsteads, and harbors." See also Burns v. Cres-
cent Gun and Rod Club, 116 La. 1038, 41 So. 249 (1906) and Haynes v. Smith
discussed in note 308, infra.
133 See L.S.A.-Civil Code, Art. 453 (supra, note 124) and R.S. 9:1101 (infra. Ap-
pendix) . Also see 33 U.S.C.A. sec. 10 which provides that "all the navigable rivers
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Although the right to free navigation of navigable rivers is given the
public, the court in 1931 cast some doubt upon how far the state
courts would go in protecting the interest of an individual in this right.
The court was presented with a case in which the plaintiff had con-
structed a canal upon his own land, diverting water from a navigable
stream. According to the court, the evidence was conflicting as to
whether the river beneath the point of the diversion had been rendered
nonnavigable by the diversion, and, if so, whether by the action of
the plaintiff in diverting water from the river. The canal had been
constructed for the purposes of navigation, and tolls were apparently
charged. The defendant felt, however, that since the water had been
diverted from a navigable stream, he had the right to use the canal
without cost. The plaintiff then sought to enjoin the defendant from
such free use of the canal. He was granted the injunction in the lower
court. The State Supreme Court affirmed this decision on the grounds
that the defendant could not, as a remedy for a wrongful diversion
by plaintiff, use the canal free of charge, as such a remedy was not
recognized in Louisiana.
In the course of the decision, the court used the following language:
And of course there is ample authority for the proposition that
one may be enjoined from diverting so much of the flow of navi-
gable streams as to render them unnavigable.^34
But in our opinion, the Congress of the United States, which has
plenary powers over the navigable waters of the nation, has placed
the whole subject-matter of diverting the water of a navigable
stream under the jurisdiction of the Secretary of AVar, who is
far more capable of dealing with such matters than are the courts,
since he can get his information at first hand and on the spot; and
it is within his discretion to say how much, and under what con-
133 {Continued)
and waters in the former territories of Orleans and Louisiana shall be and forever
remain public highways." (Derived from an 1811 act relating to adjustment of land
claims and sale of public lands in these territories. 2 Stat, at 666.) Act of Congress
April 8, 1812; 2 Stat. 701, which admitted Louisiana into the Union, contained the
following provision: "Provided that it shall be taken as a condition upon which the
said state is incorporated into the Union, that the river Mississippi, and the navi-
gable rivers and waters leading into the same, and into the Gulf of Mexico, shall
be common highways and forever free, as well to the inhabitants of the said state
as to the inhabitants of other states and the territories of the United States, with-
out any tax, duty, import, or toll therefor imposed by the said state ..." 2 Stat. 703.
Louisiana cases construing this provision include Harvey v. Potter, 19 La. Ann. 264,
92 Am. Dec. 532 (1867) ; Boykin & Long v. Shaffer, 13 La. Ann. 129 (1858) ; Carondelet
Canal & Navigation Co. v. Parker, 29 La. Ann. 430, 29 Am. Rep. 339 (1877) .
Also see California Co. v. Price, 225 La. 706, 74 So. 2d. 1, 3, 11 (1954) where
it was conceded that even though the bed of a navigable bay was susceptible of
private ownership, the waters were subject to public rights of navigation, com-
merce, and fishing. This possibility of private bed ownership and public rights in
the waters is criticized in a dissent to the opinion, at page 13.
134 The court cited no authority, however.
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ditions, the water of navigable streams may be diverted. See Att
Cong. March 3, 1899 § 10 (33 U.S.C.A. § 403)
.^^s
The holding in the case would seem to be only that the defendant
could be enjoined from using the canal which the plaintiff had built
on his land, leaving defendant to other remedies if the plaintiff's di-
version was wrongful. But the above-quoted language indicates that
the defendant would not have had a remedy in the Louisiana courts.
The act of Congress cited by the court, ^•^'^ however, does not read as
though exclusive jurisdiction over diversion of navigable waters had
been placed in the Secretary of War (now called Secretary of the
Army) .^^ In fact, cases noted under this statute in the United States
Code Annotated indicate that concurrent Federal and State jurisdiction
may be exercised. ^^s Although the Louisiana Supreme Court has neither
repudiated nor modified the language set forth above in any subsequent
case, the writers do not feel that it would today refuse jurisdiction if
faced squarely with a case concerning the diversion of navigable rivers.
Congress has granted the Corps of Engineers, U. S. Army, certain
regulatory authority over the construction of dams and alteration of the
course or capacity of navigable waters. The Federal Power Com-
135 Ilhenny v. Broussard, 172 La. 895, 135 So. 669, 670 (1931) .
Similarities between the Federal and Louisiana Courts' criteria for determining
whether a stream is navigable are discussed in 30 Tulane Law Rev. 332 (1956) . Also
see Navigable Watercourses: Definition, supra. Congress has specifically declared Bayou
Cocodrie (from its source to its junction with Bayou Chicot) and Eagle Lake to be
nonnavigable for Federal purposes. 33 U.S.C.A. sees. 21 and 47.
136 33 U.S.C.A. § 403: ". . .; and it shall not be lawful to excavate or fill, or in
any manner to alter or modify the course, location, condition, or capacity of, anv
port, roadstead, haven, harbor, canal, lake, harbor of refuge, or inclosure within
the limits of any breakwater, or of the channel of any navigable water of the United
States, unless the work has been recommended by the Chief of Engineers and au-
thorized by the Secretary of War prior to beginning the same."
137 The Secretary of War was changed to Secretary of the Army by Act July 20,
1947, c. 343, Title II § 205 (a), 61 Stat. 501.
i38Leitch V. City of Chicago (CCA. 111.), 41 F 2d. 728, cert, den., 282 U.S. 891,
51 S. Ct. 106, 75 L. Ed. 786 (1930) ; Robinson v. Silver Lake Ry. & Lumber Co.,
153 Wash. 261, 279 P. 1109 (1929); North Shore Boom & Driving Co. v. Nicomen
Boom Co. (Wash.) , 29 S. Ct. 355, 357, 212 U.S. 406, 53 L. Ed. 574 (1909) ; Cummings
v. Chicago (111.) , 23 S.Ct. 472, 477, 188 U.S. 410, 47 L. Ed. 525.
139 See, e.g., 30 Stat. 1151; 33 U.S.C.A. sees. 401 and 403. With respect to the
withdrawal or diversion of such waters, see Sanitary Dist. v. United States, 266 U.S
405 (1925) ; United States v. Ormsbee, 74 F. 207 (1896) .
The Corps of Engineers also has engaged in several channel-improvement and
other projects in aid of na^'igation. The writers have been informed that in planning
projects the corps gi\es consideration to the provision of liberal supplies of fresh
water, as well as sufficient water for navigation purposes in waterways during low-
water periods. (Based on information supplied by Col. G. M. Cookson, District En-
gineer, U. S. Army Engineer District, New Orleans.)
It may be noted that La. Acts 555 (1958) proposed an amendment of the La
Const, of 1921, which has been ratified l)y the people. Art. IV, sec. 12, as amended
property or rights of way, easements, or other servitudes, now owned or later ac
quired, to the United States for use in connection with the construction, maintenance
and improvement of artificial and natural navigable waterways and river and harboi
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mission also has certain regulatory authority over such waters, particu-
larly with respect to the construction of hydroelectric power dams.^^°
Contrary to the expressed lack of intention to take jurisdiction over
cases involving diversion of navigable streams, the Louisiana Supreme
Court has clearly and often held that a navigable stream cannot be ob-
structed without authorization from the state. Obstruction, in fact, is
made a criminal act by two separate statutes. The first of these statutes
deals with aggravated obstruction which is the intentional or criminally
negligent placing of anything, or performance of any act, on any navi-
gable waterway wherein it is foreseeable that human life might be en-
dangered.^^^ The second deals with simple obstruction, which is the
intentional or criminally negligent placing of anything, or performance
of any act, on any navigable waterway that will render movement there-
on more difficult .^"^^ In 1958 the Legislature enacted the Uniform. Pleas-
ure Boating Act which specifies various rules of law and requirements
139 (Contin.iied)
or flood-control works, or in connection with parks, forest preserves, canals, and
irrigation districts. The state or any of its agencies also may maintain in coopera-
tion with or on behalf of the United States or any of its agencies rights of way, servi-
tudes, or easements acquired in connection with the construction or improvement
of artificial or natural waterways.
140 See, e.g., 41 Stat. 1065 and 1353, 46 Stat. 798, 49 Stat. 839; 16 U.S.C.A. sec.
797 (e) . It may also be noted that in 1958 the Congress enacted legislation "to pro-
vide for more effective integration of a fish and wildlife conservation program with
Federal water-resource developments, and for other purposes." 72 Stat. 563, amend-
ing earlier legislation. This act provides, among other things, that the head of the
agency exercising administration over the water resources of the state (See State
Wildlife and Fisheries Commission, infra) , and the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service,
Department of the Interior, shall be consulted with a view to the prevention of
loss of and damage to wildlife resources, whenever the waters of any stream
or other body of water are proposed or authorized to be impounded, diverted,
or otherwise controlled or modified for any purpose by any Federal department or
agency or by any public or private agency under Federal permit or license. This
does not apply, however, to "projects for the impoundment of water where the
maximum surface area of such impoundments is less than ten acres . . ."
141 Goodwill V. Police Jury of Bossier Parish, 38 La. Ann. 752 (1886) . (Injunction
granted to prevent parish from filling in navigable stream) ; Ingram v. Police Jury
of the Parish of St. Tammany, 20 La. Ann. 226 (1868) . (Injunction granted to
prevent parish from building low bridge over navigable stream) ; Clement v.
Louisiana Irrigation & Mill Co., 129 La. 825, 56 So. 902 (1911). (Mandatory in-
junction for removal of dam across navigable river) ; Blanchard v. Abraham, 115
La. 989, 40 So. 379 (1906) ; Armistead v. Shreveport & R.R. Val. Ry. Co., 108 La.
171, 32 So. 456 (1901) ; Darrall v. Southern Pac. R. Co., 47 La. Ann. 1455, 17 So.
884 (1895) ; Houston v. Police Jury of St. Martin, 3 La. Ann. 566 (1848) .
142 L.S.A.—R.S. 14:96: "Aggravated obstruction of a highway of commerce is the
intentional or criminally negligent placing of anything, or performance of any
act, on any raihvay, railroad, navigable waterway, road, highway, thoroughfare, or
runway of an airport, wherein it is foreseeable that human life might be en-
dangered.
"Whoever commits the crime of aggravated obstruction of a highway of commerce
shall be imprisoned at hard labor for not more than fifteen years."
143 L.S.A.—R.S. 14:97: "Simple obstruction of a highway of commerce is the in-
tentional or criminally negligent placing of anything or performance of any act on
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applicable to the operation of pleasure boats. The act provides that
its provisions shall be construed to supplement applicable federal laws
and regulations when not expressly inconsistent therewith. The act
requires all political subdivisions and peace officers and game wardens
to enforce its provisions, but prohibits the adoption of local pleasure
boating regulations by political subdivisions.
No reported Louisiana court decision or Federal court decision aris-
ing in the state, appears to have dealt with the question of whether
riparian or other uses of nonnavigable watercourses or parts of water-
courses which connect with navigable waters shall be subject to limita-
tion if they affect adversely navigation or other public uses of the
navigable waters. However, the U.S. Supreme Court and other Federal
courts have so indicated in certain cases dealing with questions of Fed-
eral control.
Nonriparian Use
Although under the "riparian doctrine," which is followed in Lou-
isiana, those who own lands on the banks of certain watercourses are
given certain rights to use water which probably are not given to those
who do not own such lands, it is clear that riparian owners are not
granted the exclusive use of all the watercourses of the state.
In the case of navigable watercourses, it is questionable whether
riparian owners have materially greater rights to use the waters than
the public generally, although they generally have the advantage of
easier access to the river. However, as this subject was covered under the
preceding topic, the discussion here is limited to the rights of nonri-
parian owners in nonnavigable watercourses.
Article 661, L.S.A.—Civil Code, grants to riparian owners certain
rights to the use of running water, but it does not expressly exclude
nonriparian owners from the use of such water.^*^ Since nowhere in
the Code, statutes, or reported court decisions are nonriparian owners
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any railway, railroad, navigable waterway, road, highway, thoroughfare, or runway
of an airport, which will render movement thereon more difficult.
"Whoever commits the crime of simple obstruction of a highway of commerce
shall be fined not more than two hundred dollars, or imprisoned for not more
than six months, or both."
144 L.S.A.—R.S. 34:850.1 et seq. Among other rules, pleasure boats shall not
be operated in areas legally designated and marked as restricted areas for swim-
ming or other purposes,
145 See, e.g., Oklahoma v. Atkinson Co., 313 U.S. 508, 525 (1940) with respect
to the power of flood control and navigation; and Georgia Power Co. v. Federal
Power Commission, 152 F. 2d. (CCA. 5th) 908, 913 (1946) with respect to a non-
Federal hydroelectric power dam, construing the statutory regulatory power of the
Federal Power Commission, cited earlier, with particular reference to 16 U.S.C.A. sec.
817.
146 See Appendix, infra.
The usual French interpretation of the comparable provision (sec. 644 of the
Code Napoleon 1804) limited the use of nonnavigable streams primarily to ri-
parian landowners, although nonriparian use rights could be acquired, as against
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expressly granted any rights in such water, it would seem unlikely that
anyone has a duty to allow nonriparian owners to use the water. (It has
not been clearly decided how Article 450 regarding "things which are
in common . . . such as . . . running water" shall apply to nonnavigable
watercourses. But it would seem probable that its provision "which all
men may freely use, conformably with the use for which nature has
intended them" would be held to be subject to the provisions in
Article 661, which give riparian landowners certain rights in running
water.147)
Such questions may arise when a nonriparian owner has gained ac-
cess to a stream through some type of arrangement with a riparian own-
er, or by other means. It would seem that at least two basic types of
arrangements might be made to allow a nonriparian owner access
to a stream. First, the riparian owner might grant a mere right of way
or passage to the stream; and second, he might grant his rights, in
whole or in part, to the water itself.
When a mere right of way to the stream has been granted to a
nonriparian owner by a riparian owner, and the nonriparian owner is
using the water from the stream, the question arises as to whether
a second riparian owner can maintain an action against the nonriparian
user.^*^ If, for example, the nonriparian owner is withdrawing water
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particular riparians, by such means as purchase, condemnation, or prescription—ac-
cording to Wiel, S. C, "Origin and Comparative Development of the Law of Water-
courses in the Common Law and in the Civil Law," 6 Calif. Law Rev. 245 and 342,
at pp. 259 and 365 et. seq. (1918) .
The author added, at p. 350, that such rights of use were given to riparian
owners because of the inconveniences and dangers which the presence of the
waters often cause. (Incidentally, the French irrigation law of April 29, 1845, re-
moved all doubt that riparian owners could use water on nonriparian estates
owned by them and gave them special rights in connection with the traversing of
intervening estates, according to Planiol, Marcel, Treatise on the Civil Law, op. cit.,
note 85, Vol. 1, No. 2417.)
147 See Article 450 in Appendix, infra; Palmer Co. v. Wilkerson, supra, note
52; Shaffer v. State National Bank, supra, note 59; 16 La. L. Rev. 500, 506 (1956);
and L.S.A.-Civil Code, Vol. 3, pp. 9 and 12.
The state may now own the running waters in natural rivers and streams,
by virtue of L.S.A.—R.S. 9:1101. But the beds of nonnavigable streams that were non-
navigable in 1812 generally are owned by the riparian owners. See Nature of Ri-
parian Rights: Ownership of Beds, supra. The effect, if any, of such ownership
of running waters by the state, and of the beds by the riparian owners, on rights to
use the waters in nonnavigable watercourses has not been clearly decided. See
text at notes 53 and 54, supra.
148 Article 727, L.S.A.—Civil Code, cites as examples of conventional discon-
tinuous servitudes the rights of passage and of drawing water. Thus, it would seem
possible for the owner of riparian land to create, by any act sufficient to transfer
title, a real right in the owner of nonriparian land to convey water across the
riparian land. See Articles 727, 743, and 756, L.S.A.-Civil Code. Also see note 62, supra.
(Or he might create a personal right to do so in the nonriparian owner that
would not be attached to the ownership of the nonriparian land. See L.S.A.-Civil
Code, Articles 757 and 758.) However, the question of the nonriparian owner's
right to withdraw water from the watercourse would still remain unanswered.
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from a nonnavigable stream with which to irrigate his lands that do
not lie on the watercourse, can lower riparian owners maintain an ac-
tion against the withdrawer with a showing of actual or impending dam-
age caused by this withdrawal? Can they maintain an action if actual
or impending damage cannot be shown? Can both an action for dam-
ages and injunctive relief be maintained?
These questions must be left unanswered, as there appears to be
very little authority upon which to base answers. It would seem
probable that, in general, a showing of damage would form the basis
for a stronger case than when damage cannot be shown, but we can-
not make a more detailed prediction of what the answers might be.
When a riparian owner grants his rights in the stream to a nonri-
parian owner, a different problem is posed. Here the question is not
so much a matter of the rights of the nonriparian owner as such, but
rather a matter of the right of a riparian owner to transfer his ri-
parian rights to the nonriparian owner. As between the transferring ri-
parian owner and the nonriparian owner, a contract transferring ri-
parian rights might be binding. Article 752, L.S.A.—Civil Code, provides
that . . servitudes . . .which result from the situation of places, may
be altered by the agreement of the parties, provided the public interest
does not suffer thereby." This would seem clearly to permit alteration of
the riparian servitude as between upper and lower landowners. It
might also provide some support for the validity of contracts between
riparian and nonriparian landowners. But it is less likely that other
riparian owners on the stream would be bound by such an arrangement
without their consent.^^o
Article 654 of the Code reads as follows:
Servitude is a right so inherent in the estate to which it is due, that
the faculty of using it, considered alone and independent of the
estate, cannot be given, sold, let or mortgaged without the estate
to which it appertains, because it is a servitude which does not
pass to the person but by means of the estate.
This article would seem to indicate that the riparian owner's right
to use running water, a servitude under Article 661, could not be trans-
ferred to a nonriparian owner for the use of his nonriparian land.i°^
Although there are no State Supreme Court cases touching on this
point, in an appellate court case, a contract by which the owner of
land on one side of a bayou allowed a nonriparian owner to take
water from the bayou and convey it across his riparian land was upheld
against the objection of the owner of the land on the opposite side
149 See note 63, supra, regarding the execution of such a contract,
150 He might acquire such a right as against specific riparian owners through con-
tractual agreements with them. See note 62, supra.
The 'foregoing three sentences are in general accord with the usual French in-
terpretation of the Code Napoleon (1804) as described in Wiel, op. cit. (note 146)
at pp. 365-367.
151 Also see L.S.A.-Civil Code, Arts. 652 and 653.
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of the bayou. j-^ig ^ase, the court was not sure whether the
bayou was a running stream or still water. Moreover, although the
court felt that probably it was not a running stream, it did not indi-
cate what difference it would have made if it had been. The plaintiff
alleged that "under the laws of this state" the defendant had "no right
in or to said water, he not being a riparian owner . . ." But the court
did not deal with this question. It refused to enjoin the defendant's
use solely on the basis of the general rule that an injunction would
not be issued unless actual or impending damages were shown.
From the above, it would seem possible that nonriparian owners
might have a privilege to withdraw water from nonnavigable streams at
least as long as they have access to the streams and are neither injuring
nor threatening to injure riparian owners. However, there seems to be
little upon which to base an opinion as to nonriparians' rights to use
the water of nonnavigable streams.
There is also uncertainty regarding the question of the use of the
waters of a nonnavigable stream by a riparian owner on nonriparian
land that he may own or rent. Recall that Article 661, L.S.A.—Civil Code,
provides only that "He whose estate borders on running water may
use it as it runs, for the purpose of watering his estate, or for other
purposes. "1^^ This, in turn, raises the question of the nature of riparian
land.
Nature of Riparian Land
The court has said that riparian rights are: "The rights of owners of
land on the banks of watercourses relating to the water, its use . . .,
etc."i5* (Emphasis added.) This suggests that riparian lands at least
include those which lie on the banks of rivers and streams. The quota-
tion above is contained in an opinion dealing with rights to land ad-
joining and underlying a lake, and there are, in fact, no cases reported
in which the court has decided what constitutes riparian land for the
purpose of deciding rights to use running water. This includes the
question of how far back from the watercourse a tract of land may ex-
tend and still be considered riparian land.^^^ There are, however, a
152 Jackson v. Walton, 2 La. App. 53 (1925). The case is discussed more fully
later, under Natural Lakes and Bayous.
153 See General Nature of Riparian Rights: Right to Use of Water, supra.
i54Doiron v. O'Bryan, 218 La. 1069, 51 So. 2d. 628 (1951). See note 130, supra.
155 Courts in some other states have held or said that land must be within the
watershed of a watercourse to be considered riparian to it. See 56 Am. Jur., Waters,
sec. 278. Courts in some states have further held or said (1) that riparian land
does not include subsequent additions of nonriparian tracts to the original riparian
tracts of land, and (2) that if a part of a riparian tract of land that is not con-
tiguous to the stream is conveyed to another, the part conveyed ceases to be riparian
land (unless it is otherwise provided in the conveyance) , even though it may be
later reunited with the riparian tract. See 56 Am. Jur., Waters, sec. 277.
On the other hand, according to Wiel, op. cit., (note 146) at p. 349, et. seq.,
the usual French interpretation of Art. 644 of the Code Napoleon (1804) , which
was similar to Art. 661 of the Louisiana Civil Code, was that what constituted ri-
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great number of cases involving riparian lands that are concerned with
the ownership of land adjoining and underlying streams and rivers.
As it would seem likely that riparian lands would be the same for
both purposes, at least in many instances, we here examine the law
concerning the riparian rights to soil adjoining and beneath water-
courses.
Construing Grants and Conveyances
A number of cases dealing with rights to land adjoining watercourses
have involved the question of whether a particular conveyance of land
has transferred a riparian estate. In deciding such cases, the court has
sought to determine whether the parties to the transfer intended a
riparian estate to pass.^^^ It was early (1819) stated that an intention
to pass a riparian estate entitled to soil formed along a river bank
(called "alluvion") could be manifested either by words in the deed
expressly making the river a boundary of the estate or by the grantor
transferring an estate such that no land susceptible of private ownership
exists between the river and the transferred estate, even though the
river is not made a boundary of the estate. ^^'^
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parian land should be determined by considering the situation at the time of
the attempted use. This meant that land not contiguous to a stream could be added
to contiguous land and the entire tract would become riparian if contiguous and
held in one common ownership. This legally could include land outside the
watershed but use of water thereon would usually be considered unreasonable as
a question of fact.
Such a view, in general, would more nearly accord with the literal wording
of Art. 661, which reads: "He whose estate borders on running water, may use
it as it runs, for the purposes of watering his estate . . ." etc.
Such questions apparently have not been decided in Louisiana. The Louisiana
court has said that ascertaining whether land is riparian is a key question in
determining whether it is subject to the public servitude imposed by L.S.A.—Civil Code,
Art. 665 upon lands lying along navigable rivers for the making and repairing of
levees, etc. Such servitude came into existence when the property was separated
from the j^tiblic domain. If the land does not actually front on the river it be-
comes necessary to trace the title to the original grant to ascertain whether
it was then riparian. See, e.g., Bd. of Comm'rs, Pontchartrain Levee District v.
Baron, 236 La. 846, 109 So. 2d. 441, 443-444, (1959) ; Delaune v. Bd. of CommVs,
Pontchartrain Levee Dist., 230 La. 117, 87 So. 2d. 749, 754 (1956). The court
apparently has not further spelled out its criteria for such purposes. It is
problematical to what extent it might follow such criteria of riparian land for
water-use purposes, but it need not necessarily follow it. See the reasoning em-
ployed and the emphasis on Art. 665's use of the word "adjacent," said not to require
contact with the river, rather than "adjoining." In contrast. Art. 661 employs the
words "he whose estate borders on running water" and "through whose estate water
runs." It may be noted that in one early case the court noted that Several (ea^ly
grants of land in Louisiana "were made with narrow fronts on the rivers and
running back a great depth . . ." Bicknell v. Weindalh, 7 La. Ann. 291, 292 (1852) .
See also Zenor v. Parish of Concordia, 7 La. Ann. 150 (1852) . But in a number
of instances, different persons may now own the front and back portions of such tracts.
156 The court has been interested mainly in determining whether the estate
is riparian for purposes of deciding title to alluvion, there being no such case re-
ported concerning rights to water.
157 Morgan v. Livingston, 6 Mart. (O.S.) 19 (1819) .
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Because a conveyance which expressly designates a river as one
boundary of the transferred land is quite clearly a conveyance of a ri-
parian estate, few cases have been presented to the court for a decision
as to whether a riparian estate has been transferred by express lan-
guage. In 1819, the court held that an estate conveyed with a "front
to the river" was a riparian estate because of the use of these words.
"Front on the river" also has been held sufficient to describe a ri-
parian estate. However, in other cases the court has held that "front
to the river" would not necessarily indicate a riparian estate when
other factors in the description indicated otherwise. The words "front
to the levee" have likewise been held not necessarily to convey a ri-
parian estate.
One group of cases concerning rights to lands adjoining and under-
lying watercourses have involved meander lines. Meander lines are
generally lines run in a survey of public lands to define the banks of
certain bodies of water, generally but not necessarily navigable, and to
determine the quantity of public land subject to patent or sale by
the government. The curving banks of a body of water are represented
by a series of straight lines, as the surveyor moves from point to point
along the bank. Depending upon the surveyor's skill, the distance be-
tween points along the bank, the degree to which the banks actually
deviate from a straight line, and other such factors, the meander lines
will more or less accurately represent the true shoreline. Often, however,
the meander lines do not coincide exactly with the true shoreline.
A conflict arises in these cases when the state or Federal govern-
ment, or one of its agencies, grants land to an individual, using a
meander line as one of the stated boundaries. If the state or Federal
government, or someone claiming under a patent therefrom, asserts
title in land which might lie between the meander line and the actual
shoreline because of the meander line's location, it must be determined
whether the conveyance to the first party was intended to convey only
to the meander line, or to the true shoreline. In other words, it must be
determined whether a transfer of land with a meander line as a
boundary actually transfers a riparian estate.
In a syllabus by the State Supreme Court added to a 1917 decision,
the general rule was stated to be:
The general rule is that meander lines are not run as boundaries
of the land surveyed, but for the purposes of defining . . . the banks
of the stream or other body of water and as a means of ascertaining
158 Ibid.
159 La. Branche's Heirs v. Montegut, 47 La. Ann. 674, 17 So. 247 (1895).
160 Cochran v. Fort, 7 Mart. (N.S.) 622, 624, 625 (La. 1829) ; Cambre v. Kohn,
8 Mart. (N.S.) 572, 579, 580 (La. 1830); Livingston v. Heerman, 9 Mart. (O.S.)
656, 721 (La. 1821) . In all of these cases land susceptible of private ownership
existed between the actual boundary and the river, and the court held that the
vendors retained title to this land, which was riparian.
161 Palmer Co. v. Wilkinson, 141 La. 874, 75 So. 806, 808 (1917) , citing Horne v.
Smith, 159 U.S. 40 (See p. 43) (1895) and another Federal case.
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the quantity of land embraced in the survey. The stream or
other body of water, and not the meander line as actually run on
the ground, is the boundary. ^'^'^
The court has recognized an exception to this rule, however:
. . . but this rule has been held to apply only where the distance
between such meander line and the actual shoreline is compara-
tively small. It is not applied where . . . the real shoreline is
distant from the supposed shoreline, and there is a large area of
land between the supposed shoreline, as shown on the plat, and the
actual shoreline. ^^'3
A meander-line boundary, then, generally signifies a riparian estate
unless the meander line lies far back from the true shore.
On nonnavigable streams, another question could arise from the
fact that the riparian owners, not the state, generally own the beds of
the streams. L.S.A.-R.S. 9:2971 reads as follows:
It shall be conclusively presumed that any . . . conveyance . . .
affecting land described as fronting on or bounded by a waterway
. . . shall be held ... to include all of the grantor's interest in
and under such waterway . . . whatever that interest might be
in the absence of any express provision therein particularly ex-
cluding the same therefrom; provided that where the grantor
at the time of the transfer . . . holds as owner the title to the
fee of the land situated on both sides thereof and makes a trans-
fer or other grant affecting the land situated on only one side
thereof, it shall be conclusively presumed, in the absence of any
express provision therein particularly excluding the same there-
from, that the transfer . . . thereof shall include the grantor's in-
terest to the center of such waterway . .
1G2 Palmer Co. v. Wilkinson, 141 La. 874, 75 So. 806 (1917) .
The court indicated that the same general rule would apply to grants by
either the state or Federal government of land adjoining watercourses, (75 So. at
p. 808.) While this case involved primarily a state patent, the court applied the
same general rule in two cases involving a Federal patent. Land v. Brockett, 162
La. 519, 110 So. 740 (1926); Thigpen v. Noonan, 162 La. 527, 110 So. 743 (1926).
It would seem, however, that this would not necessarily result if a patent or
deed clearly indicated an intention jiot to convey land beyond the meander line
nor any riparian rights in the bed or waters of the watercourse.
163 Acadia-Vermilion Rice Irrigating Co., Inc. v. Miller, 178 La. 954, 152 So.
576, 577 (1933) . Accord: Bruning v. City of New Orleans, 165 La. 511, 115 So. 733, 737
(1928) regarding the effect of a deed; Land v. Brockett and Thigpen v. Noonan,
supra; Smith v. Home, supra, 159 U.S. 40, 42-43 (1895) . Cf. Hall v. Board of Commr's,
111 La. 913, 35 So. 976 (1904) regarding a swampland grant.
Another possible exception arises where the meander lines signify a body of
water that does not in fact exist. See Palmer Co. v. Wilkinson, supra, 75 So. at
p. 808. Also see State v. Aucoin, 206 La. 786, 20 So. 2d. 136 (1944) , regarding
traverse lines run in regard to swampland grants by the United States.
For a discussion of various aspects of swampland grants, see 6 La. Bar Journal
No. 1 (supra, note 116).
1G4 This provision was added in 1956. La. Acts 1956, N, 555.
lessee Nattin v. Glassel, 156 La. 423, 100 So. 609 (1924) discussed in note 43,
supra, regarding the application of perhaps somewhat different rules prior to this
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It should be noted that this statute creates a presumption that
not only title to the bed of a stream is to pass with a transfer of
riparian land, but all rights in the waterway are to pass also. It
should be noted further, however, that it apparently is possible to re-
serve these rights by express language.
An important test for determining the intention of the parties ap-
pears to be that of noting whether everything susceptible of private
ownership has been conveyed. Three objects that can intervene between
the conveyed estate and the river are a levee, a public road, and al-
luvion. It is well established that neither a public road nor a levee
will prevent an estate that would otherwise be on the river from being
riparian. 1"'^^ The rule as to the effect of the intervention of alluvion
between the conveyed estate and the river has been developed such that
"if at the time of the sale of riparian land, the alluvion attached has
attained a sufficient elevation above the waters to be susceptible of
private ownership, the alluvion does not pass with the land, unless so
expressed. "1^^ Conversely, if the alluvion is not sufficiently formed at
the time of sale to be susceptible of private ownership, it passes to the
purchaser.^^^ Alluvion is susceptible of ownership when it rises above
the ordinary low water stage of the river. ^''^^ Questions regarding allu-
vion are discussed further below.
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legislation. The 1956 statute gave persons one year from August 1, 1956, to take
action to protect prior rights that might be adversely affected, by bringing suit
or by recording a notarized declaration asserting such rights in the conveyance rec-
ords of the proper parish. L.S.A.—R.S. 9:2973. The statute also includes a proviso
that its rules relative to the conveyance of land adjoining a waterway shall not affect
any "then existing valid right of way upon, across or over said property so trans-
ferred or conveyed . . ."
1G6 Morgan v. Livingston, 6 Mart. (O.S.) 19, 251 (La. 1819) ; Municipality No.
2 V. Orleans Cotton Press, 18 La. 122, 239, 240, 36 Am. Dec. 624 (1841) ; Succession
of Delachaise v. Maginnis, 44 La. Ann. 1051, 11 So. 715, 718 (1892). Also see note
177, infra, and note 108, supra.
icTBarre v. City of New Orleans, 22 La. Ann. 612, 613 (1870) . See also Cochran
V. Fort, 7 Mart. (N.S.) 622, 625 (1829) ; Ferriere v. City of New Orleans, 35 La. Ann.
209, 210 (1883) . This rule does not override particular words in a deed which
convey a riparian estate, however. To this point see La Branche's Heirs v. Montegut,
47 La. Ann. 674, 17 So. 247 (1895) , where alluvion was formed at the time of a
mortgage of land described in the mortgage as "a sugar plantation on the left
bank of the Mississippi river, having a front of one-fourth of one arpent, more
or less, on said river, by eighty arpents in depth." The purchaser under foreclosure
got a riparian estate.
108 Meyers v. Mathis, 42 La. Ann. 471, 7 So. 605 (1890) . It is not clear whether
the right to future alluvion might be reserved by the grantor in a conveyance of
riparian land. R.S. 9:2971, set forth later in the text of this section, implies that
rights in the land beneath a waterway might be specifically reserved by the
grantor; but in the Delachaise case cited in the text below, the court indicated that
title to alluvion is incapable of existing apart from the riparian estate. This latter
would seem to be the better view, for otherwise the conveyed riparian estate would
cease to be on the river as alluvion formed to its front.
1G9 State V. Richardson, 140 La. 329, 72 So. 984, 991 (1916) ; Seibert v. Conserva-
tion Commission of Louisiana, 181 La. 237, 159 So. 375 (1935) .
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Shifting Shores and Channels
Several of the problems connected with the determination of ri
parian land stem from the very nature of the rivers and streams ir
Louisiana. The continued shifting of the shores of many rivers anc
streams because of their soil-building and erosive propensities has beer
a never-ending source of litigation to define the lands that border on oi
lie near rivers as riparian or nonriparian.
L.S.A.-Civil Code, Articles 509 to 518 deal specifically with the ef
fects of changes in the location of soil, caused by actions of streams anci'
rivers. Article 509, probably the most important of these articles, del
fines the accretion formed "successively and imperceptibly" to soil sit
uated on the shore of a river or stream as alluvion, and gives this al
luvion to the owner of the soil situated on the edge of the stream o
river, whether or not it is navigable.i^°
Article 510 applies this same rule to dereliction formed by the rive
or stream retiring imperceptibly from one of its shores. Conversely i
denies to the owner of the shore upon which a river encroaches an'
claim to soil carried away.^^^ But Article 511 allows the owner of soi
which is carried away by a "sudden irruption" of a river or stream t
claim the land that was washed away if it can be identified and i
claimed within one year.^^^
Alluvion formed in front of the property of several riparian ownei
is to be divided according to the frontage of each owner at the time c
formation of the alluvion.^"
170 The court has indicated that this may apply even though the process (
forming accretions was initiated by the act of man, such as by the constructioj
of a cut-off channel across a bendway. It has said that the decision in such case
should depend on principles of equity. Esso Standard Oil Co. v. Jones, 233 La. 91.
98 So. 2d. 236, 241 (1957) , cited supra, note 15. See also 32 Tulane Law Rev. 31l'
323 (1958).
Article 509 also provides, however, that the riparian owner ". . . is bound I
leave public that portion of the bank which is required by law for the publ
use." See note 16, supra, for the complete article.
171 L.S.A.-Civil Code, Art. 510: "The same rule applies to derelictions forme
by running water retiring imperceptibly from one of its shores and encroachir
on the other; the owner of the land, adjoining the shore which is left dry, has
right to the dereliction, nor can the owner of the opposite shore, claim tl
land which he has lost."
"This right does not take place in case of derelictions of the sea."
Arts. 509 and 510 have been construed by the court in a number of cases'. Si
L.S.A.-Civil Code, Arts. 509 and 510, Notes of Decisions.
172 L.S.A.-Civil Code, Art. 511: "If the river or stream, whether navigable
not, carries away by a sudden irruption a consideraljle tract of land from i
adjoining field, which tract of land is susceptible of being identified, by carrying tl
same on a field lower down, or on the opposite shore, the owner of the tra
of land thus carried away, may claim his property, provided he does it with
a year, or even after the year has elapsed, if the person, to whose land the
sc
thus carried away has been united, has not yet taken possession of the same."
173 L.S.A.-Civil Code, Art. 516: "If an alluvion be formed in front of ti
property of several riparian proprietors, the division is to be made accordr
to the extent of the front line of each at the time of the formation of
the alluvior
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As for the rights in and to the use of the waters themselves, it is
not clear what the effect of shifting shores or channels might be. It
seems probable, however, that those estates that are considered riparian
for purposes of determining rights in and to alluvion would also be
considered riparian for purposes of determining the right to use water.
An excellent summary of the law applicable to title to alluvion is
contained in the syllabus by the court in Succession of Delachaise v.
Maginnis.^'^'^ It reads as follows:
1. . . .
2. The principle underlying and usually determining the title
to alluvion, in our system, is expressed in the equitable maxim,
'qui sentit onus, sentire debet et commodum! (He who bears
the burden ought also to be entitled to the advantage.) ^^'^
3. Another principle, equally germinal, is that title to alluvion
is a purely accessary right, attaching exclusively to the ri-
parian estate, and incapable of existing without it.
4. A party who sells the entire estate owned by him up to the
line of a public road or street bordering the river, and beyond
which no property susceptible of private ownership exists at
date of sale, retains no estate to which the accessary right to
future alluvion could attach.
5. The intervention of a public road or street does not prevent
the owner of the estate adjacent thereto from being considered
as the front or riparious proprietor, when nothing susceptible
of private ownership exists between the road or street and the
river.
6. Such adjacent estate must bear the whole loss resulting from
any encroachment by the river, furnishing space for a new
road or street if the old is washed away;^^^ and the law, as
well as justice, awards him the corresponding benefit from
accession.
7. The vendor of the lots adjacent to the road is subject, on the
other hand, to no risk of loss, and has, therefore, no legal or
equitable claim to any future accretion.
Land cut off from the fields of an individual by a river or stream
opening a new channel in such a way that the land becomes an island,
remains his property, whether the watercourse is navigable or nonnavi-
174 44 La. Ann. 1043, 11 So. 715 (1892).
175 Authors' insertion in parentheses.
176 See Ruch v. City of New Orleans, 43 La. Ann. 275, 9 So. 473 (1891) .
177 Apparently, it makes no difference whether the public road is entirely owned
by the city or state, or merely a servitude with the ownership of the soil in the
riparian owner. In both cases, the road will not prevent the estate from being
riparian. See Municipality No. 2 v. Orleans Cotton Press, 18 La. 122, 237-244 (1841) .
L.S.A.-Civil Code, Article 658, provides that "the soil of public roads belongs
to the owner of the land on which they are made, though the public has the
use of them." (Authors' footnotes.)
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gable. Thus, islands formed by the river depositing soil are distin-
guished from, those formed by a shift in the channel. Those formed by
deposited soil generally belong to the state in navigable streams/^'^ and
those similarly formed in nonnavigable streams are divided among the
riparian owners;^^*^ while those formed by the river shifting channels
belong to whoever owned the land at the time of the channel shift.
It may be noted also that Article 518 provides:
If a river or stream, whether navigable or not, opens itself a new
bed by leaving its former channel, the owners of the soil newly
occupied shall take, by way of indemnification, the former bed of:
the river, every one in proportion to the quantity of land he has
lost.
They shall again take their former property, if the river or stream
returns to its former channel.
In the case of navigable streams, this article should not present
many difficulties in its application, for in most instances, it would re-
sult only in what was formerly public land—the bed of a navigablci
stream (see Navigable Rivers and Streams, supra) —becoming private
land in exchange for the formerly private land becoming public land;
i.e., the state would become the owner of the newly formed bed of
the navigable river, and the former owners would become owners
of the old bed, which was originally the state's.
The ownership of the beds of nonnavigable streams ordinarily is
in the riparian owners. Therefore, if the stream changes its course,
the owner of the land newly covered by the stream might retain this
land as a riparian owner, and might, at the same time, be granted the
ownership of the original bed which was owned by the former riparian
owner. However, another interpretation of the article might be that
the land newly covered by the stream would become the property of
the persons who formerly owned" the old bed and not the property
of the landowners adjacent to the new bed, as the article perhaps intends
that its operation should result in an exchange of rights.
Another question involved in the nature of riparian estates is
presented when a river completely erodes away a riparian estate such
that an estate which formerly lay behind the original riparian estate be-
comes the new riparian estate. If the river then adds alluvion to
178 L.S.A.—Civil Code, Art. 517: "If a river or stream, whether navigable or not, by
opening itself a new branch cuts off and surrounds the field of any individual
owner of the shore, and makes it an island, the o\\'ner shall keep the property
of his field."
179 L.S.A.—Civil Code, Art. 512: "Islands and sandbars, which are formed in the
beds of navigable ri\'ers or streams, and which are not attached to the bank, belong
to the state, if there be no adverse title or prescription."
180 See L.S.A.—Civil Code, Arts. 513, 514 and 515, included in note 41, supra.
181 Fitzsimmons v. Cassity, 172 So. 824, 829 (La. App., 1937) . Article 453 of L.S.A.-
Civil Code provides that "navigable rivers . . . and the beds of rivers, as long
^^as the same are covered by water . . ." are "public things."
182 See Nature of Riparian Rights, supra.
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Who owns accretions formed by silt deposits along streams or bays?
this new estate, does the original estate reappear, or does the new
riparian estate take title to the alluvion? Logic and the law would
seem to indicate that the new riparian estate should gain title to the
alluvion, but in the one case where such a situation seemed to be
presented, the court held that the law applicable to submergence and
reemergence applied, rather than the laws regarding alluvion and,
therefore, the original riparian estate was recreated. Although the
court did not mention the Civil Code articles, it in effect applied the
above-quoted Article 518 rather than Article 509. It would appear, how-
ever, that where the court cannot find Article 518 applicable, it would
be compelled to hold that once a riparian estate is lost to the river,
it is forever lost. This would be so because by Article 509 the owner of
the land on the water's edge becom.es the owner of the accretions added
to the land.^^^ Thus, as the estate which had been eroded into the river
is replaced by new alluvial deposits, these new deposits would become
part of the estate to which they are added. As the eroded estate reap-
peared, then, it would reappear as additions to the estate which lay on
the water's edge at the time the accretions began to be formed; and
even though the former riparian estate might be entirely replaced, it
would be replaced as an addition to the estate which originally had not
been on the banks of the river.
Pollution Control by Public
The rights of individuals to pollute watercourses^^^ are affected by
certain statutes designed to protect public rights to these watercourses.
Anyone who intentionally performs any act tending to contaminate
any private or public water supply, when the act foreseeably endangers
the life or health of human beings is to be fined not more than
S 1,000 or imprisoned for not more than 20 years, or both. If the act
does not foreseeably endanger the life or health of human beings, the
fine is not to exceed S500, nor the imprisonment 5 years.
183 Hughes V. Birney's Heirs, 107 La. 664, 32 So. 30 (1902) .
See text at note 170, supra.
185 See Pollution, supra.
186 L.S.A.-R.S. 14:58.
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Oil and gas well operators receive particular attention under a
statute which provides that no person is to discharge oil, salt water,
or other noxious or poisonous substances or gases into any stream
from which water is taken for irrigation purposes, and which would
render it unfit for irrigation purposes or would destroy the fish there-
in,^^^ except during an open season which extends from October 1 to
December 31, inclusive, of each year. During the open season, these!
products may be released into the streams. A watchman must be pro-
vided by the well operators night and day during the rest of the
year to prevent leaks, breaks, secret pipes, or violation of this law.
The statute does not apply, however, to the discharge of these
waters into those portions of natural streams having a normal salt
content of more than 110 grains per gallon or into the tributaries
of such streams if the tributary joins the stream where it has such
salt content. These streams are recognized as being unfit for irrigation.
Nor does the statute apply to streams having their source outside Lou-
isiana or to the tributaries of such streams.
A fine of not less than $100 nor more than $2,000, or an imprison-
ment for not less than 30 days nor more than 3 months is provided foT
each violation. Each day that the provisions of the statute are violated
constitutes a separate offense.
Two identical statutes provide that no person shall discharge into
any of the waters of the state any substance that kills fish, or renders
the water unfit for the maintenance of normal fish life characteristics,
or in any way adversely affects the interests of the state. Fine and/or im-
prisonment is provided for violation.
I
Perhaps the broadest powers of control over pollution are placed
in a commission known as the Stream Control Commission.^"" The com-
mission has control of waste disposal, public or private, by any person,^^^
into any of the waters of the state^'^^ fQj- prevention of pollutior
tending to destroy fish or wildlife, or domestic animals, or to be in
jurious to the public health or welfare. ^^'^ It may enter at all reasonable
187 See also State Wildlife and Fisheries Commission, infra, for other statutes
dealing with the protection of fish.
188 L.S.A.-R.S. 38:216. See State v. Hincy, 130 La. 620, 58 So. 411 (1912) ir
which a prior act (Act No. 163 of 1910) was held constitutional.
189 L.S.A.-R.S. 56:322 and L.S.A.-R.S. 56:362. The former provision relates tc
the protection of sport fishing and the latter to commercial fishing.
190 The Commission consists of the Commissioner of Wildlife and Fisheries, th(
President of the State Board of Health, the Commissioner of Conservation, the Com
missioner of Agriculture and Immigration, the Executive Director of the Depart
ment of Commerce and Industry, and the Attorney General, or their authorize(
representatives. L.S.A.-R.S. 56:1431.
191 L.S.A.-R.S. 56:1433: "'Person' includes any municipality, industry, public o
private, or co-partnership, firm, or any other entity."
192 L.S.A.-R.S. 56:1433: "'Waters of the state' includes rivers, streams, lakes, am
all other water courses and waters within the confines of the state, and all borderinj
waters, including the Gulf of Mexico."
193 L.S.A.-R.S. 56:1434.
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times upon private or public property for the purpose of inspecting and
investigating conditions relating to the pollution of any waters of
the state.^'^*
The powers and duties of the commission are defined as follows:
The commission:
(1) Shall establish such pollution standards for waters of the
state in relation to the public use to which they are or
may be put as it deems necessary;
(2) May ascertain and determine for record and for use in
making its orders what volume of water actually flows in
any stream, and the high and low water marks of waters of
the state affected by the waste disposal or pollution of
any person;
(3) May by order or regulation control, regulate, or restrain
the discharge of any waste material or polluting substance
discharged or sought to be discharged into any water of
the state.
(4) May prohibit any discharge resulting in pollution which
is unreasonable and against the public interest in view of
the existing conditions in the waters of the state.
The Commissioner of Wildlife and Fisheries is to enforce and ad-
minister the statutes relating to the commission and the rules, regula-
tions, and orders of the commission through the agents and enforce-
ment officers of the Commission of Wildlife and Fisheries. ^^''^
It is provided that no person is to discharge, or permit to be
discharged, into any waters of the state any waste or pollution that
tends to destroy fish or wild or domestic animals or fowls or to be
injurious to the public health or welfare in violation of any rule, order,
or regulation of the commission, under penalty of fine and/or im-
prisonment.
Administrative machinery is provided for the commission to carry
out its functions. When in the opinion of the commission any person
violates or is about to violate any of the above provisions, or fails to
control the polluting content or waste discharged or to be discharged
into any waters of the state, the commission may notify the alleged
offender of such determination. The person must within 10 days
from such notification file a full report showing what steps have been
and are being taken to control the pollution. The commission may
then make such orders as in its opinion are necessary. In an emergency
that causes or threatens irreparable damage, or if the public interest
requires it, the commission may issue a temporary order requiring the





198 L.S.A.-R.S. 56:1444. ''
57
not be effective for more than five days beyond the date of the hearing
and in no event for more than twenty days."^'^^
Any person who feels aggrieved by any order or restriction of the
commission may file a petition with the commission asking for a hear-
ing of the matter involved. The commission must then fix the time |i
and place of the hearing and notify the petitioner. Following the hear-
ing, the final order of determination of the commission is conclusive.
The order may be reviewed anew, however, in the District Court of
East Baton Rouge upon petition. On such review, the decree of the
court takes the place of the order of the commission. 200
In 1947, the act creating the Stream Control Commission-"^ was
attacked as unconstitutional under the Fourteenth Amendment of the
United States Constitution and under the Louisiana Constitution. In
Texas Co. v. Montgomery,-"- the Texas Company brought a bill in
equity before a Federal District Court against the Commissioner of
Wildlife and Fisheries, seeking a preliminary injunction. The court
held the act to meet the test of due process and not to confiict with
the prohibitions of the State Constitution cited by petitioner which
were in issue before the court. -""^ The court mentioned, however, that
there might be merit in the petitioner's contention that the act violates
the State Constitution in that it vests power in the commission to de-
clare what conduct shall constitute a misdemeanor, a power that can
be exercised only by the Legislature,-"^ but as no criminal action under
the act was before the court, it did not decide this point. ^"-^
Another statute dealing with pollution of streams provides that:
No person shall knowingly and wilfully empty or drain or permit
to be emptied or drained from any pump, reservoir, well, or oil 1
field into any natural stream of the state any oil, salt water, or
noxious or poisonous gases or substances in quantities sufficient
to destroy the fish therein. ^o*^' -
This statute is followed immediately by the following provision:
The commissioner of wildlife and fisheries shall supervise all
drainage of salt water and other noxious substances into the natu-
ral streams of the state. Any owner or operator or oil producing
property or oil tanks or reservoirs discharging salt water or any i
other noxious substances into the natural streams of this state
in quantities sufficient to kill the fish therein shall, when notified "
by the commissioner of wildlife and fisheries, immediately im-
199 L.S.A.-R.S. 56:1441.
200 L.S.A.-R.S. 56:1442.
201 L.S.A.-Acts 1940, No. 367. This act is now embodied in L.S.A.-R.S. 56:1431
et. seq.
202 73 F. Supp. 527 (1947) ; affirmed 332 U.S. 827 (1947) .
203 Texas Co. v. Montgomery, 73 F. Supp. 527, 536 (1947) .
204 Id. at 535.
205 Id. at 536.
20G L.S.A.-R.S. 56:1451.
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pound such substances. Substances so impounded mav be released
f
by permission of the commissioner of ivildlife and fisheries.--'
Violation of these two statutes calls ior fine or imprisonment.-"^'^
Apparently, they are supplementary to L.S.A.—R.S. 38:216 (discussed
above-09) , which also regulates pollution of streams bv oil-well operators.
R.S. 38:216 seems to be designed primarily for the protection of irriga-
tion, and its restrictions are applicable onh" to pollution of streams
used for irrigation having their sources -^vithin Louisiana. The two
statutes quoted above appear to be applicable to pollution of anv nat-
ural streams, but are limited to pollution affecting fish life, other pollu-
tion not being within their scope.
The State Commissioner of Conservation, who administers oil and
gas conservation laws, has authority to make reasonable regulations and
orders, after notice of hearing, to pre\ent the pollution of fresh water
supplies by oil, gas, or salt water: and conversely to prevent or regu-
late the intrusion of water into oil or gas strata.
DiflFused Surface Waters
A law dictionary defines "surface waters" as ^vaters -^vhich "diffuse
themselves over the surface of the ground, follo^ving no defined course
or channel, and not gathering into or forming anv more definite bodv
of water than a mere bos^ or marsh. "-^^
There is only one reported case-^- in Louisiana ^vhich discusses the
right of a person possessing lands to use the diffused surface waters that
lie on his land. In this case the Second Circuit Court of Appeal of
Louisiana, "which wrs faced with a situation in which an o-^vner of an
upper estate had constructed terraces on his land such that ^s-aters were
diverted a^s'ay from a natural drain onto the lower owner's land at a
point other than that at which thev naturallv would enter, said that:
The action of defendant in constructino^ the terrace ^\'as certainlv
within itself a la-^s'ful act, and for the purpose of improving his
property, and rendering it better adapted for agriculture; and
even conceding that Article 661 of the Civil Code is applicable
to surface waters which fall upon the land from the clouds, it
must be construed with the preceding article-^^ and ^vith the rule
of construction which has been uni\ersallv follo-^ved bv the Su-
preme Court of this state in its application of the law to cases
where one of the o^vners of contiguous estates has constructed works
for impro\"ing and cultivating his land.
2or L.S.A.-R.S. 56:1452.
208 L.S.A.-R.S. 56:1453.
209 See text at note 187, supra.
210 L.S.A.-R.S. 30.4 (c) .
211 See definition of "Surface Waters," Black's Law Dictionary, Fourth Edition,
p. 1762.
212 Chandler v. Scogin, 5 La. App. 484 (1926).
213 See Articles 660 and 661 in Appendix, infra.
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The universal rule in this state has been to construe the law so
as to reconcile it with the interests of agriculture . . .; and where
the work is done for the improvement of the property for agricul-
tural purposes, we cannot conceive of its being ordered destroyed
unless the person demanding its destruction shows that it will
injure his property.
The provisions of Article 661 of the Civil Code do not vest in
the proprietor of an estate or in the estate through which a
stream flows any right in the bed of the stream which is not a
part of the estate nor in the water which falls upon other estates
!
which may finally reach and become a part of the stream . . .; and
if defendant chooses, he may prevent the water from coming into
the drain . . ., and plaintiff could not have any case of complaint
unless he shows injury . . .
Although the court denied that the lower owner had any rights
in the diffused surface waters appearing on the lands of the upper own-
er, and that the upper owner might prevent the water from entering
the drain, it implied that there would be a cause of action if the lower
owner could show injury. It was contended that the diversion of the
water into another drain caused flooding of lower lands, but the court
refuted this. What other types of injury might furnish a basis for a
cause of action was not made clear. It is problematical whether a lower,
owner would be entitled to a certain portion of the diffused surface
waters from the upper owner's lands for purposes, for example, of
irrigation, if he could show that his crops were being injured by the
deprivation of the waters. At any rate, the court made it clear that the
lower owner was not entitled as a matter of right to any of the water
in the absence of injury. Furthermore, this case did not actually involve
the withholding of surface waters, but, rather, the diversion of water!
away from a drain so that the water reached the lower estate at a point'
other than the one it would normally have reached. Thus it was es-i
sentially a drainage rather than a "right to use" case. In view of this
it is probable that the decision should not be given a great deal of
weight regarding rights of use.^i*
It will be recalled that the State Supreme Court has indicated for
particular purposes that streams that only flow during rainy seasons or
that do not have well-defined banks may nevertheless be considered
natural watercourses. In one case, however, a body of water lying in a
swamp forming a part of a so-called shallow lake that conveyed water
214 It may be noted that this case was decided not by the State Supreme CouTt
but by a Court of Appeal. Under the 1921 Constitution, the Supreme Court is
the highest court and has been the court of last resort in the state in this andjj'
many other kinds of civil suits when more than $2,000 is involved. However, under
a constitutional amendment approved by the voters in 1958, decisions of the inter-!
mediate courts of appeal (increased from 3 to 4) apparently now will generally!
be unappealable in most cases (see La. Const, of 1921, Art. 7, sees. 10, 20, and 29;
as amended by S. B. Bill 128, 1958) , although the Supreme Court may still decidel
questions of law on the request of any court of appeal (Const. 1921, Art. 7, sec. 25) .|
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sometimes one way and sometimes another and depended for its ex-
istence on rainwater or overflow from streams, was considered a mere
slough, not a stream. It is problematical whether the courts might
treat certain shallow bodies of water, although not classed as nor con-
nected with a stream, as shallow lakes or bayous to which riparian rights
might attach. it would seem that, to be so treated, they would need
at least to have poorly defined banks.
Although there is little authority as to the right of an upper owner
to prevent diffused surface waters from reaching the lower estate,
there is a great deal of law concerning his right to dispel such waters
from his estate. The basic Civil Code provision (Article 660) relating
to this subject reads as follows:
It is a servitude due by the estate situated below to receive the
waters which run naturally from the estate situated above, pro-
vided the industry of man has not been used to create that servi-
tude.
The proprietor below is not at liberty to raise any dam, or to
make any other work, to prevent this running of the water.
The proprietor above can do nothing whereby the natural servi-
tude due by the estate below may be rendered more burdensome.
The last paragraph of this provision determines the rights of the
upper estate owner in regard to drainage of surface waters from his
lands. Taken literally, this paragraph might be interpreted to mean
that the waters must be left to drain at their own speed and in their
own course, without being speeded up or rechanneled by the upper
landowner. It is clear, however, that generally the court will construe
the paragraph liberally in favor of the upper owner,^^^ so that a certain
amount of drainage works necessary to the proper cultivation and to
the agricultural development of his estate may be constructed. In de-
termining the amount of drainage construction to be allowed, the court
has stated the following rules to be applicable:
The owner of the superior estate may make all drainage works
which are necessary to the proper cultivation and to the agricul-
tural development of his estate. To that end, he may cut ditches
and canals by which the waters running on his estate m.ay be con-
centrated, and their flow increased beyond the slow process by
which they would ultimately reach the same destination.
But the owner of the superior estate cannot improve his lands to
the injury of his neighbor, and thus he will not be allowed to
cut ditches or canals, or do other drainage works by which the
waters running on his lands will be diverted from their natural
flow, and concentrated so as to flow on the lower lands of the
215 See Natural Watercourses, Definition, supra.
2i« See Natural Lakes and Bayous, infra.
2i7Guesnard v. Bird's Ex'rs., 33 La. Ann. 796 (1881) ; Chandler v. City of Shreve-
port, 169 La. 52, 124 So. 143 (1929) ; State ex rel. Wood v. Finder 41 So. 2d. 479,
485 (La. App. 1949) .
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adjacent estate at a point which would not be their natural desti
nation, thus increasing the volume of water which would by nat
ural flow run over or reach any portion of the lower adjaceni
estate, or to drain over his neighbor's lands stagnant waters froir
his, and to thus render the servitude due by the estate below more
burdensome.
In practice, it may be difficult to determine in a particular fact situa
tion whether a particular drainage is or is not allowable.
With respect to the application of the above-quoted Civil Code Ar
tide 660 to the obstruction of drainage by a lower landowner, the
court in 1852 said that every low place in a field which might drair
rainwater from above was not to be considered as a "natural drain.'
even though it might run through adjacent estates.--" The court saic
that, in the best interests of agriculture:
When the low places in a field are not too deep to be drainec
by the system of draining now in general use, they become a parf
of the field, and cease to be natural drains.
It noted further that:
There are, no doubt, cases in which the drainage ... is interruptec
by bayous and deep coulees, which the proprietor of the lowei
estate is bound to keep open . . .
Nevertheless, in a later case in which the court enjoined the obstruc
tion of natural drainage by a lower owner, held to be in violation olj
Article 660 of the Code, this drainage consisted of no more than the
scattered flow of rainfall water across lower land having only a fe\A
inches less elevation.
218 Ludeling v. Stiibbs, 34 La. Ann. 935, 937 (1882) . In an earlier case, th<
court noted that early grants of land in Louisiana were made with the condition
"that the land should be cultivated . . ." This, the court said, implied "the right
to drain them to the rear . . ." which was the natural direction of drainage, ". ., . b)
means of ditches ..." — but the right shotild be exercised so as to cause no unneces-
sary injury to others. Becknell v. Weindhal, 7 La. Ann. 291, 292 (1852) .
219 On the question of the possibility of increasing the burden of the natura
servitude of drainage by the drainage of irrigation water from irrigated land, see
Broussard v. Cormier, 154 La. 877, 98 So. 403, 405 (1923) ; Cornett v. Herbert, 31 So
2d. 446, 448-449 (La. App., 1947) . The 1950 Census reported that 219,219 acre;
or more than 1/3, of the irrigated land in the state was artificially drained. 195C
U.S. Census of Agriculture, Vol. Ill, Irrigation of Agricultural Lands, Part 8, Louisi
ana, State Table 2.
220 Becknell v. Weindhal, supra, 7 La. Ann. 291, 292-293 (1852).
221 Both the upper and lower landowners were rice irrigators. Broussard v. Cor
mier, 154 La. 877, 98 So. 403 (1923) . See also Louisiana Irrigation and Mill Co. v
Sixth Ward Drainage Dist., 158 La. 701, 104 So. 623 (1925) , which is in genera:
accord. It may be noted that in tlie early Becknell case, supra, the court's decision
appears to have been influenced by the provision of an alternate drain and thej




The authors ha^e been unable to disco\-er anv reported cases in
Louisiana dealing ^sith rights to T\-aters h ing beneath the surface of
the earth. The Louisiana Ci\-il Code pro\-isions that T\-ould appear to
be most applicable to such rights are the follo^vinCT:--
Article 491. Perfect oiaiership gi\-es the right to use. to enjo\- and
to dispose of one's propert\^ in the most unlimited manner, pro-
vided it is not used in anv T\-a\- prohibited bv la^\-s or ordinances.
Article 503. The o^\-nership of the soil carries ^\-ith it the o^\-ner-
ship of all that is directh- aboA"e and under it.
The owner mav make upon it all the plantations, and erect all
the buildings ^vhich he thinks proper, under the exceptions es-
tablished in the title: Of Sen itudes.
He ma\- construct beloA\- the soil all manner of ^\-orks. dippin^s; as
deep as he deems com-enient. and drags' from them all the benefits
^vhich maA" accrtie. inider stich modification as ma\- result from the
la^s's and regulations concerning mines and the laA\"s and regulations
of the police.
Article 666. The laA\- imposes upon the proprietors ^'arious obli-
gations tOA\-ards one another, independent of all agreements: and
those are the obligations A\"hich are prescribed in the follo-^\'ing
articles.
Article 667. Although a proprietor mav do ^\-ith his estate A\-hat-
ever he please, still he cannot make an\- -^vork on it, "ivhich ma\'
deprive his neighbor of the libertv of enjo^ino: his o"^\"n. or "isdiich
mav be the cause of an\- damage to him.
Article 66S. Although one be not at libertv to make an^" ^vork
bv -^\-hich his neighbor's btiildinss m3.\ be damaged, xet every one
has the libertv of doing on his o^vn ground ^diatsoeA^er he pleases.
althou,2:h it should occasion some incon\"eniences to his neighbor.
Article 2315. E\"erv act "^vhatever of man that causes damage to
another, obli,2^es him b\" ^^Tiose fault it happened to repair it. . . .
Althouoii none of these articles has been interpreted in anv case
concerning rights to A\-aters. the\" ha\'e been disctissed in T\'hat are
perhaps analogous cases concerning rights attaching to underground
gas and oil. In Hi,o;orins Oil and Fuel Co. v, Guarantv Oil Co. 1 1919)--^
the plaintiff had sunk an oil ^vell on his land,--- and was drawing oil
therefrom bv means of a ptunp ^sdien defendant sank a ^cell on its
land approximatelv 400 feet from plaintifl's well. The defendant's
'^vell pro\-ed to be a nonprodticer and T\-as abandoned, but h\' some
means of underground comminiication it let air into the area affected
bv the plaintiff's pump, consequentlv reducing the production markedh".
Although Griffin v. Mares. 54 So. 2d, SoS La. App., 2d, Cir,^ 1951 dealt with
!
the construction of an agreement for joint use of a ^sater ^vell. The court held that
I
the plaintiff had not been prevented from making use of his one-half interest in
' the well which -^\-as located on or along the propertv line between adjoining properties.
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This well in Evangeline Parish pumps ground water for irrigation purposes
The plaintiff sought to have the defendant plug the open well to stop
the flow of air. But the trial court held that the plaintiff had no cause
of action, and the plaintiff appealed.
The Supreme Court noted in its reported decision that "subterranear
or percolating waters" presented an analogous situation, and stated thai
"In the civil law the right to drain off by means of a deeper well the
subterranean water of the neighbor is well settled . . ."^25 couri
suggested that this would be so at least so long as there were no injury
to the surface of a neighbor's land, «uch as drying it up. It also suggestec
that it would make no difference whether the withdrawal of watei
were accomplished by means of a pump or by relying on the natura'
flow or percolation of the water.^se
223 145 La. 233, 82 So. 206, 5 A.L.R. 411 (1919) .
|
224 Apparently neither plaintiff nor defendant actually owned the tracts upoi
which they sank their wells, but merely held oil leases.
225 82 So. at 211. See also Ohio Oil Co. v. Ferguson, 213 La. 183, 34 So. 2d. 746
750 (1947) . For a discussion of the view that caution should be exercised in drawing
such analogies between water and oil or gas because of differences in their nature o
use, see Summers, W. L., The Law of Oil and Gas, Vol. lA, Sec. 62 (1954) . In an^
event, it should be borne in mind that the withdrawal of oil and gas, unlil<:e water
has been made subject to considerable regulation by a state agency since 1940., See
L.S.A.—R.S. 30.1 et. seq. This may include the establishment of drilling units anc
pooling arrangements.
226 82 So. at 211, citing New York and Mississippi cases. The court has nol
defined percolating groundwaters, but they would seem, in general, to constituti
such waters as seep or percolate through the ground and are not shown to be con-
fined in any definite underground watercourse.
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The court went on. howe\ er. to di-cuss the effect of the abo\-e-quoted
Code articles on the case at hand. ^\-hich in\olved oil wtlU. It reasoned
as follows:
This last article--' can be but of little assistance in the case, for
it applies onlv to a person \\ho is at fault, or. in other ^vordv. ^vho
has committed,, or is committing a ^vrong; and the question in the
case is -^vhether the defendant is 'at fault.'
The pro^ision of Article 667. that the o^\'ner ma\" not make an\-
work on his propert\' 'T\-hich ma\" be the cause of an\- damage to'
his neighbor is found imder the title of "Of Ser\itudes." and hence
apparently is one of the exceptions to ^vhich Article 505 refers,
and hence -^N'ould seem to be a limitation upon Article 505.
It is also apparently in direct conflict \\iih the provision of Article
491 that "o-^N-nership gi^'es the right to enjoy and dispose oi one's
property- in the most inilimited manner." The line of demarcation
bet-^veen ^vhat an o^vner ma\" do ^vith impunity and i\'hat he may
not do without incurring liability is drawn by Article 66S be-
tween what is a mere incom enience and what causes a real damage.
But this cannot be the meaning: for very e\identh' an owner can-
not be debarred from the legitimate use of his proper t\' simply
because it ma\- cause a real damage to his neighbor. It ^vould be
contrary to the fundamental legal principle according to ^\'hich
the exercise of a right cannot constitute a fault or Avrong, and
besides, eyery damage is real; an unreal damage cannot be a
damage.--*
Thus, the mere fact that the plaintiff had been injured in this case
did not necessarily gi\'e it a cause of action against defendant; for. as
defendant had a right to make ^\T)rks upon his own land, the exercise
of that right could not constitute a fault or a ^vrong. After re\"ie^\- of the
French authorities on this subject. hoT\-eyer. the court concluded that
such cases as this should not be decided by an\- inflexible rule, but should
be guided b\ iwo general principles: (1) that the o^vner must not
injure seriousb: any right of his neighbor, and (2i eyen in the absence
of any right on the part of the neighbor, he must not in an unneighborly
spirit do that ^vhich ^vhile of no benefit to himself causes damage to
the neighbor.--'^ It is on this latter pchnt that the coin-t apparently de-
cided the case in fayor of the plaintiff. As defendant Ts-as obtaining no
utility from the well and was injuring plaintiff, the court held that
plaintiff had sho^vn a cause of action.-"
In iw'o cases im"olying ^\-aste of gas (a gas ^\'ell had "blo-^vn out")
,
the court has said that adjoining lando^vners would not be able to com-
plain of the depletion of the portion of the gas reser\-oir Iving beneath
their lands, if the depletion had been caused b^' the depleter's taking
227 L.S.A.-Civil Code, Art. 2315, i Authors' footnote.)
228 Higgins Oil and Fuel Co. v. Guaranty Oil Co., 145 La. 233, 82 So. 206, 207, 5
A.L.R. 411 (1919) .
229 Id. at 82 So. 211
230 Id. at 82 So. 212
65
the gas for a useful purpose. (But in a later case, the court quotec
approvingly its prior reference in the above-discussed Higgins Oil anc
Fuel Co. case to a U. S. Supreme Court case in which the owner o
one of the tracts of land overlying an oil and gas basin "was restrainec
from wasting the gas, even though his doing so was for the—to him-j
useful purpose of lifting the oil to the surface."232)
If the gas is being wasted, as in the two cases involved, the adjoining
owners can obtain an injunction to prevent the waste, but still cannot
obtain money damages unless negligence or willful wastage can be
shown.233
The court has sometimes referred to the "coequal" or "correlative' >
rights of the owners of lands overlying oil and gas fields, and has madf'
the statement that:
The rights of the several owners of the gas field are coequal; on(
owner cannot exercise his own right so as to preclude his neighboi
from exercising his, or so as to interfere with the neighbor.^s*
But the court also has referred to the ability of one to withdraw ar
undue proportion to the detriment of the others, in the absence oJ
regulatory legislation. (Legislation relating to oil and gas wells is
embodied in L.S.A.-R.S. 30:1, et seq.)
It should again be emphasized that none of these cases involved
water or water rights, and that if the court were faced squarely with
a case concerning percolating ground waters, it might depart from the
language of the above cases. Nevertheless, in view of the court's em
ployment of an analogy to ground water in the Higgins oil case, dis
cussed above, the court might also analogize in the opposite direction
and apply principles in percolating ground water cases similar to those
which it applies to oil and gas cases.
There would appear to be no way of determining at present
whether a distinction may be made between different forms of ground
waters and the rights connected to them. It is possible that different
231 Louisiana Gas and Fuel Co. v. White Bros., 157 La. 487, 143, So. 383, 85 A.L.R,
1147 (1932).
232 Hunter Co. v. McHugh, 202 La. 97, 11 So. 2d. 495, 505 (1942) .
233 McCoy V. Arkansas Natural Gas, 175 La. 487, 143 So. 383; 184 La. 101. 165 So.
632 (1936); 191 La. 332, 185 So. 274 (1938); 4 A.L.R. 2d. 205-206.
234 Higgins Oil and Fuel Co. v. Guaranty Oil Co., supra, at 82 So. 212; Hunter
Co. V. McHugh, 202 La. 97, 11 So. 2d. 495, 502, 505 (1942) .
235 Hunter Co. v. McHugh, supra, at 11 So. 2d. 502 and 503.
In a recent Federal case involving a Louisiana situation, the court held (citing
Louisiana cases) that "there is no legal duty or ol)ligation on the part of land
owners to refrain from engaging in the lawful production of gas from their own
lands, notwithstanding the fact that such production may cause drainage from sands
underlying adjoining lands." Billeaud Planters v. Union Oil Co. of California, 245
F. 2d. 14, 19 (1957) .
In any event, the Louisiana court has held that the drilling of a well on one's
own land which descends at an angle so as to reach beneath another's land consti-'
tutes a trespass and is not permissible. Gliptis v. Fifteen Oil Co., 204 La. 896, 16 So.
2d. 471, 474 (1943) .
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rights may attach to ^vaters considered to be percolating ground waters
in contrast to underground streams, or underground waters flo^dne in
conjunction ^A-ith a natural above-ground stream. In other states ^/.here
such questions ha^e arisen, the appellate courts have usuallv held or
said that the underground streams and underflows of surface ^.vater-
courses are governed bv about the same rules of law that 3.vjtjIv to
surface -vv-atercourses. but that all groundwaters will be Dresur.ied to
be percolatino; ^//aters rather than in an undersrround s:rea:r: ur/.ess
some evidence to the contrarv is presented to the court. Perhaos this
distinction will be made also in Louisiana, but there is no indication
from the court as ^et thai it m'HI be made.
Natural Lakes and Bayous
Rights re,garding the use of the x-.-aters of natural lakes and bayous
ap}3ear to be unsettled.
There are no reported Louisiana Supreme Court decisions specificallv
concerned ^vith rights to use '/.-:i:ers from natural lakes and bayous. In
1925, ho^vever, the Second Circuit Court of Appeal of Louisiana decided
a case concemins; rights to the -^vaters of a bavou T\-hich the court felt
was probably not a runnino^ stream.-- The ba\ou "5'.as not navigable;
it was about 2.000 feet long and 100 feet ^dde. The plaintiff o^\med
land on one side of this bavou. and sought an injunction to prevent
the defendant from taking water from the bavou for purposes of irri-
gating his lands, which drained into but did not adjoin the bavou. The
defendant ^A-as taking the water under a contract entered into ^/rith the
person who o^vmed the land bet^v-een his land and the ba^.ou. on the
opposite side of the bavou from the plaintiff. The contract purported
to authorize him to pump the neater and convex- it across the inter-
vening land.
The trial court granted the injunction. Bu: the Cjurt of Appeal
reversed this judgment on the grounds that plaintiff did not shov: that
he would be damaged bv the taking of water, in that he did not sho^.r
how much water would be pumped, nor that plaintiff desired the "./ater
other than for fishing and to maintain the market value of his land,
nor that defendant's Dumping of "^cater T\-ould kill anv fish or ha^e an^
appreciable effect on the ba\"Ou except in extremelv drv seasons. Lender
the general rule of law that an injunction ^\-ould not be issued unless
actual or impending damages are shown, the injunction T^-as denied. The
court added: "Ho^/.-eA-er, plaintiff's right to rene^.^• the action, should
necessitv for it arise, should be reser\-ed." But the court did not other-
wise discuss how the bodv of water should be classified, nor did it
discuss what difference it would make if the bavou had been a running
stream, nor anv question of riparian rights or use of ^.vater on nonri-
parian land.
A I..R. 13.36. 109 A.L R,
Jackson v. Walton 2 Li A : : -i' A L R. BS7. Also see eir'.ier dii-
cussions of this case under .V.;: . :. : Z : and Nonrip . Use.
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It is possible that not a great deal of weight should be put on th
case since (1) it was never clearly established that the bayou was no
a stream, and (2) the only rules of law expressed by the court were thos
pertaining to injunctions rather than water rights as such.^^s But th
case does support the proposition that a riparian owner cannot enjoii
the taking of water from a nonnavigable, nonflowing body of water b
a nonriparian landowner under a contract with a riparian owner, wher
no actual or impending damage is shown. It is doubtful whether th
holding should be extended beyond this to include any broader state
ment of riparian rights.^ss
L.S.A.—R.S. 9:1101 declares the waters of all bayous, lagoons, lake:
and bays not under the direct ownership of any person on August
1910, to be the property of the state. Unlike the waters in rivers an>
streams, which always have been insusceptible of private ownership ur
der Article 450 of the Civil Code relating to running water,^*! it wouL
appear that there is no Code restriction that would have made th
waters in lakes and bayous (other than such as might be classed a
"running water") insusceptible of private ownership. The implicatio
of the statute is, in fact, to the contrary—that such waters may be pr
vately owned. If they are susceptible of private ownership, it seem
possible that Article 505 of the Code would place this ownership of th
water in the person owning the soil beneath the waters.
The ownership of the beds of all navigable lakes was vested in th
state on its admission into the United States in 1812. ^^"^ By the terms c
the 1921 Constitution, the state cannot now transfer title to the beds c
navigable waters except for reclamation purposes,^** but prior to 192
there was no such restraint. In the 1954 case of California Co. v. Price,^^
the court held that any beds of navigable lakes or bays could have bee
transferred by the Legislature to private individuals prior to 1921, an
that, under a prescriptive statute of 1912,24« the state could not attac
those transfers in the 1954 case even though the public policy of th
state is probably contrary to such transfers.
238 Also recall earlier discussion in note 214 about this being a decision of
lower appellate court, not the Supreme Court.
239 It would seem that for riparian rights to attach to a shallow nonflowing bayc
or lake it would need to have at least poorly defined banks, as discussed earlier und«ji
Diffused Surface Waters.
240 See Appendix, infra.
241 See Appendix, infra.
242 See text at notes 53 and 54, supra.
243 California Co. v. Price, 225 La. 706, 74 So. 2d. 1, 2 (1954). But see qualificatic
in note 109, supra. The State Supreme Court has indicated that the state's ownershi
of the bed of a navigable lake generally extends to the high-water mark. Roy, Inc.
Bd. of Comm'rs, Pontchartrain Levee District, 237 La. 541, 111 So. 2d, 765, 768, (195£
244 L.S.A.-Const. of 1921, Art. 4, Sec. 2. See text at note 105, supra.
245 225 La. 760, 74 So. 2d. 1 (1954).
246 L.S.A.-R.S. 9:5661. See note 106, supra.
247 California Co. v. Price, 225 La. 706, 74 So. 2d. 1, 11-14 (1954).
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" There was little discussion by the court in this case regarding what
effect private ownership of the bed might have on the right to use
the overlying waters. It did recognize that the ownership of beds would
be subject to the superior rights of the government and the public to
the "unhampered use of the water above them for navigation, commerce,
fishing and the like."^^^ What "and the like" might mean is difficult
to determine.
A strong dissenting opinion (the case was decided by a 4 to 3 vote)
deals with the problem created by considering the effect of L.S.A.—Civil
Code, Article 505, which states that "The ownership of the soil carries
with it the ownership of all that is directly above or under it," on the
granting of private ownership of the bed.^^^ The dissent maintains that
Article 505 gives complete ownership of the waters to the owner of
the bed, and that if the bed is placed in private ownership the state can
have no legal claim to the use of the waters. -^^
It may well be, however, that waters in navigable lakes may be
held to be insusceptible of private ownership despite the lack of any
codal provision declaring this to be the case, as has been held with
respect to underground oil and gas.^^^ The question of rights to reduce
the water to possession, and what effect the ownership of the bed might
have on this right, might then be involved.
The following questions then are left undecided:
1. Are the waters of navigable lakes susceptible of private own-
ership?
2. If they are, does their ownership accompany ownership of the
beds?
3. If so, what rights in the waters are reserved to the state and
the public?
4. If the waters of lakes are insusceptible of private ownership,
does ownership of the beds provide the right to reduce the
waters to possession?
5. If there is such a right to reduce to possession, is it subject to
other rights of other individuals, or the state and public?
6. In any case, what are the rights of a shore owner as opposed
to a bed owner, where the owners are different individuals?
' As can be seen, despite the court's holding that the beds of navigable
lakes are susceptible of private ownership, very little has been clearly
decided as to the rights to the water itself.^^^
I 248 Id. at 74 So. 2d. 11.
i
249 Id. at 74 So. 2d. 23-24. This problem was not directly dealt with by the majority
i opinion.
250 Id. at 74 So. 2d. 24.
251 See Ground Waters, supra.
252 See Doiron v. O'Bryan, note 130, supra, where riparian rights in a navigable
! lake were discussed. But the case dealt only with the question of ownership of formerly




It appears to be unquestioned that the beds of nonnavigable lakes!
are susceptible of private ownership. ^^^^ (Whether a particular ripariani
owner owns any part of the bed depends on the circumstances. ^s*) It isl
not clear, however, whether ownership of the bed carries with it the
rights to exclusive use of the water of the lake or bayou. It would seem
likely that if one person owns all the land surrounding a nonnavigable
lake, which is not connected with any other body of water, and also
owns its bed, he would be entitled to an exclusive use of its waters,^'^^
but many problems might arise where ownership of surrounding lands
and the beds are in more than one person. Perhaps some form of ap-j
portionment with respect to the withdrawal of water would be in order
in a situation in which two or more owners hold different lands adjoin-
ing a lake, but it is difficult to guess how a conflict between a person
owning the shore of a lake and another person owning the bed might
be resolved. On the one hand. Article 505 perhaps places ownership and
control of the waters in the owner of the bed,256 but on the other, thCj
court has indicated that the owner of land on the shore of a lake|
has '.'riparian rights. "^^^ Also difficult to determine is the effect of|
ownership of beds and banks on the rights to use the water for fish-
ing, hunting, etc.^^^
Some lakes or bayous may be considered a part of or connected with]
a flowing stream or river. Such lakes or bayous have been discussedl
earlier.259 In one case, the court noted that:
j
Bayous not only serve to supply estates with water, but they also
serve as channels through which estates are drained, and they may!
in particular cases be 'floatable streams,' which serve as highways
for the transportation of logs and other property. As natural drains,,
or 'floating streams,' many persons may be interested in them, so!
253 See California Co. v. Price, 225 La. 706, 74 So. 2d. 1, 10 (1954); State v. Sweet
Lake Land and Oil Co., 164 La. 240, 113- So. 833 (1927); Realty Operators v. State
Mineral Board, 202 La. 398, 12 So. 2d. 198 (1942); McDade v. Caplis, 154 La. 1019,
98 So. 625 (1923), 112 A.L.R. 1120.
254 In the McDade case, supra, at 98 So. 626, the court indicated that a grant of
land bordering on a nonnavigable lake did not include title to any of its bed, even
though all the surrounding land was eventually acquired through such grants. But
the Sweet Lake Land case, supra, suggests that a grant of land entirely surrounding a
nonnavigable lake may include title to its bed without mentioning it. Here the state'
in three separate grants, but on the same day, had granted all the land surrounding
the lake. See 113 So. 834 and 839.
See also State v. Aucoin, 206 La. 786, 20 So. 2d. 136 (1944) regarding shallow lakesj
whose beds were granted to the state as "overflowed land" in swampland grants by|
Congress.
If a nonnavigable bayou is considered a flowing stream, the grant of adjoining land
ordinarily carries title to the bed. See Begnaud v. Grub and Hawkins, supra, note 39.j
255 See Realty Operators v. State Mineral Board, 202 La. 398, 12 So. 2d. 198 (1942)
'
256 See text at notes 53 and 54, supra.
257 Doiron v. O'Bryan, 218 La. 1069, 51 So. 2d. 628 (1951). See notes 130 and
252, supra.
258 See note 66, supra, which has some bearing on this question.
259 See particularly Nature of Riparian Rights: Right to Use Water; and Natural
Watercourses: Definition.
70
that no one person can say as to a particular stream that there is
united in him all the elements of perfect ownership. . . .^^o
Artificial Watercourses
It would appear that, under authority of various articles of the
Civil Code,^^'^ an individual may construct entirely on his own land
any canal, ditch, or other artificial watercourse which he may choose
to make. But his rights connected with such works are less clear when
such artificial watercourse connects with a natural body of water or
otherwise affects the property or rights of other persons.
In 1885, a case arose concerning the rights of contiguous landowners
on a canal to use the water flowing in the canal. The plaintiff in the
case had conveyed an undivided third interest in a sugar estate to the
defendant, the conveyed estate being contiguous to plaintiff's estate.
The conveyance contained a clause giving the plaintiff the right to get
water from a lake or swamp in the front of defendant's estate and con-
duct it through defendant's estate back to plaintiff's estate. Another
clause extended this right to plaintiff's estate itself, rather than merely
to plaintiff personally, and described the canal which was to be used
for transportation of the water. It further providejd that the plaintiff's
estate was to keep the canal free and open at all times, such that no
damage to defendant's estate should occur from transportation of the
water, and that defendant's estate should not obstruct the flow of the
canal except for self-protection.
Plaintiff complained that defendant had placed two dams across the
canal, was drawing off water from the canal, and was about to pollute
the canal with sugarhouse skimmings. He sought to enjoin these actions.
The court in upholding the district judge's decision in favor of the
plaintiff noted that a predial servitude^^^ had been created by the
contract and that the parties' rights in the canal waters were to be
governed not only by the contract but also by the Civil Code provisions
dealing with servitudes. As the contract specifically provided that the
defendant could place no obstruction in the canal to prevent the water
from running freely, it would seem that the dams placed in the canal
by the defendant could have been ordered removed under authority of
the contract itself. The court, however, went further and cited Articles
655, 660, 661, and 777 of the Code (since the parties had created a
200 Palmer v. Wilkinson, 141 La. 874, 75 So. 806, 810 (1917) . For further discus-
sion of this case, see note 52 and Navigable Watercourses: Definition, supra.
' 261 See particularly Articles 491, 505, 667 and 668, quoted under Ground Waters,
supra.
262 Shaffer v. State National Bank, 37 La. Ann, 242 (1885) . Another case, in 1959,
involved the construction of a right-of-way agreement regarding the construction and
iuse of a canal for the irrigation of rice. Kingery v. Reeves, 113 So. 2d. 64 (La. app.,
1st ct.) 1959) .
263 That is, a servitude due one estate by the other, rather than a mere personal
servitude between the parties.
71
predial servitude) "which are to the effect that the owner of the estate
which owes the servitude, can do nothing tending to diminish its use
or to make it more inconvenient. "^64
It stated that:
The law on this subject has been judicially expounded by thu
court in a number of cases, particularly in that of Ludeling v
Stubbs,265 [Authors' footnote] in which, after a review of the juris;
prudence, it was declared that dams illegally obstructing a Rem
of water to the prejudice of one of the contiguous proprietors oi
owners, was a nuisance, which the law would order to be abated.^^'
After citing nine other Louisiana cases to this point,^^^ the couri
continued:
In the present case, it is therefore clear that the dams complained
of and which arrested the water, were illegal obstructions, anc
that the plaintiff cannot be required to endure them, unless for c
time in cases of unavoidable necessity, of which there is no evi
dence in the present controversy. (Emphasis added.)
It would appear that the court felt that in certain circumstance
obstruction of the flow would be allowed.
As to the diversion of water from the canal, the court held that ar
unjustified withdrawal would not be allowed. It expressly provided
however, that the defendant might use the water in a cross ditch or
his estate for supplying his sugarhouse, cultivating and developing hi
estate, and for any other purposes; provided he did not thereby unneces
sarily divert the flow of the canal, or cause any permanent injury to th<
plaintiff which might seriously impair his right to draw water througl
defendant's land citing Article 661.^68 Apparently this would set u{
some form of a reasonable use test in determining the relative right:
in and to the waters of the canal.
2*^^ Shaffer v. State National Bank, 37 La. Ann. 242, 248 (1885).
L.S.A.—Civil Code, Art. 777; "The owner of the estate which owes the servitud
can do nothing tending to diminish its use, or to make it more inconvenient."
"Thus he cannot change the condition of the premises, nor transfer the exercis
of the servitude to a place different from that on which it was assigned in the firs
instance . . ,"
L.S.A.—Civil Code, Art. 655: "One of the characteristics of a servitude is, that i
does not oblige the owner of the estate subject to it to do anything, but to abstair
from doing a particular thing, or to permit a certain thing to be done on his estate.
Articles 660 and 661 are included in Appendix, infra.
2Go 34 La. Ann. 935 (1881) .
sf^^c 37 La, Ann, at 248, 249. It would appear that the court has somewhat expande
the actual holding in Ludeling v. Stubbs, which dealt solely with the right of an up
per owner to cut ditches on his lands and thus divert surface waters onto the lowe
owner's lands in a manner in which they would not naturally flow, and of the righ
of lower owner to obstruct by dam the drainage of the upper estate. There was n(
mention of the right of an upper estate owner to obstruct the flow that would read
the lower estate.
267 As in Ludeling v. Stubbs, supra, none of the cited cases were directly ii
point.
268 Shaffer v. State National Bank, 37 La. Ann. 242, 248 (1885) .
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The threatened pollution of the water by defendant was not en-
joined by the court under the Code nor under the express provisions
of the contract, but rather by inference from the contract, on the
reasoning that to allow pollution would be destructive of the privilege
granted plaintiff to draw water for useful purposes. ^^^^
This case would seem to indicate that the servitude provisions of
the Civil Code are applicable to artificial watercourses where the parties
contract expressly or impliedly for this to occur. In effect, the court
treated the canal as a natural watercourse, at least as between the two
estates involved. It is probable, however, that because of the existence
of the contract between the parties, the case should be limited to its
particular facts as authority.
Navigation canals may be constructed on one's own lands, and a
toll charged for their use even without a franchise from the Legisla-
ture. Domestic corporations organized for the purpose of building
navigation canals have the power of expropriation for rights of way
for such canals,-^^ if the corporations file with the Louisiana Secretary
of State a resolution agreeing to be public utilities,^'^ and the estimated
cost of construction exceeds $3,000,000.^^3 xhey are also given right of
way over public lands. ^'^ The Commissioner of Wildlife and Fisheries
is authorized to acquire by lease, purchase, or expropriation any canals
situated in the coastal parishes useful to the seafood industry, and to
operate them so that they are open to free navigation by all vessels.
The construction, iniprovement, and maintenance of navigation
canals, and the acquiring of property for such purposes, including the
acquiring of adjoining property for industrial development (but no
part of which shall be more than one-half mile from the center of such
canals) are declared to be works of public improvement, the titles to
which are to vest in the public and for public purposes.
The municipalities, as well as the parishes, are authorized to acquire
property for carrying out the above-mentioned public purpose, by ex-
propriation, if necessary. This authority exists in the case of munici-
palities whether the works are within or without their corporate
limits.277
Under the state Constitution, the Legislature is empowered to create
navigation districts as political subdivisions of the state for the purpose
2fi9 Id. at 249.
270 Hiarvey v. Potter, 19 La. Ann. 264, 92 Am Dec. 532 (1867). Ilhenny v. Brous-




274 L.S.A.-R.S. 45:66; L.S.A.-R.S. 34:346.
275 L.S.A.-R.S. 34:341.
276 L.S.A.-R.S. 34:361. Just how this provision can be reconciled with the court
holdings that navigation canals can be privately owned and operated (supra) is
difficult to determine. Perhaps this provision is merely an authorization for public
ownership, rather than a mandate.
277 L.S.A.-R.S. 34:362.
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of obtaining, improving, and maintaining navigation on rivers anl
streams. Pursuant to this, the Legislature has created a few such di|
tricts.2'9
Any canal or other artificial waterway constructed by a levee di
trict, which is navigable in fact and connects with any other navigabl
waters, may be dedicated and declared by the governing authority c
the levee district with the approval of the Department of Public Wort
and concurrence of the United States district engineer, as a waterwa
subject to free and unrestricted navigation by the public.
Prescription
It would appear that a riparian owner's right to use running wate
granted by L.S.A.—Civil Code, Article 66I281 cannot be terminated t
nonusage or failure to exercise the servitude, for the Code explicit
states that:
Prescription for nonusage does not take place against natural c
necessary servitudes, which originate from the situation of places.
^
The servitude created by Article 661 appears to be such a servitude.
Although a riparian owner apparently cannot lose his rights to watc
given under Article 661 through nonusage, there is the possibility that hr
may lose these rights through other means, such as adverse use, implie!
acquiescence, or a conflicting acquired servitude.
The court has given some slight indication that the natural serv
tude of drainage due the upper estate by the lower, by virtue of Artie]
660 of the Code, might be lost under certain circumstances. In a cas
in which the lower owner had filled in a shallow depression in his fiel
such that waters from the upper estate could not use this depression c
a means of escape from the upper estate, the court indicated that on
of its reasons for refusing to compel the lower owner to remove th
obstruction was that the obstruction had been made openly and i
the presence of the upper owner without complaint from the uppe
owner. This implied acquiescence in the existence of the works over
period of years amounted to a waiver of his right to complain.
As the right of natural drainage is a natural servitude arising froi
the situation of places, it would seem that the above-quoted Code pre
vision forbidding prescription against such servitudes might not b
applicable when there is a waiver of a servitude. It should be notec
2T8 L.S.A.-Const. of 1921, Art. 14, § 30.3 (1921).
279 L.S.A.-R.S. 34:401 et. seq.
280 L.S.A.-R.S. 38:291.
281 The article begins: "He whose estate borders on running water may use it
it runs . . ." See Appendix, infra, for complete article.
282 L.S.A.—Ci^ il Code, Art. 795. In contrast, conventional servitudes may be e
tinguished by nonusage during 10 years. See L.S.A.—Civil Code, Art. 789, and casi
noted thereunder.
283 Becknell v. Weindhal, 7 La. Ann. 291 (1852) .
j
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however, that the court placed a great deal of emphasis on the interests
of agriculture in this case, and could have decided it solely on the
grounds that Article 660 of the Code calls for a liberal construction in
the interests of agriculture-^^ That is, it is possible that the upper owner
had never had a right to that particular drainage under Article 660, and
thus had no right which he could waive.
Although the riparian right to use water apparently cannot be lost
by nonuse, it is not clear whether it might not be acquired by a con-
tinuous and apparent use for a period of 10 years. L.S.A.—Civil Code,
Article 765 provides that "continuous and apparent servitudes may be
acquired by title, or by a possession of ten years. "^^s it would seem that
something of a conflict might arise in applying the two servitude articles.
284 The lower owner in this case had provided an alternative drain, so that ap-
parently the upper owner's ability to cultivate his fields was not greatly affected.
Thus, on balance, the total benefit to agriculture was probably maximized by al-
lowing the drain to be closed.
285 cases were found that dealt with the acquisition of a servitude to use
water when it could be said that the use was continuous and apparent. L.S.A.—Civil
Code, Article 727 defines continuous servitudes as "those whose use is or may be
:ontinual without the act of man." Aqueducts, drains, and views are cited
as examples. Discontinuous servitudes are defined as "such as need the act
of man to be exercised." Rights of drawing water, passage, and pasture are
cited as examples. Article 724 states that "The conducting of water or aque-
duct is the right by which one conducts water from his estate through the
land of his neighbor by means of an aqueduct or ditch." Article 720 states
that "The right of drawing water is a servitude by which one suffers his neigh-
bor to draw water from the well or spring he has on his land . . ." The
right is generally limited to the use of those living in his neighbor's house.
From the foregoing general distinction drawn between continuous and discontinuous
servitudes, however, it seems probable that any ditches, canals, or other structures or
devices that would 7iot require "an act of man" for their operation, which are
physically apparent and continuous, and which serve to bring water upon one's estate
could create through prescription a servitude that would entitle the recipient estate
to their continued enjoyment. But in a number of cases, a servitude created through
prescription, such as to convey water through a ditch across another person's land,
may not include any rights to use the source of the water. In any event, it is
problematical whether rights to use a natural watercourse could be acquired
through prescription so as to impair the natural servitude of riparian land-
owners under Article 661, as indicated above.
The pertinent Code articles appear to be derived from French and Spanish
sources. Project of the Civil Code of 1825, 1 Louisiana Legal Archives 78 (1937) ; 15
La. Law Rev. 777, 779 (1955) . ". . . An aqueduct conveying water from a fountain
which rose in another's field . . ." was recognized as an example of a servitude that
could be acquired by prescription in Spanish law. Las Siete Partidas 3.31.15; The
Laws of Las Sieta Partidas 416 (Moreau-Lislet & Carlton Translation 1820) . In one
early case, the Supreme Court indicated that the use of a neighbor's well Avas not
a continuous servitude but it did not describe the nature of such use. Durel v.
Boisblanc, 1 La. Ann. 407 (1846) . A lower appellate court, in a case involving a
sewer line, indicated that continuous servitudes do not require unceasing operation.
Fuller V. Washingon, 19 So. 2d. 730, 731 (La. App., 1944) .
For a more complete discussion of the subject of acquisition of servitudes by
prescription, see 15 La. Law Rev. 777 (1955) .
28G It should be noted, however, that L.S.A.-Civil Code, Article 3504 provides
that "A continuous apparent servitude is acquired by possession and the enjoyment
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If, for instance, an upper riparian owner were to divert water by means
of a canal for a period longer than 10 years he might possibly acquii)e
a servitude under Article 765. But a lower owner apparently cannot be
deprived of his servitude to use water given by Article 661 because of!
nonusage. The question may well be raised as to whether the lower
owner has lost his rights of use, to the extent that they are infringed,
not by nonusage, but by allowing the upper owner to establish his
servitude. In the absence of decided cases it is difficult to predict whether
this approach would be followed.
Incidentally, it may be noted that L.S.A.—R.S. 9:1251, enacted in
1958, provides that if any landowner "expressly or tacitly" allows the
public or certain persons to pass through or across his land solely for
their convenient access to waters for boating or to any recreational
site, they shall not thereby acquire a servitude or right of passage (nor
shall it thereby become a public road or street by reason of a governing
authority's maintaining or otherwise performing work thereon). How-
ever, this shall not prevent "land owners from entering into enforceable
contracts specifically granting" such a servitude,^^^ nor the specific dedi-
cation of roads or passages to public use, nor does it "repeal any laws
creating servitudes along rivers, streams or other waters. "^89
Contrariwise, another statute provides:
When private property is damaged for public purposes any and
all actions for such damages are prescribed by the prescription of
two years, which shall begin to run when the damages are sus-
tained. (Emphasis added.
286 {Continued)
of the right for thirty years uninterruptedly, even without a title or good faith."
Art. 765 has been interpreted to mean that 10 years' prescription will suffice to ac-
quire a contintious, apparent servitude if good faith is present. Kennedy v. Suc-
cession of McCollam, 34 La. Ann. 568, 574 (1882) . For a discussion of the case and
the problems it dealt with, see 15 La. Law Rev. 777, 790, et seq. (1955) . See also
Randazzo v. Lucas, 106 So. 2d. 490 (La. App., 1958) .
287 In Sample v. Whitaker, 171 La. 949, 132 So. 511 (1930), the court held that
a discontinuous mineral servitude in another's land, to drill for and remove
minerals therefrom, may be extinguished, under particular circumstances, when the
ownership of the land is acquired through prescription by the "holder of an ap-
parently valid title for the whole property, in good faith, remaining in undisturbed
possession of the land . . ."—although, under the circumstances, the minority of
some of the owners of the servitude might suspend the operation of a statute pro-
viding for the loss of such a servitude through nonuse. However, the relevance
of such a case to the question at hand is problematical.
-88 See note 145, supra, indicating that such enforceable contracts may be created
by acts sufficient to transfer title.
289 Nor does it repeal laws regarding expropriation of servitudes or authorizing
the legislature or governing authorities to open, lay out, or appoint public roads or
streets.
290 L.S.A.-R.S. 9:5624. It has been held that this statute doesn't apply when
property is taken, but not damaged, for public purposes. A. K. Roy, Inc. v. Bd. of
Comm'rs, Pontchartrain, 237 La. 541 111 So. 2d. 765, 767 (1959). Also see discussion
in this case of R.S. 9:5626 relating to appropriated lands used or destroyed for levees
or levee drainage purposes. See also note 106, supra.
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1958 Declaration of State Policy
Regarding Surface Waters
In 1958, the State Legislature enacted an act which declared a pol-
icy of the state in regard to surface waters including the following:
1. The ownership and control of development and use of surface
waters for all beneficial purposes are within the jurisdiction
of the State which . . . may establish measures to effectuate the
proper and comprehensive utilization and protection of such
waters.
2. The constantly increasing needs of the people of the State for
water requires that the surface water resources within the
State be put to beneficial uses to the extent of which they are
most reasonably capable and the waste and unreasonable use
of surface waters should be prevented, and conservation of
such waters should be accomplished to the fullest extent which
is reasonably possible.
3. The public welfare and interest of the people of the State re-
quire the proper conservation, development, use, and protection
of the inseparable land and water resources.
In the same act, the Legislature provided for a temporary water
resources study commission to study needed revisions in the water pol-
icy of the state and to develop recommended implementing legislation
for the next regular session. (But the commission had not been activated
as of April 1, 1959, and no appropriations had been made available for
that purpose.) It noted that a careful, comprehensive study of surface
water resources and related problems should be made by the state
before enacting any additional water resources legislation, and added
that:
Nothing in this Act shall impair or interfere with the continuance
of any existing valid rights to the use of surface waters, or to in-
terefere with the customary use of water for domestic purposes.
In using the term "surface waters," the Legislature apparently was
primarily concerned with waters in rivers, streams, and other bodies
of water on the earth's surface.
State and Local Agencies or Organizations
Following is a description of some of the functions of various state
and local agencies or organizations that have responsibilities and re-
lated powers concerning water resources.
It was noted in a recent report that:
Including overhead and general expenses of the various state de-
partments involved, the State is spending over $8,500,000.00 on
291 La. Acts 1958, No. 363.
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The State Department of Public Works is empowered to plan, construct^ operate, andj
maintain dams, spillways, reservoirs, canals, locks, levees, drainage and irrigation!
systems, and other public works.
construction, improvement and maintenance of various water
installations for the biennium 1955-56. In addition to this, |3,840,-.
000.00 has been allotted to the various parishes for drainage and*
road purposes.
This report states also that large sums are being spent by special!
drainage, levee, and other districts, and by parishes, municipalities, and'
industry.
State Department of Public Works
This department is empowered to plan, construct, operate, and main-
tain "levees, canals, dams, locks, spillways, reservoirs, drainage systems, ir-
rigation systems—inland navigation projects, flood control and river im-
provement programs—and other public works. "^^^ it may provide (and
charge the reasonable cost of) engineering, economic, and other advisory
services to local governmental subdivisions and special districts. It is also
specifically authorized to plan systems of inland waterways and water
292 Water Problems in the Southeastern States, Research Report No. 5, Louisiana
Legislative Council, April 7, 1955. Quotation is from summary. Also see pp. 42-44 oi
Dec. 1957 revision of this report (Research Study No. 11) regarding 1956 and 1957
appropriations by the state for various programs.
293 L.S.A.-R.S. 38:1 et. seq.
78
conservation projects, to "foster the maintenance, improvement, and
extension of the Intracoastal Canal System and its feeders and initiate,
sponsor, and carry through to completion all waterway projects which
will further develop and expand the water resources of Louisiana . . .,"
subject to the jurisdiction of the United States. The department is
required to confer with the State Wildlife and Fisheries Commission in
the planning of projects affecting wetlands and other wildlife habitat—
whether they are "joint state-federal, state-parish or state or parish
projects."
In order to perform its functions relating to the planning and de-
signing of various hydraulic projects relating to drainage, irrigation,
and water conservation, the department collects and interprets basic
data to appraise the state's water resources. Since 1942, the department
has increased annually the amount of money allocated to its program
of extensively collecting and publishing water-resources data collected
in cooperation with the United States Geological Survey. Streamflow,
water quality, and other surface and ground-water data are collected
under this cooperative program. The State Geological Survey (discussed
later) also contributes funds to this program for the collection of
ground water data.
In addition to its general operating budget, the department from
time to time, by special legislation, has been granted appropriations of
state funds to expend for particular purposes. Frequently, this has been
done to enable the department to assist with projects of local districts,
such as by making surveys, developing plans, or constructing necessary
dams or other facilities. Examples of such assistance are included
later.295
State Stream Control Commission
This commission exercises regulatory powers to control pollution, as
discussed earlier under Pollution Control by Public. It will be recalled
that the commission consists of the Commissioner of Wildlife and
Fisheries, the President of the State Board of Health, the Commissioner
of Conservation, the Commissioner of Agriculture and Immigration,
the Executive Director of the Department of Commerce and Industry,
and the Attorney General, or their authorized representatives.
State Board of Health
This board has jurisdiction over water supplies and waste disposal
within the state for the protection of health. It is authorized and di-
rected to adopt a sanitary code that will include regulations regarding
294 It may be noted that to promote the development of navigation, the Legis-
lature has also created various navigation districts, harbor and terminal districts, and
port commissions or authorities. See L.S.A.—R.S. 34:1 et seq.
295 See, for example, Bayou D'Arbonne Lake Watershed District, and Fish and
Game Preserves, infra.
296 L.S.A.-R.S. 56:1431 et. seq. See L.S.A.-R.S. 33:3881 et. seq with respect to
sewerage districts and sewerage systems.
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these matters. The regulatory powers granted to the Stream Contro
Commission do not deprive the Board of Health of its jurisdiction ii
regard to matters that directly affect the public health.
State Wildlife and Fisheries Commission
Some of the relevant functions of this commission are discussed late
under the heading Fish and Game Preserves. The commission admin
isters various laws relating to the protection, propagation, and taking o
fish and game.^^^
Two identical statutes deal with the protection of fish. L.S.A.—R.S
56:321 and R.S. 56:361 provide that any person taking water from an'
of the fresh waters of the state for any purpose shall provide suitabh
screens on intake pipes in order to prevent fish being removed froni
the streams and destroyed or pumped out upon the land. The requirimj
and approval of such screens is under the judisdiction of the Wildlif<!
and Fisheries Commission. ^oo r.s. 56:321 is meant to apply to th(
protection of sport fishing, and R.S. 56:361 applies to the protection o,
commercial fishing.
i
The commission also exercises certain functions relative to the con
trol of pollution, discussed earlier under the heading Pollution Contro
by Public.
State Geological Survey
The Geological Survey, Department of Conservation, is empowerec
to make a geological survey of the entire state, and it may cooperat([|
with others in doing so.^^i j|- j-^^s published a number of reports or!
surface and ground water resources. It is currently cooperating witl
the State Department of Public Works and the U.S. Geological Surve^
in making investigations of water resources and uses in Louisiana.
Police Juries
These are the governing bodies of the several parishes in the stau
(which are comparable to counties in other states) . These juries an
authorized, among other things, to:
(1) Regulate the construction and repair of dams and levees;
(2) Close and dam small canals or streams of water in the parisl
that are not under the jurisdiction of the United States Gov
207 L.S.A.-R.S. 38:11.
298 L.S.A.-R.S. 56:1437.
299 L.S.A.-R.S. 56:1 et. seq., and Const, of 1921, Art. 6, sec. 1(A) (1921).
300 If, on inspection, a technician determines that a screen over an intake pip<
is needed, the matter is taken up with those making the diversion, by the Commis
sion's D'vision of Water Pollution Control, whose principal function is aquatic bio
logical and chemical research. (Based on information supplied by Mr. K. E. Biglane
Chief of the Division.)
301 See L.S.A.-R.S. 30:201 et seq.
302 See particularly their cooperative report entitled Water: A Special Report t<
the Louisiana Legislature, published by the Department of Public Works in 1956.
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ernment and are found to be harmful to property or public
health. However, the approval of the Department of Public
Works (or any levee district in which the dam is located) must
first be obtained and a public hearing held;
(3) Regulate the clearing of the banks of rivers and natural drains
to secure free passage for boats, logs and timber;
(4) Build dams to prevent salt water from the Gulf of Mexico and
connected waters from entering into fresh-water streams;
(5) Construct and maintain drainage ditches and canals, to open
drains, and perform related functions, and to cooperate in any
related state or federal program.^os
In 1954, the Legislature specifically authorized the Police Jury of
East Carroll Parish "to regulate the height and use of the waters of
Lake Providence . . The Police Jury of Vernon Parish is cooperat-
ing in a joint project with the State Department of Public Works and
the Anacoco-Prairie State Game and Fish Preserve to impound a fresh
water supply. (See Fish and Game Preserves, infra.)
Municipalities
Incorporated municipalities (cities, towns, and villages) have a
variety of powers regarding water resources or water supply. Some
have been included in the special legislative charters of those that
have been created by this method. Other powers are included in general
or other special legislation applicable to all or certain municipalities.
Examples of such powers include powers to operate water works and
acquire necessary property rights for such purposes by purchase or ex-
propriation. Municipalities, as well as parishes, also may engage in
such works of public improvement as the deepening and improvement
of watercourses or construction of canals for navigation purposes and
the acquiring of adjoining property for industrial development.^^^ One
or more municipalities, parishes, or special districts may by agreement
jointly exercise a number of powers that they hold individually.^^''
The court in a 1941 case stated that the police powers of municipali-
ties generally may not be exercised outside their limits even though
they have acquired property outside. It said the Legislature may grant
such powers by special acts but they are to be strictly construed. In this
case the city of Shreveport had been granted regulatory powers regard-
303 L.S.A.-R.S. 33:1236 to 33:1238.
304 Acts 1954, No. 514.
305 See, e.g., L.S.A.-R.S. 33:361; 33:841.
306 See L.S.A.-R.S. 34:361 and 34:362.
307 Provided such agreements (1) do not affect designated types of private or
semi-private activities, including water systems and flood control and drainage
iprojects, and (2) do not constitute a donation of public funds or services of one
municipality, parish, or special district for the benefit of another. L.S.A.-R.S. 33:1321
et. seq.
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ing, and ownership of the bed of, a navigable lake outside its limits
to provide an unpolluted city water supply.
Irrigation Companies
The Louisiana Constitution of 1921 provides that:
"Corporations formed or to be formed . . . for the purpose ol
constructing and operating gravity canals for irrigation and navigation
. . . shall have the right under such regulations as shall be prescribed,
by the Department of Public Works to utilize for such purpose the'
waters of the navigable streams . . . which may be the property ol
the state; . . ."^^^ The term "corporation" includes "all joint stock com i
panies or associations having any power or privilege not possessed b)l
individuals or partnerships. "^^^
It might be noted that L.S.A.—R.S. 9:1101 provides that no one h
to be charged for the use of state waters. As irrigation companies un
doubtedly do charge persons who use the water they supply, it would
seem that either the statute has been abrogated as to this provision or
the companies are charging only for their services, not for the water.
The Legislature has provided that corporations formed to construct
and operate canals for irrigation by gravity have power to acquire all
land needed for rights of way and reservoirs either by negotiation with
the owners of the land or by expropriation. The power of expropriation
may not be used, however, within a township or section having a canal
308 By virtue of acts enacted in 1910, 1920, and 1926. (The regulatory power;!
also encompassed the area around the lake for a distance of 5,000 feet.) The cour'
held that the city's ordinance prohibiting the operation of motor boats withoui
mufflers on the lake was ultra vires and unenforceable because it had no relation tc
the city's regulatory power to prevent pollution of the lake waters. City of Shreve
port V. Case, 198 La. 702, 4 So. 2d. 801 (1941) . See City of Shreveport v. Wilkinson
182 La. 783, 162 So. 621 (1935) , regarding the validity of an ordinance prohibiting
boating on the lake at night. In a case decided by the Court of Appeals, 2nd Circuit
the city's Commissioner of Public Utilities had authorized the defendant, a ripariarj
owner, to l)uild a boat house and pier on the lake for a commercial fish camp, bu
j
other riparians (who used the lake for their private boating and/or residentia
purposes) sought to enjoin its construction and use. The injunction was denied. (TIk
court noted that the city had not adopted any regulations governing the constructioi
of boat houses, piers, etc., nor had the defendant's property been zoned or mad([
subject to any private restrictive convenants.) Haynes v. Smith, 85 So. 2d. 326 (1956)
Recall that the 1958 Uniform Pleasure Boating Act now prohibits the regulatior
of pleasure ])oating by local political subdivisions. See text at note 144, supra. Mu
nicipal corporations were called political subdivisions of the State in State v. Malt
reiean, 193 La. 824, 192 So. 361 (1939) .
j
309 L.S.A.—Const, of 1921, Art. 13, § 6. (This provision also applies to hydroelec!
trie power companies.) Such corporations are also granted "the right to use a
reservoirs . . . the deserted beds of former navigable streams which may be th!
property of the State . . ." It is provided, however, tli«t the property and plants o
companies utilizing this authority shall become state property after 70 years fron
the completion of their canal systems or plants, "to be operated by it for public
revenue in such manner as the Legislature shall direct . . ."—except for canals ii
existence before January 21, 1921.
310 L.S.A.-Const. of 1921, Art. 13, sec. 8.
311 See Nature of Riparian Rights, Ownership of Water, supra.
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already in actual use unless consent is obtained from the owners of
such canal. The Legislature has further provided that not only
may the waters of navigable streams be utilized by companies operating
under this legislation but that "other waters of the State" may be so
used, under regulations prescribed by the Department of Public Works
"for the purpose of preventing unnecessary injury to private or public
property."^^^
These provisions were embodied in Acts 1920, No. 43 which further
provided that any such corporations formed after the act became effect-
ive were to be deemed public service corporations. Corporations in ex-
istence before the passage of the act do not fall within its provisions.
An act passed 4 years prior to the 1920 act was similar and apparently
is still in effect. xhe major differences in the two acts appear to be
that the earlier act:
1. Applies to corporations organized to build and operate not only
irrigation canals, but also commercial navigation and hydro-
electric canals; ^1'^'
2. Does not explicitly grant to the corporations the right to utilize
the waters of the state;'^^'^
3. Restricts the width of the right of way for the construction and
laying out of canals to 600 feet;"^^^
4. Requires that the
,
corporations file with the Secretary of State a
resolution agreeing that the corporations shall be public utilities
before they can exercise the right of expropriation.
There are a number of companies that furnish irrigation water in
the state, particularly in southern Louisiana. In some instances, disputes
regarding their undertakings to supply irrigation water to individual
farmers have reached the Louisiana Supreme Court. But in none of
the reported cases were rights to the source of the water used in dis-
pute. In one case, however, the court noted that irrigation companies'
rights of supplying irrigation water are subject to the condition that
if "they should abuse their right to pump water from the public streams
adjacent to their land, or to the land of those whom they contracted
to supply water ... to the prejudice of the rights of other indi-
viduals or corporations or of the state, the law would afford the injured
party an adequate remedy."32o
312 L.S.A.-R.S. 45:61.
313 L.S.A.—R.S. 45:62. It is not clear here whether "other waters of the state"
refers to state-owned waters, or to all waters within the state.
314 L.S.A.-R.S. 45:63.





320 State V. Riverside Irr. Co., 142 La. 10, 76 So. 216, 218 (1917) .
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In a case in 1907 the court ruled that, under the terms of a contrac t
by a certain company to furnish water to a rice irrigator, the company
could be held liable for failing to supply the water when properly re-
quested to do so—except for a deficiency in supply of water at its source
and certain other exceptions. But the company was held not to be liable
because the irrigator had not given it a 10-day written notice that he
wanted the water, as required by the contract. •''-^
In an earlier case, the court held that under the terms of its contraci
a certain company was not liable for damages by failing to furnish irri
gation water, when the failure was due to the inadequacy of rain thiii
supplied a bayou. Conversely, as the farmers suffered almost a total los'j
of their crops, they were not held liable for the stipulated rent.'^22
'
Irrigation Districts
The State Legislature is granted the power by the Louisiana Constitu
tion to authorize the police juries of the various parishes to create irri
gation districts, which may be composed of territory either wholly withir
a parish, or partly within two or more parishes, and to authorize them
within limitations, to incur debt and issue negotiable bonds to construe
irrigation works.
In pursuance of this constitutional authorization, the Legislature ha
enacted laws allowing irrigation districts to be formed. '^24 Under thes(
laws, the lands comprising one or more parishes or any portion or por
tions of one or more parishes may be formed into an irrigation dis
trict.'^^o land that cannot receive any benefit from operation of ai
irrigation district shall be excluded at the time the district is created.
The police juries do not initiate the action that creates a district, bu
they must create a district when petitioned to do so by the owner
of a majority of the acres of land within the limits of the proposec
district, outside corporate limits of incorporated towns and cities. j
the proposed district is composed of lands situated in more than on
321 Mathieu v. N. American Land & Timber Co., 119 La. 896, 44 So. 721 (1907)
For other cases construing contracts of various companies to furnish irrigation wate
see cases cited in Louisiana Digest, Waters, sec. 254, et. seq.
322 Landers v. Garland Canal Co., 52 La. Ann. 1465, 27 So. 727 (1900) .
It may be noted that legislation provides for a lien on irrigated crops to secui
the agreed payment for the irrigation water supplied by another. L.S.A.—R.S. 9:4521
(See also 9:4521.) Cases construing this statute include Ferre Canal Co. v. Burgii
106 La. 309, 30 So. 863 (1901) , and Haas v. Ardoin, 145 So. 388 (La. App., 1933) .
323 L.S.A.-Const. of 1921, Art. 14, § 14 (d) . The constitution limits the amour
of debt which the Legislature can authorize the districts to incur to 10 percent (
the assessed value of the taxable property within the district, except that an acreae
tax, or forced contribution, not exceeding 50 cents an acre for a period not excee(
ing 40 years may be imposed by the district to support a bond issue not withi;
this 10 percent limitation. L.S.A.-Const. Art. 14, § 14 (f) (1921) .
324 Acts 1938, No. 415; L.S.A.-R.S. 38:2101-38:2123.
325 L.S.A.-R.S. 38:2101 (B) .
326 L.S.A.-R.S. 38:2101 (C) . (Added by Acts 1956, No. 462.) No criteria a
provided for determining whether land will receive benefit, however.
327 L.S.A.-R.S. 38:2102.
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parish, the petition must be signed by the owners of a majority of
the acres of land in each parish witliin the proposed district, and pre-
sented to tlie police jury of the parish ha\"ing the largest number of
acres in the proposed district.^^s
All irrigation districts are governed by a board of commissioners
made up of five commissioners. They are selected by the landowners
of the district, and ser\e for a term of four vears.^^o
Irrigation districts have broad powers and authority. They may
conserve the fresh water supply of the state for the benefit of the
inhabitants of the districts to provide water for irrigation and other
uses, both within and outside their boundaries. They are corporations
with all the powers and rights of a political subdivision of the state for
the purposes of issuing bonds and incurring debt. Thev ma} sue and be
sued, incur contract obligations, and perform any acts necessary and
proper for the carrying out of the purposes and objects fo^^ which they
were created. This includes the po^iver to expropriate property.
The districts may acquire by any means necessary the properties
needed for their suitable operation and may dispose of anv properties
owned to any body organized under the laws of the United States. They
may contract and enter into agreements with the United States, or any
person, firm, corporation, or political subdivision of the state. They may
delegate to any body organized under the laws of the United States all
powers conferred upon them by the state, to the fullest extent allowed
by la^v. Also, they ma\" coordinate their activities with state and federal
flood-control works and na\'igation projects.
Such districts may issue and sell revenue bonds for the purpose of
constructing, acquiring, or impro\ ing an irrigation system and may
furnish and supph water for this purpose. An irrigation district may
acquire water from any other irrigation system, or from any other
source, and distribute the ^vater. It may "make a uniform rate for, and
collect a charge for ^vater" distributed to the users. This charge shall
be in addition to any tax le\ ied to pay on any bonds ^vhich are issued.
No part of the money realized from the sale of bonds voted to construct
irrigation systems, canals, or ditches shall be used to pay for waters so
purchased.
Any irrigation district may, when petitioned to do so by the owners
of a majority of the acres of land in the district (outside of incorporated
towns and cities), levy an acreage tax not exceeding 10 cents an acre
328 Id. There would appear to be no limitation as to the minimum size of the
district or the number of irrigators required, except for the provision that there
must be five commissioners residing within the district. See footnote 198, supra.
329 L.S.A.—R.S. 38:2107. Each must be a qualified elector of Louisiana, reside
within the district, and own lands in the district of an assessed value of S2,000, or
represent a corporation owning lands of this value within the district.
330 L.S.A.-R.S. 38:2102; L.S.A.-R.S. 38:2108.




for a period not exceeding 40 years, for the purpose of maintaining and
'
operating the district. AH lands within the district (outside of in- ji
corporated towns and cities) shall be taxed. The fact that water from
the natural or artificial waterways in the district is not used on certain
lands does not exempt them from taxation.
This last provision of the law was added in 1956. It appears that, al-
though the basic law was enacted in 1938, no irrigation district was
formed until after the 1956 amendment. This may have been due at
least in part to the provision of the original 1938 act that lands which
do not receive "benefit from the operation of an irrigation district" and
"which do not use water from natural or artificial waterways within the
district" could not be taxed. Apparently, this would have made it diffi-
cult to sell bonds, because often there would be inadequate assurance
that enough money would be forthcoming to pay the obligations.
Apparently to remedy this situation, in 1956, the Legislature added a
section to the law so that lands which would not benefit from being
in the district were to be excluded when the district was formed,336 and
amended the law to make all other lands in the district liable for
taxes regardless of use of water. it is as yet too early to determine
the effectiveness of this action.
It might be noted that the provision of the law providing for a
charge for the use of water is in direct conflict with R.S. 9:1101 (See
j
Ownership of Waters, supra) which provides that: "There shall never
be any charge assessed against any person for the use of the waters of
the state for municipal, industrial, agricultural, or domestic purposes."
As the irrigation district statutes are the later expression of the legis-
j
lative will, apparently this sentence of R.S. 9:1101 has been nullified
at least so far as irrigation districts are concerned. Nevertheless, it
would seem that an irrigation district might still be required to pay
for any nonnavigable waters it might take, to the extent that other
riparian rights are infringed, under the theory that the right to use I
these waters is vested in the riparian owners. (See General Nature of Ri-
parian Rights, supra.)
j
Since the 1956 amendment of the law on irrigation districts, the f
First Joe's Bayou Irrigation District has been formed. A dam and reser-
voir have been constructed within the District (on Joe's Bayou in East
Carroll Parish) by the Department of Public Works, for irrigation,
flood control, and other purposes. 338 Water and flowage rights were
333 L.S.A.-R.S. 38:2116.
334 L.S.A.-R.S. 38:2118.
335 See Water Problems in the Southeastern States, Louisiana Legislative Council,
Research SUidy No. 11 (Dec, 1957), pp. 28-29.
336 L.S.A.-R.S. 38:2101 (C) , added by Acts 1956, No. 462.
337 L.S.A.-R.S. 38:2118, as amended by Acts 1956, No. 461.
338 The Department utilized some of its general operating funds for this purpose.
The legislation on irrigation districts provides that an irrigation district may co-




acquired by the district from adjoining landowners in consideration c|
expected benefits resulting from the impoundment of water for irrigjj
tion, stock, and recreational purposes. Some irrigation water was take
from the structure in 1958 by one adjoining owner. As of April ,
1959, no assessments or charges or water use regulations had been ini




Police juries may divide their respective parishes into waterworl!
districts. Each district is authorized to construct, operate, and maintai
a "waterworks system." It may exercise the power of expropriation an
may issue bonds and levy taxes for such purposes. It may dispense wate
to persons within or outside the district. Twenty-five or more landowne:
within a proposed district may by petition require the police jury t
establish such a district.
It also may be noted that the Bayou Lafourche Fresh Water Distrii
was authorized by constitutional am.endment in 1950 "for the purpose (i
furnishing fresh water from the Mississippi River to the incorporate!
villages, towns and cities within its boundaries or adjacent thereto . . ."^
Legislation has been enacted to create such a district and to authori;
expenditure of state funds in furtherance thereof.^*^
Soil Conservation Districts
The interrelationship between soil conservation and water contr
is so great that many measures taken in the field of soil conservati
must of necessity entail a certain control over water also. For exampl
one important method of conserving the soil is to retard the spe
with which water runs off it and thereby to reduce the amount of so
that is carried away. Furthermore, the enabling legislation which pr
vides for the creation of Soil Conservation Districts, as amended i
1956, specifically authorizes such districts to perform broad functioi
with respect to water resources, in addition to carrying out various so|
conservation measures. shall discuss this legislation primarii
in terms of its relation to water resources. It is clear that the legisl
tion is concerned with more than soil practices, for included in tl
legislative declaration of policy is the statement that the policy «
the Legislature is to provide "for the prevention of floodwater arj
339 Based on information supplied by Henry McPherson, President of the D
trict, Frank Byerley, Secretary-Treasurer of the East Carroll Parish Police Jury, ai
Calvin T. Watts, Assistant Director, Louisiana Department of Public Works.
340 L.S.A.—R.S. 33:3811, et. seq. Seventeen waterworks districts were reported '
be in existence in the 1957 U. S. Census of Governments, Vol. 1, No. 3, Local Go
ernment Structure, p. 36.
341 L.S.A.-Const. of 1921, Art. 15, sec. 3.
342 Acts 1950, No. 113; Acts 1952, No. 192; see also Acts 1952, Nos. 191 and 566.
343 La. Acts 1938, No. 370, amended by La. Acts 1956, No. 10, and also by A(
1958, No. 231. Aqts are embodied in L.S.A.-R.S. 3:1201-3:1217.
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sediment damages, and for furthering the conservation, development,
1
utilization, and disposal of water. "^^^
i
Twenty-six soil conservation districts, collectively covering the entire
state (except Plaquemines Parish) were in existence in January, 1959.^^^
The legislation specifies that each district shall be governed by five super-
visors, of whom two are appointed by the State Soil Conservation Com-
mittee and three are elected by the landowners of the district.
The districts have the power "To carry out preventive and control
i
measures and works of improvement for flood prevention or the con-
Iservation, development, utilization and disposal of water within the
I
district ... on lands owned or controlled by this state or any of
its agencies, with the cooperation of the agency administering and having
jurisdiction thereof, and on any other lands within the district upon
obtaining the consent of the owner as well as occupants of such lands
or the necessary rights or interests in such lands. "^^^
"
The districts are authorized "to acquire, by purchase, exchange,
lease, gift, grant, bequest, devise, or otherwise, any property ... or
rights or interests therein . . ."^^^ In this connection, it is also provided
that "No provision with respect to the acquisition, operation, or dis-
I
position of property by other public bodies shall be applicable to a
district organized hereunder unless the legislature shall specifically so
state. "2^^^ It is expressly stated that the districts may not levy taxes
or special assessments.
One purpose of the districts is to cooperate, assist, and enter into
[j agreements with individual landowners in the carrying out of works
of improvement for the conservation, development, and utilization of
f| water. (A district may use funds received from state or federal agencies
lor income from its property.) This would be voluntary on the part of
the landowner, although the supervisors could attach such conditions
( to the aid as they deem necessary.^^^
i It would appear that such districts do not have broad powers to
I make regulations to control water use. There is, however, a method by
)1 which the supervisors could promulgate regulations having the force of
il law. The supervisors of each district are authorized to formulate regu-
|j
344 The act commences with a legislative determination that to "prevent flood-
water and sediment damages, and further the conservation, development, utilization,
[and disposal of water, it is necessary that , . . works of improvement for flood pre-
Hjvention or the conser\'ation, development, utilization, and disposal of water be
adopted and carried out; . . ." L.S.A.—R.S. 3:1201 (D) .
)i 345 See L.S.A.-R.S. 3:1204 (A) in which the names of the 26 districts are
m listed.
;
346 L.S.A.-R.S. 3:1205 (F) , R.S. 3:1206, and R.S. 3:1207.
347 L.S.A.-R.S. 3:1208 (1) .
0 348 L.S.A.-R.S. 3:1208 (3) .
349 L.S.A.-R.S. 3:1208 (10). For an opinion that such districts apparently do not
have expropriation powers, see Opinion, dated Jan. 10, 1955 of Mr. Carrol Buck, 2nd
Ass't Attorney General, State of Louisiana.
350 L.S.A.-R.S. 3:1208 (11) .
351 L.S.A.-R.S. 3:1208 (2), (7), (9).
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lations, including provisions to require the carrying out of necessar)
engineering operations such as construction of terraces, terrace outlets
check dams, dikes, ponds, ditches, and other necessary structures.''
These formulated regulations must then be presented to the landowner,'
of the district in a special referendum. If approved by a two-third?
majority of the votes cast, the regulations may be enacted into law b)
the supervisors. Administrative and judicial processes are available
to any landowner who feels that the ordinance imposes great practica
difficulties or unnecessary hardship upon him."^^*
The State Soil Conservation Committee acts primarily as a coordi
nating and advisory agency for the soil conservation districts and assist
in obtaining the cooperation of the Soil Conservation Service, U. S
Department of Agriculture, and other federal or state agencies in th(
operation of such districts.
Sabine River Authority
In 1950, the Legislature provided that:
All the territory in the parishes of DeSoto, Sabine, Vernon, Beaure
gard, Calcasieu and Cameron, lying within the watershed of th
Sabine River and its tributary streams, shall be embraced ii
the limits of and shall conscitute a conservation and reclamatio:
district to be known and styled 'Sabine River Authority, State o
Louisiana. '356
The Authority is governed by a 12-member board of commif
sioners.357 it is an agency and instrumentality of the state and is
corporation and body politic, invested with all rights and immunitie




355 L.S.A.-R.S. 3:1204 (D) . The Committee consists of seven members. Five ai
elected by the soil conservation district supervisors in convention (one member froi
each of five state areas) . The other two are the Dean of the College of Agriculture (
the Louisiana State University and the State Commissioner of Agriculture. L.S.A.—R.
3:1204 (A).
356 L.S.A.-R.S. 38:2321. The provisions covering the Authority are contained i
L.S.A.-R.S. 38:2321 through L.S.A.-R.S. 38:2337. The original provisions concernir
the Authority were set forth in Act No. 261 of 1950 and also Act. No. 260 of 195
The two Acts were identical in terms and purpose, but Act. No, 260 contained a
additional section conditioning the operative force of the Act to the ratification (
an amendment to Article XIV of the Louisiana Constitution. When this amendmei
failed of passage, Act. No. 260 was ineffective. Act No. 261, not being dependei
upon the Constitutional amendment, remained in effect, forming the basis of tl
present Statutes. Certain amendments to the Act were enacted in 1956, (Acts 1951
Nos. 116 and 432.) A proposed constitutional amendment to incorporate the legiji
lation creating the Authority in the State Constitution (Acts 1956, No, 632) was vot<
'
against by the people,
357 L.S.A,-R.S. 38:2322. The Director of Public Works is a member and chairmj
of the board, ex officio, while the other 11 members are appointed by the Govern
for terms of four years. Four of the members appointed by the Governor must 1
residents of Sabine Parish, two of Vernon Parish, and two of DeSoto Parish, i
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state. Expressly withheld from the Authority, however, is the power
to levy taxes. However, it is not required to pay property taxes, nor
excise, license, or other taxes on its operating revenues. All bonds is-
sued and their transfer and income therefrom are likewise exempted
from, taxation within the state.
The powers of the Authority are comprehensive. It has the power:
To conserve, store, control, preserve, utilize, and distribute the
waters of the rivers and streams of the Sabine watershed; to drain
and reclaim, or cause to be drained and reclaimed, the undrained
or partially drained marsh, swamp and overflow lands in the dis-
trict of said Authority, with the view of controlling floods and
causing settlement and cultivation of such lands; and in addition
to all of the aforementioned powers for the conservation and bene-
ficial utilization of water resources, to control and employ such
waters of the Sabine River and its tributaries in the State of Lou-
isiana, including the storm and flood waters thereof, as are herein-
after set forth;
The particular "control and employment" of the waters set forth
following the above-quoted paragraph includes distribution and con-
servation of the water for domestic, municipal, irrigation, hydroelectric,
manufacturing, flood control, and navigation purposes. 3*^°
The applicable legislation also provides;
So far as authority is vested in the legislature to grant such right,
the Sabine River Authority is hereby expressly granted and vested
with full right to lise all waters and to possess all water rights
in the waters of the Sabine River and its tributaries necessary to
the carrying out of its corporate objectives, and the right herein so
vested in the Authority shall be prior and superior to all other
rights in such waters, provided only that water and riparian rights
now vested in private persons or entities shall not be taken or
damaged without the paying of adequate compensation therefor,
which compensation shall be determined in the manner herein-
after provided for the expropriation of property.^^i
The Authority is expressly granted the power of expropriation. ^^^^
For the purpose of providing funds for the acquisition of any prop-
erty, including the acquisition of water rights, the Authority may issue
bonds in anticipation of the collection of its revenues. Total indebted-
ness cannot exceed $50,000,000. The Authority may pledge to the
payment of all such bonds all or any part of its revenues, and, addi-
tionally, may secure them by mortgage lien or deed of trust upon all or
any properties it may own.^es
358 L.S.A.-R.S. 38:2324.
359 L.S.A.-R.S. 38:2325 (J) .
360 L.S.A.-R.S. 38:2325 (J) .
361 L.S.A.—R.S. 38:2328 (E) . It may be noted here that there possibly are no private
vested rights in the waters of navigable streams. See Navigable Watercourses: Right to
Use Water, supra.
362 L.S.A.-R.S. 38:2325 (b) .
363 L.S.A.-R.S. 38:2330.
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The Authority has no powers of taxation, but it may obtain rev
enues under its power to collect charges and rentals for its facilities and
services. 2*'^ This power to charge for facilities and services might con-
flict with the provision of L.S.A.—R.S. 9:1101 which provides that::
"There shall never be any charge assessed against any person for the!
use of the waters of the state for municipal, industrial, agricultural, or
domestic purposes." Whatever conflict that might be involved, how-
ever, has been resolved by Section 8 of Acts 1956, No. 432, which reads,
in part, "To the extent that there may be any conflict between the pro-
visions of R.S. 9:1101 and the provisions of this Act, the provisions of
this Act shall be controlling."^^'^ i
Further powers of the Authority authorize it to establish or provide
for public parks and other recreation facilities and to acquire land fori
such purposes, to make contracts to effect the construction and operation'
of toll bridges or ferries over water owned by it, and to own and op-
erate toll bridges and ferries across any of the waters within its juris-
diction. The board of commissioners also has the power to adopt andj
promulgate all reasonable regulations relating to sanitary conditions of
all waters in its reservoirs and all waters flowing into its reservoirs. They^
can also regulate residence, hunting, fishing, boating and camping and]
all recreational and business privileges in and around its reservoirs, the
Sabine River and its tributaries.
The only express power regarding pollution that is given the Au-
thority is that which authorizes the board of commissioners to make
regulations to preserve the sanitary conditions of its reservoirs. Its
general powers over rivers and streams include those to "conserve, store,
control, preserve, utilize and distribute" and "to control and employ. "^^'^t
It is difficult to determine to what extent these words grant general!
powers to control pollution. It may be noted that the Stream Control
Commission has been given broad powers of control over pollution ol[
the waters of the state. In view of the broad powers over pollution!'
given the Commission and the lack of any specific grant of such powers
to the Authority, the Stream Control Commission perhaps has jurisdic
tion, either exclusively or concurrently, over pollution within the Au
thority's territorial limits.
In brief, the Authority is given the power to control and distribute
the waters of the rivers and streams within its jurisdiction in the wa)
it deems to be most beneficial, taking into account all uses that mighij
be made of the water by competing interests. It must, however, provide!
364 L.S.A.-R.S. 38:2325 (f) .
365 In this Act, an amending act to the original Sabine River Authority act, the
Authority is granted the right to make charges for the facilities and services of thf
Authority.
366 L.S.A.-R.S. 38:2333, R.S. 38:2332, and R.S. 38:2335, respectively.
367 L.S.A.-R.S. 38:2331.
368 Ibid.
369 L.S.A.-R.S. 38:2325 (J) .
370 See State Stream Control Commission, supra.
92
adequate compensation for any vested riparian or other water rights
which are taken or infringed in the course of this control and distribu-
tion, as noted earlier. The Authority's control is subject also to the
provisions of the Sabine River Compact, discussed later.
The only permit issued by the Authority as of January 1, 1959, was
to the city of Logansport to take water from the Sabine River for mu-
nicipal use. Pending before the Authority was an application by the
Anacoco-Prairie State Game and Fish Commission to impound water
on Upper Bayou Anacoco in Vernon Parish. (This project is discussed
under Fish and Game Preserves.)
The Authority also has made a study determining the feasibility
of, and is planning the construction of, a multiple-purpose dam and
reservoir on the Sabine River at Toledo Bend. The dam and reservoir
would provide hydroelectric power and water supplies for irrigation,
municipal, and industrial purposes. The Authority is cooperating in
this endeavor with the Sabine River Authority of Texas. It may be
noted that, in carrying out its responsibilities, the Authority is au-
thorized to cooperate with local agencies and private persons and with
any agency of the state of Texas or the United States. It may contract
with them for the joint construction, operation, or ownership of needed
facilities.
Bayou D'Arbonne Lake Watershed District
In 1956, the Legislature created the Bayou D'Arbonne Lake Water-
shed District, embracing the area of the watersheds of Bayou D'Arbonne,
Bayou Corney, Bayou Little D'Arbonne, and Bayou Middle Fork in
Lincoln and Union parishes. 3'- It is a political subdivision of the
state, having as its purpose the conservation of soil and water and
the development of the natural resources of the district for sanitary,
recreational, and agricultural purposes. j^- constitutes a body cor-
porate in law, with all powers of a political subdivision of the state
relating to the incurring of debt and the issuing of bonds therefor. It
has the power of expropriation and may use such power to expropriate
property for all its purposes and objectives."^
It is empowered to conserve the fresh water supply within its boun-
daries for the benefit of the inhabitants and property owners within
the district and the state, to provide water for commercial, municipal,
and any other uses, both within and without the district. It may own
in full ownership all servitudes, rights of way, and flowage rights and
may acquire sam.e by donation, prescription, purchase, expropriation, or
otherwise."^
However, "any individual from whom flowage rights, rights of way







his mineral rights in the lands so encumbered, and lands covered 1)'
the lake shall be exempt from all state and local taxes.
The district is governed and controlled by a Board of Commissioner?"!
which consists of five members who are appointed by the Governor To
terms of four years each.^"^ The board acts for the district in the exej
cise of the powers set forth above, but it is subject to certain restriction^
It is to assist in conserving soil and water and in developing the watt
resources of the district; however, it is to do nothing to interfere wit)
districts previously organized under Louisiana law.'^^^ Further, all th
powers conferred upon the board are subject to the supervisory contrc,
of the Department of Public Works and the Wildlife and Fisherie
Commission, with jurisdiction by the latter over the fish, game, ant
wildlife of the watershed.
|
The Board of Commissioners is empowered to make necessary aiv
advisable rules and regulations:
(1) To protect and preserve the properties owned by the distric
prescribe the manner of their use by public corporations an
persons, and preserve order within and adjacent thereto;
(2) To prescribe the manner of building bridges, roads, fences c
other works in, along or across any channel, reservoir or otlie
construction of the district;
(3) To prescribe the manner in which ditches, sewers, pipelines, c
other works shall be adjusted to or connected with the worl
of the district or any watercourse therein, and the manner i
which the watercourses of the district may be used for sew(
outlets or for disposal of waste;
(4) To prescribe the permissible uses of the water supply provide
by Bayou D'Arbonne, a lake to be created within the distric
to collect fees therefor, to determine the manner of its distribi
tion, and to prevent the pollution or unnecessary waste of sue
water supply;
(5) To prohibit or regulate the discharge into sewers of the di
trict of any waste deemed detrimental to the works or improv
ments of the district;
(6) To coordinate and cooperate with the Department of Publj
Works in the construction by the Department of a dam and ir
poundment of Bayou D'Arbonne;
(7) To regulate hunting, fishing, boating, and any and all activiti'
upon the waters of the lake created by the impoundment.^**^
376 L.S.A.-R.S. 38:2570 to 38:2572. (See Acts 1956, No. 351 for a similar pro^
sion regarding lands used for a game and fish preserve.) These sections also gra
to the district the right to use any state-owned lands within the district for t)
purpose of constructing the Bayou D'Arbonne Lake and related structures.
377 L.S.A.-R.S. 38:2555.




The Department of Public Works is a general supervisory agency
over the Board of Commissioners. It is to construct and create the Bayou
D'Arbonne Lake, and to this end, it is given full powers of expropria-
tion of property.281
The Legislature has appropriated a million dollars to be expended
by the Department of Public AVorks for the purpose of acquiring "the
rights of way, flowage rights, and servitudes" and for construction of a
dam, reservoir, and other suitable structures for the creation of the
lake.^82
The "Wildlife and Fisheries Commission has the right to determine
and fix the necessary rules and regulations, pertaining to the fluctuation
of the waters of the lake and to do any other thing necessary and proper
within its discretion for the proper managero.ent of fish, game, and
wildlife over, along, and upon the lake, working in conjunction with
the Board of Commissioners.
Three bodies or agencies exercise jurisdiction over the operations of
the watershed district—the district's Board of Commissioners, the De-
1 partment of Public Works, and the Wildlife and Fisheries Commission.
The Department of Public Works apparently is to be in direct charge
of the construction of any wwks necessary to create the Bayou D'Ar-
\
bonne Lake. The Board of Commissioners of the district is to be in
charge of the actual operation and functioning of the district, under the
supervision of the Department of Public Works. The Board's general
nature would appear to be analoguous to that of a manage^ with
broad general powers. The W^ildlife and Fisheries Commission is to
retain jurisdiction over the wildlife of the district.
latt Lake Water Conservation District
This district was created by a constitutional amendment approved
by the people of the state in 1956^^3 for the stated purpose of making
available "an adequate fresh water supply for industrial and other
i,
consumption in the Grant Parish-Rapides Parish area . . ." The dis-
t
trict's authorized purposes, among other things, include the furnishing
of water to "cities, towms, villages, industries, corporations, and persons
|:
both within and outside the District." It may store, control, distribute,
i,
and prevent pollution and blocking of, the waters contained in bodies
of water in the district. It may construct new dams, channels and levees,
,
and drain the lands. It may also "prevent the escape of any such waters
381 L.S.A.-R.S. 38:2563.
382 La. Acts 1956, No. 226. The proposed reservoir is intended to provide a water
supply for domestic, agricultural, municipal, and industrial use, and to provide the
area with a game and fish preserve. It has been estimated by Mr. Calvin T. Watts,
Assistant Director, Louisiana Department of Public Works, that the total cost of
the project may approach S2% million.
383 L.S.A.-Const. of 1921, Aft. 15, sec. 4. This provides that it is self-executing
without any supplementary action by the Legislature.
95
until employed to the maximum advantage of the public generally h
aiding the development of agriculture, commerce and industries, and i;
insuring a fair and just distribution of all of said waters for all of th
people of the area for the purposes shown."
The district's Board of Commissioners shall consist of five member:
two each to be appointed by the Police Jury of each parish and on
by the Governor. The Board shall constitute an instrumentality of th
state and the powers conferred on it "shall be deemed and held to b
essential governmental functions" of the state. The board may expropr
ate or otherwise acquire or lease property and issue revenue bone
(within prescribed limitations) . It may also make certain charges fcl
its services. It may not levy taxes of any kind. But, property acquire'
and held by the board, and the income therefrom, or from any bone
it issues, is exempt from state and local taxation.
The board is specifically authorized, among other things, (1) t
"effectuate and maintain proper depths of water to accommodate th
business of the District," (2) "to transfer water between watersheds ij
the District," (3) "to control the water level in and discharge ratd
from" the District's reservoirs and other bodies of water in the Distric
(4) "to regulate the recreational and other purposes for which san:
may be used," (5) "and to take and dispose of all natural water flowin!
into or originating within the District for all the purposes of th
amendment."
It is expressly provided, however, that (1) "the District shall nc
have authority to destroy or substantially diminish vested water righ
without the making of proper compensation therefor," and (2) tl
Board shall obtain the approval of the Director of Public Works befoi
issuing any revenue bonds for the payment of any dam or reservoir th
may create or aggravate a drainage problem in any city, town, or v
lage within the district, and shall provide necessary drainage faciliti
in constructing such dam or reservoir.
It is provided also that "the District may impound, treat, and d]
tribute to consumers of every nature, all water which may be ma(
available by reason of its facilities and may make appropriate charg,
therefor . . . provided only that no charges or fees shall be impose!
which shall have the effect of materially impairing any water righ
presently vested in the owners of property in the District." It may ado
appropriate rules and regulations governing the fixing and collection
charges and fees "for water and services" and may enter into contrac
operative within and without the district, with any consumer of wat
or water service governing the sale or purchase of water.
It should be noted that legislation was enacted in 1954 to authori
the creation of the Southwest Louisiana Water Conservation Distrit
which would encompass several parishes in Southwestern Louisiar
However, a proposed constitutional amendment to incorporate tl
legislation in the Constitution was voted against by the people of tl;
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state, and the legislation was later repealed, in 1956.^^^ The authorized
purposes of the district (^^vhich -were some^diat similar to those of the
latt Lake AVater Conservation District) included the furnishings of
fresh water to farm and other lands, to industries, and to cities, towns,
[and villages within the district. The regulation of ground^vater usage,
as well as of surface bodies of water, was specifically authorized—to
protect against salt water intrusion and for other purposes. Authority
also ^s-as granted to levy a property tax, ^vithin limitations.
Recreation and Water Conservation Districts
A 1954 statute enables parishes to create recreation districts which
may engage in activities to promote recreation and own and operate
recreational facilities.
Statutes were enacted in 1958 specifically to create (1) the Cvpress-
Black Bayou Recreation and "Water Conservation District, in Bossier
iParish, (2) a recreation and water conservation district in St. Helena
Pai'ish, and (3) the Black Lake Bayou Recreation and "Water Conserva-
tion District of Red River Parish. The stated purposes, powers, duties,
and related provisions of these three statutes are substantially the same.
Each provides, among other things, that the district created shall be a
political subdivision of the state for the purpose of developing the
wealth and natural resources of the district by the conservation of soil
•and water for agricultural, recreational, commercial, industrial, and
isanitary purposes.
,
The district's powers under all of these statutes include the power
to levy taxes, issue negotiable bonds,^^" and expropriate "property and
serv'itudes, rights of Avav and flo-^vage rights . . Each mav lease, build,
operate, and maintain appropriate works or machinery, and shall have
"complete control o\er any supply of fresh water made available bv its
facilities which shall be administered for the benefit of persons residing
or owning property ^vithin the district and if it should be for the
benefit of the district, it shall have the authoritv to sell such Ts'ater
for irrigation, municipal and industrial uses both Avithin and outside
the district." Each may cooperate or contract with the U.S. government
38iLa. Acts 1954, Xo. 161: repealed bv Acts 1956, Xo. 427. For proposed constitu-
tional amendment (Art. 15. sec. 4) see Acts 1954, Xo. 749 (repealed bv Acts 1956, Xo.
582) . See Table 8, Acts 1955 which reflects its failure to be adopted.
Acts 1954, Xo. 486 also was enacted to authorize the Department of Public ^Vorks
to construct dams, pumping stations, and other facilities within the district, and to
mthorize it and the ^Vildlife and Fisheries Commission to make certain studies. Six
tiundred thousand dollars in expenditures from state funds were authorized bv this
\ct—conditional, however, on adoption of the Constitutional amendment, which
railed to be adopted.
385 L.S.A.-R.S. 33:4562, as amended bv Acts 1958, Xo, 473.
386 L.S.A.-R.S. 38:2601 et. seq.. R.S. 38:2651 et. seq., and R.S. 38:2701 et. seq,.
^ respectively.
387 However, the legislation creating the Cypress-Black Bayou Recreation and
j
IVater Conservation District specifically requires authorization by an election of
'oters in the district.
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and any state department, agency, or corporation for the construction^
operation, and maintenance of its facilities, and participate in projects
authorized by federal or state law.
Other specified powers of the statutes creating recreation and water
conservation districts include regulating recreational activities (includ
ing fishing and boating) and prescribing the way in which pipelines 01
other works shall be connected with the "facilities of the district or an)
water course within the district and the manner in which the watei
courses of the district may be used for the disposal of waste . . ." Eacl
district shall exercise its powers under the supervisory control of th(
State Department of Public Works, which shall furnish it necessai'
engineering services. The department may cooperate also in constructioi
of works or facilities considered necessary to the district's purposes h\
the district and the department.
1
Fish and Game Preserves
Several state fish and game preserves or wildlife sanctuaries hav<
been created in Louisiana by special statutes. There is also a genera
statute which enables parishes to establish such preserves. These pre
serves or sanctuaries are under the supervision of the State Wildlife am
Fisheries Commission. In addition, the state commission may set asid
state-owned lands or lease privately owned lands for such purposes.
In general, these fish and game preserves are intended for the pro
tection and control of the taking of fish and game. The general statut
enabling the creation of preserves by parishes purports to give the 3
member commission of each preserve the authority to "do any and al
things necessary for the conservation, protection, and propagation 0
game and fish in the preserve." This specifically includes authority t
"build dykes or dams, dig canals, or excavate lake or stream beds." Es
propriation powers are provided.^^i
In 1954, the Legislature authorized the State Department of Publi
Works to construct a dam and other necessary structures "to create ani
impound a fresh water supply" within the limits of the Anacoco-Prairi
State Game and Fish Preserve, in Vernon Parish. State funds appropr
ated for this purpose included an appropriation for the departmer
to expend "for the purpose of acquiring such lands, servitudes, rights c
way, and flowage rights as may be necessary in connection with th
development of the Preserve," primarily for the creation and conserv;
tion of the fresh water supply.^^s Although these funds are availabh
388 See notes under L.S.A.-R.S. 56:801.
389 L.S.A.-R.S. 56:721 et. seq.
390 L.S.A.-R.S. 56:763 et. seq., and Const, of 1921, Art. 6, sec. 1 (A). See L.S.A.
R.S. 56:751 for a list of state swamplands perpetually dedicated as a game preserv
The Legislature also has provided for cooperation with the national program of wil(
life restoration projects of the U.S. Commissioner of Wildlife and Fisheries, Depar
ment of the Interior. L.S.A.-R.S. 56:701 et. seq.
391 L.S.A.-R.S. 56:722 to 56:725.
392 La. Acts 1954, Nos. 400 and 401, and Acts 1956, No. 525,
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ithe Police Jury of Vernon Parish has issued ad valorem bonds in the
lamount of $875,000 to help finance the project. It is a joint project
of the Department of Public Works, the Vernon Parish Police Jury,
and the Anacoco-Prairie State Game and Fish Preserve. Project plans
have been developed to impound water on upper Bayou Anacoco, and
the department has been acquiring rights of ways, flowage rights, etc.
As recreational lake waters already exist in the Preserve, the supply
of fresh water to be developed by the project is intended primarily for
industrial and other uses. The special statute that created the Preserve in
1948 specifically authorizes the Preserve's Commission (in addition to
providing a game and fish preserve through the construction of neces-
sary facilities and regulation of the taking of game and fish) "to create
and impound an industrial water supply, as per survey and estimates
made and established by the Department of Public W^orks . . ."^^^
The Preserve also was specifically granted the power of expropriation
and the authority to sell revenue bonds.
Levee and Drainage Districts
The Mississippi and other major rivers flowing through the state of
Louisiana have created a continuing need to protect the low-lying flood
Iplains from periodic flooding. This has led to construction of an ex-
[tensive system of levees to contain the waters.
? The state constitution authorizes the Legislature to provide for a
5tate-wide levee system. The Legislature has created a number of
Hevee districts, each with a board of levee commissioners. in addition
to constructing and maintaining levees, they "may do all drainage work
393 La. Acts 1948, No. 277, amended by Acts 1956, No. 238. It appears that few,
f any, of the other fish and game preserves or wildlife sanctuaries in the state have
seen expressly authorized to develop industrial, municipal, or irrigation water sup-
plies (nor is the State Wildlife and Fisheries Commission expressly so authorized) .
riowever, this statement is based on less than a complete reviews' of the several en-
ibling acts.
For other examples of specific authorizations for the Department of Public ^Vorks
:o construct dams within fish and game preserves, see Acts 1957, No. 38, with respect
:o dams in the Cocodrie Lake Game and Fish Preserve. The commission in this
preserve is authorized to operate gates and other regulatory devices on the dams for
'preservation and propagation" of fish and w'ildlife, subject to a prohibition against
-educing the minimum record flow in Bayou Cocodrie or impairing the riparian
.ights of the downstream landowners. See also, with respect to dams authorized in
he Northwest Louisiana Game and Fish Preserve area, Acts 1954, No. 510; Acts
956, No. 491, amended by Acts 1957, No. 15; and Acts 1957, No. 44.
394 La. Acts 1948, No. 277, sec. 12.
395 See Water Problems in the Southeastern States, Louisiana Legislative Council
^lesearch Study No. 11, Baton Rouge (Dec, 1957) , page 38 et. seq.; AsseiT, Emmett,
Special Districts in Louisiana, Bureau of Government Research, Louisiana State Uni-
ersity (1951) , p. 28 et. seq.; Louisiana Levee Districts, Public Affairs Research
^louncil of Louisiana, Baton Rouge (Aug., 1958) ; and Harrison, Robert W., Flood
'Control in the Mississippi Alluvial Valley, Delta Council, Stoneville, Miss, (undated) .
396 L.S.A.-Const. of 1921, Art. 16.
397 L.S.A.-R.S. 38:641 et. seq.
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incidental to or made necessary by the construction of the levee systen
in this or adjoining states. "^^^
The State Constitution provides that such districts may cooperat(
with the federal government and neighboring states in the constructioi
and maintenance of the levees. Moreover, they (as well as drainag*
districts) may contract with the State Department of Public Works t(
have it bear a portion of the cost of reclamation and drainage projects.
Legislation (L.S.A.—R.S. 38:221) prohibits anyone from placing
any rice-flume or other type of conduit "in, through or under" any pub
lie levee if ordered not to do so by the levee board or governing au
thority of the parish. Violators may be fined up to $500 and/or im
prisoned up to 60 days. This does not apply, however, to those levee
on the Mississippi River outside the limits of the Fifth Louisiana Leve^
District, the Atchafalaya Basin, the Lafourche Basin, the Grand Basin
the Buras, and the Orleans Levee Districts. Any permission grante(
to operate siphons "over" the public levees shall be subject to th
following regulations found in R.S. 38:222:
1. The location of all siphons shall be at right angles to the axi
of the public levee.
2. The levee shall at no place ... be cut into nor disturbed . .
3. The . . . ends of all siphons shall be located . . . not less thai
30 feet on the river side nor 60 feet on the land side fror
the base of the levee.
4. Both . . . ends . . . shall be so protected as to guard agains
any local excavation or washout.
5. In the operation of siphons for irrigation ... no area withi-
150 feet of the base of any public levee on the land sid
shall ... be flooded.
6. All areas subject to flooding . . ., shall be provided, by th
owner or operators, with low level ditches (for drainage c
levees and highways).
7. No siphons shall be placed over the levees designated in R.J
38:221 until permission has been obtained from the board c
commissioners of the levee district having jurisdiction over th
levees.
398 L.S.A.-R.S. 38:281.
•^99 L.S.A.-Const. of 1921, Art. 16, sees. 4 and 5. See also R.S. 38:551 et. se(
and 38:112. The state, with the concurrence of an adjoining state, may create lev(
districts coTnposed of territory partly in each state and may authorize the constru
tion of levees wholly in another state. Levee construction and other flood conitn
functions of the Corps of Engineers, U. S. Army, in which levee districts havfe cc
operated in various ways are disctissed in Louisiana Lex'ee Districts, supra, pp. 9-l(
Special Districts in Louisiana, supra, pp. 32-34; Water Problems in the Southeastei
States, supra, p. 40.
400 L.S.A.-R.S. 38:111.
401 The consent of the State Department of Public Works, as well as the governir
bodies of any cities or municipalities in which the public levees may be located, ma
be required also.
402 Nor does it apply to locks that connect navigation canals with the Mississipj
River. Special provisions apply to the conduits for sewerage, gas, or electricity '
municipalities and parishes.
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R.S. 38:223 extends section 5 of R.S. 38:222 by stating that:
No person shall in any manner cover with water for any purpose,
on the land side of any public levee or levees, any land situated
upon the Mississippi River within a distance of 150 feet from the
base of any public levee.
Attaining satisfactory land drainage also has been a major problem
in Louisiana (and often has been aggravated by the levees built for
Eiood protection). The State Constitution authorizes the Legislature
o provide for the creation of drainage and subdrainage districts.'*^*
pnder this authority, legislation has been enacted that enables the crea-
Eon
of two general types of drainage districts: (1) Gravity drainage dis-
icts and subdistricts^^^ and (2) drainage districts and subdistricts re-
airing leveeing and pumping-^o*"^ Several such districts have been
.leated.'^o^ Such districts may be created by the police juries of the
"espective parishes. If they fail to do so in areas needing a drainage dis-
;rict, they may be required to create a district when petitioned to do
io by a certain proportion or number of property owners owning land
n the proposed district. But the approval of the Department of Public
iVorks is required before any drainage district requiring leveeing and
Dumping may be created.
A statewide drainage program is being encouraged and assisted by
he Department of Public Works to effect better coordination of the
irainage systems throughout entire parishes and watersheds, as the
projects of some districts have aggravated drainage and flooding prob-
ems in others.
Police juries may construct and maintain drainage ditches and canals
nd perform related functions. Legislation enables parishes to assume
lebts of drainage districts if approved by a referendum,*^! and also
inables the formation of consolidated drainage districts. jn addition,
403 See Harrison, Robert W., "Louisiana's State Sponsored Drainage Program,"
''he Southern Economic Journal, Vol. XIV, No. 4 (April 1948) , p. 388.
404 L.S.A.—Const, of 1921, Art. 15, sees. 1 and 2. This also authorizes cooperation
/ith the federal government in drainage and reclamation projects. See also R.S.
8:81.
405 L.S.A.-R.S. 38:1751 et. seq.
406 L.S.A.-R.S. 38:1601 et. seq.
407 See Water Problems in the Southeastern States, Louisiana Legislative Council
Lesearch Study No. 11 (Dec, 1957), which includes a discussion of drainage dis-
dcts, on pp. 33-38. (Levee districts are also discussed, on pp. 38-41.)
408 L.S.A.-R.S. 38:1605 and 38:1703.
409 See pp. 33-34 of Water Problems in the Southeastern States, Louisiana Legis-
itive Council Research Report No. 5, Baton Rouge, April 7, 1955. The report stated
lat 25 parish-wide drainage systems had been adopted. See also pp. 37-38 of Dec,
957 revision (Research Study No. 11); Harrison, Robert W., "Louisiana State Spon-
pred Drainage Program," supra, note 403; Asseff, Emmett, Special Districts in Louisi-
na, supra, note 395.
410 See Police Juries, supra.
411 L.S.A.-R.S. 39:661 et. seq.; Const, of 1921, Art. 14, sec 14, as amended by
cts 1946, No. 386. This also applies to levee and irrigation districts and certain
ther types of districts.
412 L.S.A.-R.S. 38:1660 and R.S. 38:1841 et. seq.
I
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the Legislature itself has directly created some consolidated gravis
drainage districts/^^ ^s well as certain "levee and drainage districts,'
including (1) the Cane River, (2) the Lafourche Basin, and (3) th(
Red River-Bayou Pierre, levee and drainage districts.
As is the case with levee districts, there are several detailed provision
regarding the creation, dissolution, operation, and financing of thesi
types of districts which we shall not discuss. Such districts have va
rious powers to issue bonds, levy taxes, and expropriate property, withii
limitations, for a variety of purposes.
Enabling legislation provides that drainage districts requiring levee
ing and pumping may be formed "for the purpose of drainage an(
reclaiming the undrained or partially drained marsh, swamp, and ovei
flowed lands in Louisiana that must be leveed and pumped in order V
be drained and reclaimed . . ."^^^ It is specifically provided that an
such drainage district "may open, deepen and enlarge natural drain
within or without the district ... to make the natural drains ei
fective."*^^ ". . . All watercourses shall, if necessary to the drainage o
any. of the lands in the district, be conhejcted with and made a par
of its drainage system. "^^^ It may also straighten or change the cours
and flow of any watercourse, pond, lake, creek, bayou or natural strearr
fill up any natural stream, and concentrate, divert, or divide the flo"\
of water, provided it makes "adequate provision for the drainage of a]
lands and property affected thereby." It may construct and maintai:
ditches, canals, levees, dams, reservoirs, holding basins, and other work
of improvement. It may employ expropriation powers for a variety o
purposes, including the acquisition of lands, servitudes, reservoirs, hole
ing basins, and rights of way for levees, canals, and ditches.
Gravity drainage distracts are provided with more or less simila
powers for establishing gravity drainage systems. Their commissionei
are specifically authorized to perform all acts "necessary to fully drai
all the land in their districts and maintain the drainage when estal
lished."*2i xhis includes authority "to adopt all needful regulations ne(
essary to maintain free and unobstructed the flow of water through th
gravity canals, ditches, and drains." The commissioners may also r(
quire and control the operation of floodgates in fences that cross th
drains, ditches, and canals.
Any drainage district may make provision for the navigation
413 La. Acts 1956, No. 234; Acts 1946, No. 91.
414 L.S.A.-R.S. 38:1951 et. seq.




419 See L.S.A.-R.S. 38:1614 and 38:1638-1640.
420 L.S.A.-R.S. 38:1764 and 38:1767.
421 L.S.A.-R.S. 38:1767. See also R.S. 38:1794.
422 L.S.A.-R.S. 38:1794.
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anals established in its system of drainage.^23 specific reference to
rrigation has been discovered in the enabling legislation. In this con-
lection, the authors are informed that a few years ago some rice
armers, who were pumping water out of the parishwide drainage-system
anals controlled by the East Carroll Police Jury, were requested to
top using the canals for irrigation. At their request, the farmers were
lermitted to complete that season's irrigation. Later, they drilled irriga-
ion wells, as requested, and stopped using the canals.
General legislation provides that the various levee and drainage dis-
ficts shall have control over all "public drainage channels" within their
mits that are adopted, with or without improvement, as parts of their
rainage system, with the approval of the Department of Public Works,
"hey may adopt rules and regulations for preserving the efficiency of
ich drainage channels.^^s
Federal Watershed Protection
And Flood Prevention Act
In 1954, the Congress of the United States enacted the Watershed
rotection and Flood Prevention Act. As later amended, this act, in
eneral, provides for Federal technical, financial and other assistance
) such local agencies and organizations as are authorized under state
iw to assume responsibility for initiating, carrying out, maintaining,
Qd operating works of improvement to help conserve, develop, utilize,
ad dispose of water for a variety of purposes, including the prevention
f erosion and flood water and sediment damages, and the supplement-
ig of any needed downstream flood control measures. ^^e ^^y state or
olitical subdivision thereof, soil or water conservation district, flood
revention or control district, or other local public agency having au-
lority under state law to carry out, maintain, and operate the works
[ improvement is eligible to participate in the program.
ype of Assistance
Upon request, the Department of Agriculture is authorized, among
ther things, to assist local organizations under specified conditions in:
1) conducting surveys and investigations and preparing plans of work,
b) making allocations of costs to the various purposes and determining
jhether benefits exceed costs, (c) entering into agreements to furnish
lancial and credit assistance, within specified limitations, and (d) ob-
ining the collaboration of other federal agencies. The Soil Conserva-
on Service has been assigned the responsibility of providing such as-
stance, except that the Farmers Home Administration has been as-
423 L.S.A.-R.S. 38:1482.
424 Based on information supplied by Mr. Frank Byerley, Secretary-Treasurer,




426 68 Stat. 666, 70 Stat. 1088, 1Z Stat. 563, 567, and 1605; 16 U.S.C.A. sec. 1001
seq. See also Executive Order No. 10584 (Dec. 20, 1954) .
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signed the responsibility of making loans and advancements. For certai
projects, the approval of certain congressional committees and/or th
recommendations of the Departments of the Interior and/or Arn:
shall be obtained.
Conditions of Assistance
To be eligible for assistance from the Federal government, tf
local organization must (a) agree to acquire without cost to the Fe^
eral government the necessary land, easements, and rights of wa
(b) acquire, or provide assurance that landowners or water users ha"\
acquired such water rights, pursuant to the state law, as may be neede
in the installation and operation of the works of improvement, (c) o
tain agreements to carry out recommended soil conservation measur
and proper farm plans from owners of not less than 50 percent of tl
land situated in the general area above each retention reservoir to 1
installed with Federal assistance, (d) agree to assume a proportiona
share of the cost of installing any works of improvement applicable
the agricultural phases of the conservation, development, utilizatio
and disposal of water, or for fish and wildlife development, and £
of the costs applicable to other purposes, such as capacity for industri
and municipal water supplies, except that any part of the constructic
cost (including engineering costs) applicable to flood prevention ai
related features shall be borne by the Federal government, (e) agr
to make satisfactory arrangements for defraying the cost of operatii
and maintaining such works, and (f) construct or let contracts f
improvements on privately owned property.
Limitations on Size of Projects and Structures
No project under this legislation shall embrace a watershed or su
watershed area in excess of 250,000 acres nor shall any single structu
have a floodwater detention capacity of more than 5,000 acre-feet nor
total capacity of more than 25,000 acre-feet.
The authors are informed that by March 1, 1959, the U. S. Depa
ment of Agriculture had received 22 applications for approval of su
watershed projects in Louisiana. Nine such applications had been c
proved by the Department for preparation of a work plan. Four \
these had been approved for operation and, in one, construction wo|
was underway. The sponsoring local organization in all of these proje
has been a soil conservation district. A town council was co-sponsor
one project. It may be noted that the enabling legislation regarding s-
conservation districts, as amended in 1956, has broadened the ^
thorized purposes of such districts so as expressly to include the prev(j
tion of floodwater and sediment damages and the furtherance of t
conservation, development, utilization, and disposal of water.^^?
427 See Soil Conservation Districts, supra, for a more detailed discussion of th, ;
functions. The Attorney General has stated that soil conservation districts may
as "local organizations" under this federal legislation. See opinion dated January
1955, of Mr. Carrol Buck, 2nd Assistant Attorney General, State of Louisiana.
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The project under construction is in the Bayou Dupont Watershed
n Natchitoches and Sabine parishes. The project embraces 56,610
cres. Its primary purpose is the prevention of floodwater and sediment
lamages. In this connection, soil and water conservation practices will
be carried out voluntarily on individual farms, and the Upper West Red
liver Soil Conservation District (which is the sponsoring organization)
las awarded contracts to private contractors for the construction of 8
if 22 contemplated floodwater-retarding structures (dams and reser-
oirs) within the watershed.^^s
The other projects that had been approved for operation are the
Jpper Bayou Nezpique Watershed project (embracing an area of 214,-
lOO acres), the Upper West Fork of Cypress Bayou V/atershed project
'5,500 acres) and the Bear Creek Watershed (13,500 acres) . A primary
)urpose of each project is the same as the Bayou Dupont project—the
>revention of floodwater and sediment damage. However, the Upper
Vest Fork project also includes provisions for supplying Plain Dealing
vith city water when the need arises, and water for fish and wildlife
ievelopment, while the Bear Creek project includes provisions for the
Irainage of wet lands.
The five additional projects that had been approved for planning
,nd their stated purposes are (1) the Johnson Bayou (drainage and
lood prevention), (2) the Bayou Rapides (irrigation), (3) the Big
)itch. Pleasant Valley, and Scarborough Creek (prevention of flood-
water and sediment damage) , (4) the Beaver Button, Bentley Hollow,
nd Cook Creek (prevention of floodwater and sediment damage) water-
hed projects, and (5) Baker Canal (flood prevention and drainage) .*29
j
Interstate Compacts
labine River Compact and Administration
In 1953, Louisiana and Texas entered into a compact regarding the
distribution and use of the waters of the Sabine River watershed.^^o
The compact deals only with distribution and use of the waters,
t being set forth at the outset that:
428 It may be noted that in 1956, the Legislature appropriated funds for the
department of Public Works to expend in construction of dams, reservoirs, and re-
lied structures so as to regulate the flow of Bayou Dupont (La. Acts 1956, No. 421) .
ut a 1957 amendment limited the department's authority to expend these funds
D the purposes of "making water resources studies and in developing irrigation and
ater conservation projects" acting alone or in cooperation with other agencies or
listricts. (La. Acts 1957, No. 14.)
f 420 The above description of watershed projects is based on information supplied
y Mr. H. B. Martin, State Conservationist, Soil Conservation Service, U.S.D.A.,
lexandria, La. A publication entitled "Facts About the Watershed Protection and
lood Prevention Act" may be obtained from his office.
t 430 The compact was signed January 26, 1953. It was ratified, approved, and
iDnfirmed by the Louisiana Legislature by Acts 1954, No. 36, L.S.A.-R.S. 38:2329 et.
kq.; by the Texas Legislature, by Acts 1953, ch. 63, Vernons Ann. Tex. Civ. St.
.rt. 7466 i; and by Congress by the Act of Aug. 10, 1954, c.668, 68 stat. 690.
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The Sabine River Compact provides for the equitable apportionment of the wate
of the Sabine River between the states of Louisiana and Texas. As used in th
Compact, "Stateline reach" extends from "Stateline," which is a point just north
Logansport, La., to Sabine Lake.
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It is recognized that pollution abatement and salt water intrusion
are problems which are of concern to the States of Louisiana and
Texas, but inasmuch as this Compact is limited to the equitable
apportionment of the waters of the Sabine River and its tribu-
taries between the States of Louisiana and Texas, this Compact
does not undertake the solution of those problems.^^i
The compact is intended to settle any present or future controversy
Detween the states concerning the use of the waters of the Sabine
Reiver where it forms the border of Texas and Louisiana. The point at
tvhich the waters in downstream flow first touch both states is defined
:o be the "Stateline/'^^s (See page 106.) Above the Stateline, Texas has
free and unrestricted use of all waters of the river and its tributaries,
subject to certain provisions.*^^ One of these provisions is that nothing
n the compact shall be construed as affecting any present or future
ights or powers of the United States in, to, and over the waters of
:he Sabine River Basin. The other provision is that neither state may
reduce the flow of the river so that its flow at the Stateline falls to
ess than 36 cubic feet per second. ^^s Reservoirs and permits above the
jtateline existing as of January 1, 1953, are not liable for maintenance
)f this flow, but those reservoirs on which construction was commenced
ifter this date are liable for m.aintaining such flow. It should be noted
that minimum flows of less than 36 cubic feet per second have been
recorded in the past at the Logansport gauge, which is to be the
^auge at which the Stateline flow is to be determined under the com-
pact.*3^ Apparently, all Texas reservoirs on which construction was
started after January 1, 1953, and which lie in the Sabine watershed will
be required to contribute water to help maintain a flow of 36 cubic feet
per second, even if the flow that would "naturally" reach the gauge
^vould be less than 36 cubic feet.^^s
Before discussing the way in which the waters are apportioned be-
tween the states, it is necessary to set forth certain additional definitions
3f terms as used in the compact:
431 L.S.A.-R.S. 38:2329.
432 L.S.A.-R.S. 38:2329, Sabine River Compact, Article I (a) . The compact pro-
I'ides that "Stateline" as defined therein shall not be construed to define the
ictual boundary between the two states and that nothing in the compact shall
:onstitute an admission by either state regarding its actual location.
,
433 L.S.A.-R.S. 38:2329, Sabine River Compact, Article IV.
434 Id, Article X.
435 Id, Article V (b) (1) .
436 Marsh, Reports on the Surface Water Supply of Louisiana, to September 30,
1938, Department of Conservation, Louisiana Geological Survey (In cooperation with
United States Department of the Interior, Geological Survey) , p. 138.
j
437 L.S.A.-R.S. 38:2329, Sabine River Compact, Article 1 (c) .
438 But "no reservoir shall be liable for a greater percentage of this minimum
flow than the percentage of the drainage area above the Stateline contributing to that
reservoir, exclusive of the watershed of any reservoir on which construction was
{Started prior to January 1, 1953." L.S.A.-R.S. 38:2329, Sabine River Compact, Article
V(b) (3).
439 L.S.A.-R.S. 38:2329, Sabine River Compact, Article I.
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The term "Waters of the Sabine River" means the waters eithe:
originating in the natural drainage basin of the Sabine River, o
appearing as streamflow in said River and its tributaries, from it
headwater source down to the mouth of the River where it enter
into Sabine Lake . . .
The term "Stateline reach" means that portion of the Sabine Rive
lying between the Stateline and Sabine Lake . . .
The term "Domestic use" means the use of water by an individual
or by a family unit or household for drinking, cookin,g, laundei
ing, sanitation, and other personal comforts and necessities; am
for the irrigation of an area not to exceed one acre, obtained d:
rectly from the Sabine River or its tributaries by an individus
or family unit, not supplied by a water company, water district, o
municipality . . .
The term "stock water use" means the use of water for any am
all livestock and poultry . . .
The term "consumptive use" means use of water resulting in if
permanent removal from the stream . . .
The terms " 'domestic' and 'stock water' reservoir" m.ean any re
ervoir for either or both of such uses having a storage capacity (
fifty (50) acre-feet or less . . .
"Stored water" means water stored in reservoirs (exclusive of d(
mestic or stock water reservoirs) or water withdrawn or release
from reservoirs for specific uses and their identifiable return flo
from such uses . . .
The term "free water" means all waters other than "stored wateri
in the Stateline reach including, but not limited to, that appea
ing as natural streamflow and not withdrawn or released from
reservoir for specific uses. Waters released from reservoirs for tl
purpose of maintaining streamflows (at Stateline) shall 1
"free water." All reservoir spills or releases of stored waters mac
in anticipation of spills, shall be free water.
The basic provision for the apportionment of the waters is that a
"free water" in the Stateline reach is to be divided equally betwee
the two states. Each state has the right to withdraw its share of tl
water from the channel of the Sabine River, but all points of diversic
must be recorded and approved by the Sabine River Compact Admi
istration (discussed below) as well as "the State agency charged with tl
administration of the water laws" of the state in which the diversic
point is located. jj- further provided that:
Neither State shall withdraw at any point more than its share
the flow at any point except, that pursuant to findings and d
termination of the administration as provided under Article V
of this Compact, either State may withdraw more or less of its sha
440 Authors' insertion.
441 Id, Article V (a) .
442 Id, Article VII (g) (5) .
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of the water at any point provided that its aggregate withdrawal
shall not exceed its total share.
Except for jointly stored water (discussed below) , each state must
ivithdraw its apportionment of the freewater flow as it occurs with no
allowance of accumulation of debits or credits. A failure to use the ap-
portioned share does not constitute a relinquishment of the right to
future use, nor does it give the right to future use in excess of the
apportioned share.***
Waters stored in reservoirs constructed by the States in the State-
line reach shall be shared by each State in proportion to its con-
tribution to the cost of storage. Neither State shall have the right
to construct a dam on the Stateline reach without the consent of
the other State.**^
The states may vary the rate and manner of withdrawal of their
jhares of these jointly stored waters. They may not, however, withdraw
nore than their pro-rata share in any one year except by authority of
:he administration.
In the apportionment of waters, domestic and stock water uses are
excluded, as are domestic and stock water reservoirs.**^ If either state
Duilds reservoir storage on the tributaries of the Sabine located wholly
Arithin its boundaries and below the stateline, any reduction in the
low of the Sabine resulting from such storage is deducted from the
;tate's share of the waters; conversely, any increase in the Sabine's flow
:rom released water from these reservoirs is added to the state's share.**^
In summary, it appears, that each state is entitled to half of the flow
3f the Sabine from the Stateline to Sabine Lake. Taken into account in
determining this share is the effect on the flow of any storage of water
m the tributaries that enter the river below the Stateline. Waters used
for domestic and stock water uses are ignored.
I 443 Id, Article V(f).
This sentence would seem to imply that a state is limited in its withdrawals to
lalf of the free water flow at any particular point of withdrawal, with the exception
hat the administration may find and determine that at any particular point one
tate may withdraw more than this amount, so long as its aggregate withdrawals do
lot amount to more than its share. In other words, it would seem that the sentence
vas intended to provide for administration authorization of withdrawals amounting
0 more than a state's share at any particular withdrawal point. There appears, how-
Jver, to be one possible difficulty with this interpretation; which is, that, as far as
he authors have been able to determine, there is rio provision in Article VII em-
jowering the administration to make such a determination. Because of this, it is
x)ssible that the sentence means merely that a state may withdraw more than its
hare at any particular point if the findings of the administration are that the with-
Irawal will not place the aggregate withdrawal of the state at more than its share.
:n other words, possibly a state might withdraw any amount of water at any par-
icular point so long as it does not exceed its total aggregate withdrawals as de-
ermined by the administration.
444 L.S.A.-R.S. 38:2329, Sabine River Compact, Article V (i) .
445 Id, Article V (g) .
446 Id, Article V (h) .
447 Id, Article V (j) .
448 Id, Article V (d)
.
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Except for the provision relating to storage of water on tributarie
there appears to be no provision relating to the states' use of the watej
of these tributaries, nor to the division between the two states of thet
waters. It is possible, however, that the same provisions that app^
to the Sabine itself apply also to its tributaries. Article V of the con
pact begins with the phrase, "Texas and Louisiana hereby agree upo
the following apportionment of the waters of the Sabine River . .
"Waters of the Sabine River" are defined in Article I, set forth abov
to include the tributaries of the Sabine. This, along with the abov
quoted statement at the outset of the compact, indicates that the i
tention of the compact is to apportion the waters of tributaries as wCj
as the waters of the Sabine. But no Fater provision clearly spells ot|
that tributaries are to be apportioned between the states. Article V
does provide that any point of diversion on the tributaries and ti
Sabine River must be approved by the administration,**^ and this wou
indicate that the waters of the tributaries are to be treated as tl
Sabine River itself. Possibly then, the intention of the compact i
that tributaries are also to be divided equally between the states
the same way as the Sabine.
The administration is officially entitled the "Sabine River Coi-
pact Administration." It consists of two members from each state ai[
of one nonvoting member chosen by the President of the United Stat J
to represent the Federal government. This member is ex-officio chairm:ji
of the administration. The Director of the Louisiana Department f
Public Works serves as an ex-officio member; the other member isji
resident of the Sabine Watershed and is appointed to a four-year term.!
The administration has the power to make regulations consistei
with the provisions of the compact.*^! It can employ such personnel i
eluding engineering and legal personnel, as it deems necessary.*^^
to collect and analyze all factual data necessary or proper for the adm^
istration of the compact, including streamflows, water uses and div
sions, supplies, and storage.*^^ jj- investigate all violations of t
compact and report its findings to the states as it deems fitting. It c
acquire and hold all property necessary for the performance of its fui •
tions and duties under the compact.*^*
Findings of fact made by the administration are not conclusive [|
any court, agency, or tribunal, but unless they are satisfactorily rebutt
they constitute evidence. ^ quorum for any meeting consists of thi
voting (state) members, each of whom has one vote. Each decision '
determination requires the concurring vote of three members.*^^
j
449 Id, Article VII (g) (5) .
"
450 Id, Articles VII (a) to VII (c) .
451 Id, Article VII (1) .
,
452 Id, Article VII (f) (3) . ,
453 Id, Article VII (f) (1) , (g) . ,
454 Id, Articles VII (g) (7) and (8) . ,
455 Id, Article VII (i) .
,
456 Id, Article VII (e) .
^
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In case of a tie vote, arbitration is provided for. Each side is to
hoose an arbitrator, and the third is to be chosen by the two arbitrators.
i the arbitrators fail to select a third arbitrator within 10 days, he shall
36 chosen by the representative of the United States.
It is explicitly provided in the compact that all rights to any of
he waters which have been obtained in accordance with the laws of
he state are recognized and affirmed. It is further provided, however,
hat withdrawal of water for the satisfaction of such rights is subject
o the availability of supply in accordance with the apportionment of
vater provided under the compact. Apparently, then, riparian rights
ire not to be affected by the compact, except that the taking of water
mder these rights cannot be so great as to use up more than the share
ipportioned to the state. It is further provided that withdrawals by
he states shall not impair or prejudice the existing rights of users of
Jabine River waters. It is not clear whether these provisions protecting
iparian rights extend to allowing new diversion by riparian owners
vithout the administration's approval of the diversion point as pro-
dded for in Article VII.**^o In any event, it appears that private uses
)f water legally exercised prior to enactment of the compact are not
o be infringed upon except to the extent that they might amount to
L use of more than the state's share of the waters.
In the course of its operations, the administration has issued a per-
mit to the city of Logansport to use water from the Sabine River, fol-
owing a similar permit by the Sabine River Authority. (See Sabine
liver Authority.) It has also collected and maintained information on
he various existing uses of water from the river and its tributaries.
)ther Interstate Agreements and Arrangements
Another interstate compact into which the state of Louisiana has
ntered (along with Florida, Mississippi, Alabama, and Texas) is the
julf States Marine Fisheries Compact. The purpose of this compact
s to promote the better utilization of the fisheries of the seaboard of
he Gulf of Mexico.4fii
In 1955, Congress specifically authorized the states of Louisiana,
Texas, Arkansas, and Oklahoma to negotiate with respect to the formula-
ion of an interstate compact providing for an equitable apportionment
)f the waters of the Red River and its tributaries. Such negotiations were
n progress in January 1959.^^2
Polluted water coming into the state from other states has been
he source of some difficulty in Louisiana. interstate compact with
457 Id, Article VII (j) •
458 Id, Article III.
459 Id, Article V (f) .
460 Id, Article VII (g) (5) .
461 See L.S.A.-R.S. 56:41 et. seq.
462 69 Stat. 654.
463 See Water Problems in the Southeastern States, Louisiana Legislative Council
Research Study No. 11 (Dec, 1957), pp. 23-27.
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respect to the control of such pollution had been entered into b
Louisiana as of January 1959.^^* Some action has been taken, howevei
under the Federal Water Pollution Control Act.*''^ In addition to pre
viding for Federal financial assistance and technical services to state;
interstate agencies, and municipalities for pollution abatement, this a(
provides that the Federal government may take action to secure th
abatement of the pollution of interstate waters in certain circumstance
The act is administered by the Surgeon General of the Public Healt
Service, under the supervision of the Secretary of Health, Education, an
Welfare.
Whenever the U. S. Surgeon General, "on the basis of reports, su
veys, or studies, has reason to believe" that the pollution of interstai
waters is occurring,*^^ or if requested by a governor or state water po
lution control agency, "he shall give formal notification" to the stal
water pollution control agency (or any interstate agency) of the sta'
or states in which the pollution is discharged and shall call a confe
ence of the agencies in the respective states. After such conference,
he believes that the health or welfare of persons in another state
endangered and effective progress is not being made to abate sue
pollution in the state in which the pollution is discharged, he sha
recommend that necessary remedial action be taken by the appropria
water pollution control agency. If appropriate steps are not taken withi
a specified time, the U. S. Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfa:
is to call a public hearing to be held before an appointed board in (
near the area in which pollution originates. The board shall determii
whether appropriate steps have been taken to abate the pollution an
if not, it may recommend reasonable and equitable measures to be cs
ried out. If measures reasonably calculated to abate the pollution a
not carried out within an additional specified time after proper noti
to the persons discharging the polluting material and the appropria
state agency or agencies, the Secretary (with the written consent
appropriate agencies or officials in the state in which the pollution
discharged or at the request of appropriate agencies or officials in ai
of the states affected thereby) may request the U. S. Attorney Gener
to bring a suit on behalf of the United States to secure abatement
the pollution.
464 The Federal Water Pollution Control Act encourages and permits negotiati
of such interstate compacts, although they shall not be binding on any state until "<
proved by the Congress."
465 62 Stat. 1155 (1948), as amended by 70 Stat. 498 (1956); 33 U.S.C.A. sec. ^
et. seq.
466 Interstate waters are defined for this purpose as "all rivers, lakes ,and otl
waters that flow across, or form a part of, boundaries between two or more State
The pollution of interstate waters in or adjacent to any state or states (whether i
polluting material is discharged directly into such waters or reaches such waters af
discharge into a tributary thereof) , which endangers the health or welfare of p
sons in another state shall be subject to abatement as provided in the act.
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The State Stream Control Commission and others in Louisiana
requested the Federal government to intervene in connection with the
pollution of the Corney Creek drainage system. Corney Creek arises in
Arkansas and flows into Louisiana, then through Corney Lake and
orney Bayou into Bayou D'Arbonne, which flows into the Ouachita
Eliver. A five-member Hearing Board appointed by the Secretary of
Health. Education, and Welfare held a hearing at Homer, La., on
fanuary 16, 1957. It found that certain operators of oil-well leases
A^ere "discharging substantial quantities of salt brines of an acid
lature, oil spillage, and other substances" into the drainage system
n Arkansas, "flowing through said system into Louisiana, thereby pro-
lucing excessive and abnormal salinity and abnormally low pH value
n said waters, causing and contributing to the pollution thereof . . ."
The board found that such discharges were destroying large numbers of
fish and other aquatic plants and animals and made the waters unfit for
ishing, recreation, stock watering, irrigation, and municipal and most
ndustrial uses. The board concluded that such pollution should be
topped and recommended that this be accomplished by injecting the
Dolluting substances into underground formations.*^^ The board's rec-
ommendation has been complied with by the offenders.*^^
467 The board noted that this method of disposal was "being successfully used by
substantial majority of the other operators of . . . oil well leases in the watershed
)f said Corney Drainage System." See Findings and Recommendations of the Hearing
3oard in the Matter of Pollution of the Interstate Waters of the Corney Drainage
ystem, Arkansas-Louisiana. See also Water Problems in the Southeastern States,
upra, note 463, at pp. 26-27.
468 Based on information supplied by Murray Stein, Chief, Interstate Enforcement
lection, Water Supply and Water Pollution Control Program, Public Health Service,
J.S. Dept. of Health, Education, and Welfare. For a summary of activities in the
Jnited States under the Federal Water Pollution Control Act. see Mr. Stein's paper
'ntitled "Cleaning Up Our Water," presented at the Briefing Conference on Water
Resources, sponsored by the Federal Bar Association in cooperation with the Bureau
•f National Affairs, Inc., held on May 22-23, 1958, in Washington, D. C.
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Appendix
Some Provisions of the Louisiana Civil Code and
Revised Statutes Relative to Water That Are
Frequently Cited in This Bulletin
L.S.A.-Civil Code, Article 450
Things which are common, are those the ownership o£ which belong
to nobody in particular, and which all men may freely use, conformabl
with the use tor which nature has intended them such as air, runnin
water, the sea and its shores.
L.S.A.-Civil Code, Article 660
It is a servitude due by the estate situated below to receive th
waters which run naturally from the estate situated above, provide
the industry of man has not been used to create that servitude.
The proprietor below is not at liberty to raise any dam, or to mak
any other work, to prevent this running of the waters.
The proprietor above can do nothing whereby the natural servituc
due by the estate below may be rendered more burdensome.
L.S.A.-Civil Code, Article 661
He whose estate borders on running water, may use it as it run
for the purpose of watering his estate, or for other purposes.
He through whose estate water runs, whether it originates there (
passes from lands above, may make use of it, while it runs over h
lands; but he cannot stop or give it another direction, and is boun
to return it to its original channel, where it leaves his estate.
L.S.A.-Revised Statutes, 9:1101
The waters of and in all bayous, rivers, streams, lagoons, lakes ar
bays, and the beds thereof, not under the direct ownership of any pe
son on August 12, 1910, are declared to be the property of the stat
There shall never be any charge assessed against any person for tl
use of the waters of the state for municipal, industrial, agricultural, <
domestic purposes.
While acknowledging the absolute supremacy of the United Stat
of America over the navigation on the navigable waters within tl
borders of the state, it is hereby declared that the ownership of tl
water itself and the beds thereof in the said navigable waters is vest(
in the state and that the state has the right to enter into possession
these waters when not interfering with the control of navigation ex(
cised thereon by the United States of America. This Section shall n
affect the acquisition of property by alluvion or accretion.
All transfers and conveyances or purported transfers and convf
ances made by the state of Louisiana to any levee district of the sta
of any navigable waters and the beds and bottoms thereof are herel
rescinded, revoked and canceled.
This Section is not intended to interfere with the acquisition in go<
faith of any waters or the beds thereof transferred by the state or
agencies prior to August 12, 1910. i
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